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PREFACE

The topic for this investigation has grown
out of a longstanding
commitment to the importance of intellectual
freedom to democracy and
to education.

The point of view taken is deeply rooted in the
liberal,

democratic tradition

a tradition which has historically been committed

to the betterment of social and individual life
through education and

schooling, and to a process of social change achieved through
the

laborious and incremental restructuring of institutions.

It expresses

a belief in human dignity and in the possibility of the full develop-

®®nt of individual capacities through intelligent and free inc^uiry.
And it is consonant with the idea put forth by John Dewey that the dis-

tinguishing feature of a democratic society is its dedication to social
change that leads to growth or improvement.

Implicit in the idea of

grovrth is an underlying conception of democracy as a way of life.

Dewey said,

As

"A democracy is more than a form of government; it is pri-

marily a mode of associated living, of conjoint communicated experience."
The case around which much of the work for this project has focused
is Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District

.

It is a

case which reaffirmed that students and teachers retain their constitutional rights while in school at a time when the hierarchical nature of

educational institutions and an attitude of paternalism toward students
had led many people to ignore or forget our basic societal commitment to
the principles of freedom, equality, and human dignity.

Despite the

uniqueness of their respective vocational positions, both teachers and
students are people.

They are also citizens who are entitled to a full

panoply of rights while in school.
V

The purpose of the present investigation was to discover how the

Tinker case has been used to promote or hinder the development of a
climate of intellectual freedom in the public school setting.

More gen-

erally, the purpose was to discover if the spirit of Tinker is thriving
in the schools and in the courts as seen from cases where issues of intel-

lectual freedom have arisen and been resolved.

Chapter

I

provides information on the purpose and importance of

free speech from a historical perspective.

Chapter II suggests the re-

lationship between intellectual freedom and education in a democratic
society; and it describes and analyzes the Tinker case and some of the

means courts have used to implement free speech.

Chapters III, IV, and V

present the results of an investigation of how the state and federal
courts have dealt with intellectual freedom in public schools in the post-

Tinker period.

And Chapter VI presents conclusions which can reasonably

be draim from the investigation and recommendations for the more effec-

tive realization of the ideal of freedom of intercommunication in public
schools.
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In the famous black armband case of Tinker v. Des Moines

,

decided

in 1969, the Supreme Court declared that students were persons and that

both students and teachers were entitled to exercise their constitutional
rights while in school.

It is generally believed that this case helped

to usher in a new era of judicial protection of the fundamental consti-

tutional rights of teachers and students.

The purpose of this disser-

tation was to discover whether the propositions and the philosophy of

Tinker have been used by state and federal courts to support intellectual freedom in public schools.

The philosophical framework of this project is derived from the
liberal, democratic tradition, with its belief in human dignity and in
the possibility of the full development of individual capacities through

intelligent and free inquiry.

The first two chapters survey various

examine
interpretations of the purpose and importance of free speech and
in a
the special importance of intellectual freedom for education

democratic society.
intellectual
Against this background, cases involving issues of

vii
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—

freedom for teachers and stiidents in public schools were
analyzed.

Consideration was given to how the courts have balanced the preferred
right of free speech with the unique needs and purposes of public
schools.

The student’s right to speak and not to speak; to know and

not to know were examined in a wide variety of situations involving
oral and written speech.

The scope

aind

limits of the teacher's

freedom to speak and not to speak in school and classroom situations

were considered.

From the above analysis it was concluded that the major importance
of the Tinker case has been its recognition and reassertion of a phil-

osophy toward children which respects their individuality and uniqueness.
Students, despite their special role, are people who retain their consti-

tutional rights wherever they go.

To curtail those rights

— especially

the fundamental right of free speech so important to education itself

requires extraordinary justification, not merely reasonable justification.

By analogy, teachers, too, are people who retain their consti-

tutional rights while in school.

While the right of free speech which

students and teachers retain must be adjusted to the special characteristics of the school environment, it must also be especially protected
and promoted in order to facilitate the educational process.

Judging from the relevant cases which have arisen and been reported
from 1969 - 1979 , school officials often act to promote institutional

order at the expense of freedom of expression.

In resolving these

conflicts, courts have shown a relatively speech-protective approach
of speechin about half of the cases considered and a relative lack

protectiveness in about a quarter of the cases considered.
viii

If it is

Assiunod, Es SGcms likely, thst the contosticd &nd repoTTod c^ses repTo*

sent particularly egregious instances of institutional repressiveness,
the degree of support that intellectual freedom has been given by the

courts does not appear outstanding.

There is still much to be done to protect intellectual freedom in
educational settings.

Neither educators nor judges have fully realized

that while the public school is a place where speech occasionally may

have to be curtailed to advance important educational objectives, it is
also a place where it should arguably be protected and promoted more

than in any other.

A school is a unique place primarily because it is

dedicated to teaching and learning.

Intellectual freedom not only ad-

vances this purpose, but it is the principal end of education in a

democracy as well.

ix
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CHAPTER
FREEDOM OF SPEECH:

I

THE HISTORY OF AN IDEA

If there is any principle of the Constitution that more
imperatively calls for attachment than any other it is
the principle of free thought--not free thought for those
who agree with us but freedom for the thought that we hate.

Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.
U.S. V. Schwimmer (1928)

Introduction

The definition of freedom of speech, intellectual freedom, or, as
it is sometimes called, tolerance

— its

scope, limits, purposes and inm

portance and the means for its realization
political, and legal philosophy.

— is

a vital matter of social,

It is a definition that has evolved

historically and which continues to evolve, so that it will vary depending upon the culture and time in which it is discussed.

Even cultures

which place high value on the principle of intellectual freedom can
implement that principle according to very different understandings of
its importance and purpose.

This can be illustrated by the example of

the second Moscow International Book Fair which took place in September

of 1979.

According to the conditions for participation, books which

advocated war or racial or national exclusiveness, were offensive to the
national dignity of other exhibitors, were anti-Soviet in character, or

were considered pornographic or incompatible with public morals were not
to be admitted.

Pursuant to this policy, Soviet censors confiscated

more than forty books from the exhibits of American publishers.

In

of
defense of the official action of Soviet authorities, the chairman

1

2

the State Committee for Publishing Houses, Boris Stukalin,- argued:

"Books of that nature do not bring people closer together and do not

serve the cause of detente.

Instead, they stir up hatred and hostility

between people and hamper the process of detente."^

Mr. Stukalin fur-

ther elaborated that book censorship of this sort was not a violation

of the principle of free speech:

"This is the highest affirmation of

freedom of speech, since freedom to propagandize fascism is the kind of

freedom that all honest people in our country and in other countries
must oppose."

2

The implication appears to be that peace and preserva-

tion of the Soviet way of life are overriding values, and further that

they are values which must be protected as practical and moral necessities to the effective realization of freedom of speech itself.

Suppres-

sion is thus justified as a means to the end of freedom.
In 1923, C.E. Ruthenberg, the National Secretary of the Workers'

Party of America, explained that while the principle of free speech was
not opposed by Communists, it was first necessary to bring about the

conditions which would give epual opportunity for freedom of speech to
all.

Those conditions would exist when the educational system and the

means of communication were no longer controlled by the dominant capi-

talist class.

"We believe that in our fight for Communism we are also

make real
fighting for those conditions which will, for the first time,
all groups and
freedom of speech, through putting on a basis of equality

individuals in the social order.
to the mind
This point of view, which seems somewhat paradoxical

but is on the ascent in
nurtured in the liberal tradition, is not new

contemporary political philosophy.

It has been elaborated most recently

3

in the United States by the late professor and
philosopher Herbert

Marcuse who argued that because we are ’’enslaved by
institutions that

vitiate self-determination,” pure tolerance must not be
permitted.
Freedom of expression must not be allowed to ’’protect false words
and

wrong deeds which demonstrate that they contradict and counteract
the
possibilities of liberation.”

Because of the emergency situation pre-

sently faced by our society, Marcuse would allow the inevitably small
groups who have attained ’’maturity of [their] faculties” to decide on

what would be tolerated for all.

Marcuse argued that, given present

conditions, censorship is necessary to bring about the development of

conditions that would be liberating and humanizing.
The Marcusian philosophy was adopted by one student member of the

committee which examined freedom of expression at Yale University in
1974.

The committee, which was chaired by the noted historian

C.

Vann

Woodward, was formed after an incident in April of 1974 where Professor

William Shockly of Snanford University was physically prevented from
speaking at Yale because of his controversial views concerning genetic

differences between races.

KOnneth J. Barnes, a law student and gradu-

ate student in economics, argued that free speech cannot become a possi-

bility until we are liberated from unequal power relations, an oppressive ideology, and irrational factors which condition knowledge.

He

concluded that ”[u]nder certain circumstances, free expression is out-

weighed by more pressing issues, including liberation of all oppressed
people and equal opportunities for minority groups.”^

Like Marcuse,

Barnes assumed that liberation can plausibly be brought about through

temporary suppression of certain ideas.

4

These attacks on the traditional liberal notions of
free speech which
emmanate from the political left are joined by perhaps
more virulent
attacks from the political right

— more

virulent because they question

the basic value of intellectual freedom as well as the
means used to

implement it.

The most violent incident of attempted censorship of

ideas that has taken place in recent years occurred throughout the

summer and fall of 1974 in Kanawah Coxmty, West Virginia.

*

A local

school board member, various fundamentalist religious groups and an

organization called Christian American Parents mounted a crusade against
three hundred different language arts textbooks.

Although the attempted

censorship was eventually unsuccessful, there were picketing, strikes,
boycotts, and violence which led to the closing of the public bus system,
a trucking terminal, mines, and several stores and factories.

mentary school and several cars were bombed.

One ele-

It has been reported that

many of the same national groups which were active in the attempted censorship in Kanawah County

— including

the Ku Klux Klan, the John Birch

Society, Citizens for Decent Literature, and Citizens for Decency

Through Law

— were

€

involved in incidents in several other states as well.

These illustrations are not given to suggest that incidents such as
the one in Kanawah County are likely to become everyday occurrences, or
in order to advocate the adoption of a radically different perspective

on the function, importance, and means of securing freedom of speech and

intellectual freedom in our society.

They are meant only to illustrate

that the philosophical issues surrounding the theory and methods of in-

tellectual freedom continue to be debated.

Although freedom of speech

it
may not appear to be the most pressing issue of the present decade,

..
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is certainly always an issue of importance.

I

would agree with Zechariah

Chafee, Jr., one of the most prolific defenders of
civil liberties in

American jurisprudence, that, ”[l]iberty of discussion must
itself be

constantly discussed.”^

Is liberty of discussion valuable?

useful to conceive of freedom of speech as an absolute value?

what are its limits?
society?

Is it

If not,

Should it be a value which is prefenred in our

If so, how is this preference to be promoted, and what are the

limits of the preference?

Is intellectual freedom valued as a means, as

an end, or as both?

The remainder of the first chapter will selectively survey some
recurrent themes in the literature of freedom of speech from Plato to
various English and American antecedents.

Special emphasis will be

placed on the purposes and means that have been expressed for the preservation and encouragement of intellectual freedom.

In Chapter II the

interrelationship of these social and individual purposes with the
purposes of contemporary education in the United States will be suggested.

It will be argued that freedom of speech and intellectual freedom

are fundamentally intertwined with the purposes and methods of education.
If free speech can be said to be a necessary requisite to education, it
is also true that behavior that has educative consequences will broaden

and deepen the ability to inquire intellectually and to speak freely and

intelligently.

Freedom of Speech:

"Invaluable Sources”

The recorded tradition of the censorship of thought, belief, and
speech begins in the West with the death of Socrates in 399 B.C.

6

Socrates was officially condemned for corrupting the
youth of Athens and
for believing in new divinities, but his death was surely
as much a

result of the fact that he disturbed the intellectual complacency
of
the Athenian population with his method of cross-examination
and his

scientific approach to issues of human concern.

He called himself a

gadfly to the state— arousing and testing the ideas of the populace.

Although he might have saved himself, Socrates refused to give up his
teaching, affirming that "daily to discourse about 'virtue,' and of

those other things about which you hear me examining myself and others,
is the greatest good of man, and that the unexamined life is not worth

living.

..." 8

Socrates did not defend or justify the importance of

the search for virtue (or excellence) and truth as much as he extolled

and affirmed it by his willingness to "die many times."

It is here in

Plato's account of the trial of Socrates that an early indication of the

notion of truth-getting as a process can be found.

Virtue and truth,

according to Socrates, arise through continual discourse and questioning.
Just as Socrates believed that the unexamined life was not worth
living so John Milton believed that the freedom to know and to speak

freely was the most important freedom:

"Give me the liberty to know,

to utter, and to argue freely according to conscience, above all

liberties."^

In "A Speech for the Liberty of Unlicensed Printing,"

the Areopagetica

,

composed in 1644, Milton made an eloquent plea to

redress what he saw as the evils of censorship.

In one of the most

censorstrilcing passages, Milton personifies books and analogizes their

ship and destruction to the killing of reason itself.

7

We should be wary therefore what persecution
we raise
against the living labours of public men, how we
spill that
seasoned life of man, preserved and stored up in books;
since
we see a kind of homicide may be thus committed,
sometimes a
martyrdom, and if it extend to the whole impression, a kind
of massacre; whereof the execution ends not in the slaying
of
an elemental life, but strikes at that eternal and fifth
essence, the breath. of reason itself, slays an immortality
rather than a life.
But censorship, according to Milton, kills more than reason, it also

kills truth.

Viewing truth more perhaps as a thing to be got once and

for all rather than as something in the process of redefinition, Milton

uses his famous battle metaphor to argue that licensing is "weakness and

cowardice in the wars of Truth" and to argue that truth will be victorious if allowed to fight freely:

And though all the winds of doctrine were let loose to play
upon the earth, so Truth be in the field, we do injuriously
by licensing and prohibiting, to misdoubt her strength. Let
her and Falsehood grapple; who ever toew Truth put to the
worse, in a free and open encounter?
In addition to allowing for the development and expression of

reason and the discovery of truth, Milton believed that freedom of

communication was instrumental in the development of a shared though
diverse culture and the promotion of progressive change.

He believed

that a nation was a harmony of differences that come about through

natural interaction of individuals within a culture and not through an
imposed unity which would lead to "a gross conforming stupidity, a stark
and dead congealment of wood and hay and stubble, forced and frozen

together.

.

.

With mocking irony, Milton speaks of the kind of

unanimity that would be wrought by a cessation of learning:

"How goodly

and how to be wished were such an obedient unanimity as this, what a
fine conformity would it starch us all into!

Doubtless a staunch and

8

solid piece of framework, as any January could
freeze together.
But for Milton, as for Socrates before him,
the virtue of intell-

ectual freedom was more than its instrumental service
to the discovery

of truth for social purposes.

Just as Socrates believed that every

good of human beings both public and private derived from
virtue, so

Milton believed that knowledge was a "flowery crop," a "new light" and
that the lack of intellectual freedom was an affront both to learning

itself and to individual human dignity.

Censorship is "the greatest

displeasure and indignity to a free and knowing spirit" as well as an
"undervaluing and vilifying of the whole Nation.

Learning, discourse,

the use of human reason--these are things to be valued for themselves
and as an affirmation of respect for human dignity as well as for their

role in social change and cultiiral evolution.
It was left to John Stuart Mill in his 1859 essay "On Liberty" to

fully express the cardinal principle of the liberal tradition.

That

principle is expressed in a quote by Wilhelm Von Humboldt with which
Mill chose to introduce his essay.

The selection demonstrates that

for Mill the "absolute and essential importance of human development in
its richest diversity" is the primary goal of all liberty.

Like

Milton and Socrates before him. Mill believed that the liberty of first
importance was that of thought, speech and writing.

He presents what is

widely considered to be the classic liberal argument for freedom of
expression.

Since hiiman beings are fallable, intellectual freedom is

needed to discover, enlarge, and affirm an understanding of truth.
Mill believed that we need to allow our most warranted beliefs to be

open to challenge and correction of error.

Although perhaps too

9

simplistic by

modem standards, expression of opinion

was to be abso-

lutely privileged, according to Mill, unless it would directly harm

specific individuals.

Just as for Socrates and Milton, the truth-seeking function of
intellectual freedom is of major importance for Mill.

Unlike Milton,

however, who felt that truth emerged from a battle. Mill believed that
the more common case was that conflicting doctrines "share the truth

between them."

"Truth, in the great practical concerns of life, is so

much a question of the reconciling and combining of opposites.

Truth is not so much ready-made as synergistically created.

.

.

Mill was

also somewhat more realistic than Milton, who felt that truth needed

merely to be stated to be seen for what it was, at least if one looked
at least twice.

Milton said that truth might be prohibited accidentally

because "its first appearance to our eyes is more unsightly and unplausible than many errors.

..." 17

Mill, on the other hand, felt that

truth did not always triumph naturally or survive despite censorship,
but that it was discovered and rediscovered over the course of time.
In addition to the truth-seeking function of intellectual freedom,

for Mill this liberty also provided protection against tyrannical gov-

ernments and led to the improvement of the htoman condition.

Mill saw

more clearly than others the function of intellectual freedom in allowunderstanding for the interpretation of experience, thereby deepening
ing and making individual human experience more meaningful.

In this

and philosregard Mill presaged those twentieth century psychologists

develop
ophers who have concluded that self, mind, and personality
interaction.
through a process of social and environmental

18

As for t

10

wider social importance of intellectual freedom, there is evidence
that
Mill felt that diversity of opinion— especially religious and philoso-

phical sectarianism--was an evil which would lessen with greater opportunities for freedom of speech.

That Mill hoped for the day when a

higher state of intellectual development would lead to stability and
make diversity of opinion unnecessary suggests that he felt the social

world could arrive at some fixed truth once and for all.

This truth

would then only have to be reaffirmed through continued freedom of
speech so as not to be held as ’’dead dogma."

Although this latter

belief may be controversial, its acceptance or rejection does not detract from Mill’s general argument that expression of opinion is to be

absolutely protected absent personal or public harm, and that the ultimate goal of liberty is the development of individual human beings.

Fourteen years after the appearance of Mill's "On Liberty," James
Fitzjames Stephen, a former student of Mill's, published a critique

which illustrates several controversies that have continued to the present day.^^

Stephen, who was influenced by Thomas Hobbes, felt that

Mill formed "too favourable an estimate of human nature" and that the

result of txnlimited freedom of speech was usually scepticism.

The real difference between Mr. Mill's doctrine and mine is
We agree that the minority are wise and the majority
this.
foolish, but Mr. Mill denies that the wise minority are ever
justified in coercing the foolish majority for their own
good, whereas I affirm that u^ger circumstances they may be
justified in doing so. ..."
nature, and the
The first controversy thus concerns the nature of human

limits of liberty.
ed the chapter.

that openIt echoes the book censorship controversy

11

The second controversy appears when Stephen mounts a more general
attack on what he perceives as Mill’s absolute stand in favor of freedom

of expression of opinion, and asserts in contrast that whether or not
liberty should be allowed is dependent on the situation.
If, however, the object aimed at is good, if the compulsion employed such as to attain it, and if the good obtained
overbalances the inconvenience of the compulsion itself I do '
not understand how, upon utilitarian principles, the compulsion can be bad.^^

Of course, Stephen is correct that an unrefined utilitarianism is not
consistent with the assertion of absolute principles such as liberty

of thought and discussion,

A utilitarian ethical theory would require

that all principles be amenable to adjusted implementation depending

upon the good sought and the means necessary to acheive it.

I

don't

think Mill would disagree except perhaps with the limits of adjustment.
But more generally, the argument that liberty, including intellectual

liberty, is necessarily limited by the particular context in which it is

exercised has been an important and controversial issue to the present
time.

Some

modem jurisprudential scholars have argued

that the importan-

ce of free speech places it in an invulnerable position, where it cannot

when
be defeated and where its force and power are absolute, especially

matters of political importance are concerned.

Justice Black has

it
argued forcefully that when the abridgement of speech is direct

should be absolutely protected.
dora

Others have argued that although free

hierarchy of values
of communication deserves a special place in our

it is not possiwhich is something that Stephen did not argue in 1873,

situation that it should be
ble to say in advance of any particular

12

absolute.

But among the Supreme Court Justices at least,
the position

of the absolutists has never commanded majority support.

A principled

balancing of various values and interests in context, because
it is
pragmatic and empirical, continues to be the dominant philosophy.
The essay by Stephen just discussed along with the ones preceding
it are mentioned in Zechariah Chafee's 1920 and 1941 bibliographies
on

freedom of speech as ’’invaluable” in developing an understanding of the

political and philosophical bases of such freedom.

This is a prereq-

uisite, he feels, to the full understanding of the legal meaning of

freedom of speech.

To the essays discussed above, Chagee adds one

other, ’’The Metaphysical Basis of Toleration” by Walter BAgehot, pub-

lished in 1874.

27

In this essay some themes previously considered are

repeated and some new themes appear for the first time.
Like Socrates, Milton, and Mill before him, Bagehot puts major em-

phasis on the truth-getting function of toleration, which he defines as
the legal protection of the public expression of opinion.

Discussion

’’promotes the progressive knowledge of truth, which is the mainspring of

civilization.”

28

Although it is not clear whether he means to say that

truth is something we come closer to getting the more we engage in dis-

cussion or whether he means that what is considered true changes, there
is at least some indication that truth-getting is an active process

rather than something to be accepted as a given.

Like Milton, Bagehot

believes that truth has an advantage against error if the human mind is
left free to do its logic.

’’Strong and eager minds” play the part of

advocates of opinion, some true and some false.

Meanwhile the ’cooler

people” serve as ’’quasi-judges” in the court of centuries where

’

truth

13

has the best of the proof, and therefore wins most of
the judgments.
So,

Bagehot adds one more metaphor to truth-getting as a search,
a

battle, and a reconcilliation in collision--that of a courtroom drama.

Bagehot is more like Mill's critic Stephen insofar as he shares

Stephen's rather Hobbesean view of human nature.

Bagehot believes that

the desire for persecution or censorship is deeply rooted in human na-

ture and that it is perpetuated more to stop political danger than to

arrest intellectual error.

Although Bagehot does not mention it, this

appears to have been the case with Socrates

perhaps that he was a gadfly to the State.

,

whose greatest sin was
More recent examples of the

desire to arrest political dissent can be illustrated by the appearance

of laws against seditious libel

— laws

aimed at preventing political div-

isiveness and strife by prohibiting certain categories of speech.

Even

if Bagehot is wrong and the major motive for censorship is not to stop

political danger, the maintenance of law and order in the state and in

society has been a recurring justification for suppression of speech.

Although Bagehot argues for freedom of opinion and discussion in
all matters, he does admit that there should be two conditions or limi-

tations to that freedom.

The conditions he presents concern issues of

continued importance, the first to free speech in general and the second
to intellectual freedom in the context of the education of children.

The first limit that Bagehot states if that "[n]o government is bound to

permit a controversy which will annihilate itself:

it is a trustee for

many duties, and if possible it must retain the power to perform those

duties."^®

speech criIn contemporary jurisprudence, the limit of free

presented a
tical of government would be precisely where that speech
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a ’’clear and present danger."

In the language of the most recent defin-

itive Supreme Court case on the issue, advocacy which is

1)

inciting or producing imminent lawless action" and which is

"directed to
2)

"likely

to incite or produce such action" can be prohibited or prevented con-

sistent with the Constitution.

So that while it is true that govern-

ment must not permit a controversy that will annihilate itself, in order
to prevent speech the threat of that annihilation must be intentional,
immediate, and serious.

The second condition to complete liberty of expression that Bagehot
states is that free speech cannot apply to the uncivilized and to child-

ren because such people are incapable of engaging in rational discussion.
Bagehot also believes that before there was a common national character
that a "coercive despotism" was necessary, and that coercion should be

ended only when the rulers determine that the citizens are mature enough
to engage in enlightened interchange.

Although our present liberal

philosophy would deny the necessity of such paternalism with regard to
adults, the argument that Bagehot makes has been much more readily

accepted with regard to children, whom Bagehot analogizes to intellec-

tually immature citizens.
The case is analogous to that of education. Every parent
wisely teaches his child his own creed, and till the child has
attained a certain age it is better that he should not hear
too much of any other. His mind will in the end be better
able to weigh arguments because it does not begin to weigh
them so early; he will hardly comprehend any creed unless he
has been taught some creed: but the restrictions of childhood
must be relaxed in youth and abandoned in manhood. One object
of education is to train us for discussion; and as that traingradually
ing gradually approaches to completeness, we should
The
begin to enter into and to take part in discussion.
pernicious
are
old
years
nine
at
restrictions that are useful
at nineteen. "32
..

IS

Just as citizens need the coercive despotism of their rulers,
so children need that of their parents.

This is an idea that has been accepted

almost without question with regard to the treatment of children and

incompetents in the legal system of twentieth century America.

We are

only now beginning to sort out the illegitimate issues of paternalism
from the legitimate and genuine concerns for the mentally disabled and
for children who are in the process of maturing developmentally.

This

question of the proper balance between education and indoctrination,

between freedom of inquiry and socialization will be seen to be at the
heart of many of the free speech cases presented in the later chapters.

There is one more idea of immediate concern which Bagehot raises
that , although generally discredited by contemporary legal scholars,

continues to appear in legal opinions.

Bagehot tries to draw a dis-

tinction between speech and action analogous to John Stuart Mill’s
attempted distinction between the self and others illustrated by the
assertion that one is at liberty to do anything that does not affect

another adversely.

Bagehot states:

"It is plain, too, that the argu-

ment here applied to the toleration of opinion has no application to
that of actions."

Just as Stephen, the poet John Donne, and others

have made the point that no man is an island, so contemporary legal
scholars have discussed the difficulty or impossibility of determining

whether symbolic behavior, for example, should be classified as speech
or action.

To the extent that one realizes the difficulty of making

may
absolute distinctions between speech and action, the distinction
containing
continue to be useful in understanding free speech cases

elements of both.

The problem is that speech is expressive behavior and
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some action is, as the Supreme Court has realized, very close to
pure
speech.

It is at least necessary to understand that this distinction

has been relied upon heavily in past free speech cases.
it will be relied on in the future is debatable.

Whether or not

Bagehot is not the

first nor the last person to assume that such a distinction could be

made easily and effectively.

Freedom of Speech;

Old and New Themes

The truth- getting function of free speech that had been of primary
importance since the time of Socrates, continued to be thought of as a

principal concern for centuries.

Not only were such writers and scholars

as Milton, Mill, and Bagehot expressing this purpose, but the thought

that the whole truth results from a variety of opinions continued to be

colorfully expressed by commoners and popularizers.

A good example is

Wendell Phillips, a nineteenth century minister and social reformer:
No matter whose the lips that would speak, they must be
Let us believe that the whole of truth can
free and ungagged.
The community
never do harm to the whole of virtue.
most
hated member in
and
humblest
protect
its
dares
not
which
how false or
matter
no
opinions,
of
his
the free utterance
hateful, is only a gang of slaves.
.

.

.

If there is anything in the universe that can't stand
discussion, let it crack. 35
In the first year of the twentieth century, the English philosopher

of truth.
Herbert Spencer reaffirmed freedom of discussion as the agency
experience may
In his Principles of Ethics he states that "regard for
are wholly
reasonably prevent us from assuming that the current beliefs

true.

agency by which
We must recognize free speech as still being the

error is to be dissipated.

..." 36
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Founding fathers, too, expressed their high regard for freedom of
discussion.

Thomas Jefferson, in his 1801 inaugural address, invokes the

battle metaphor of Milton:
If there be any among us who would wish to dissolve this
Union or to change its republican form, let them stand undisturbed as monuments of the safety with which error of opinion
may be tolerated where reason is left free to combat it. 37

And the famous writer and Supreme Court Justice, Oliver Wendell Holmes,
updated Milton's metaphor of a battle to a "marketplace of ideas"

— an

analogy more suited to the twentieth century.
[W]hen men have realized that time has upset many fighting
faiths, they may come to believe even more than they believe
the very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate
good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas that
the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get
.38
itself accepted in the competition of the market.

—

.

.

Zechariah Chafee, as well, reaffirmed the truth-getting function of
freedom of speech in his two seminal works on that subject appearing in
1920 and 1941 respectively.

39

The true meaning of freedom of speech seems to be this.
One of the most important purposes of society and government
is the discovery and spread of truth on subjects of general
concern. This is possible only through absolutely unlimited
.^0
discussion.
.

.

For Chafee, however, freedom of speech was not a romantic, wholly relative method whereby the truth would emerge unaided by the application of

intelligence:
ianism.

"The tolerance

I

propose involves no mushy latitudinar-

Willingness to hear all views does not mean that we should,

after hearing them, treat them all as of equal value.

Chafee was

emergence of truth
also well aware of the obstacles to the "automatic
prejudice, and a
from the contest" presented by inequalities of power,

multiplicity of issues and arguments.

He might have been thinking of

I
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Milton when he allowed that the great writers had
misled us somewhat by
encouraging us to expect the truth to emerge too easily from
discussion.
Chafee, however, follows fundamentally in the same liberal
tradition by
his staunch advocacy of the method of freedom of discussion,
though

imperfect and slow, as the best means available to discover and disseminate worthwhile ideas,

Zechariah Chafee was one of the first judicial scholars to argue
that the provisions of the Bill of Rights, including the guarantee of

freedom of speech could not be absolute.

He urged that one must look

to history, to social purposes, and to the human facts behind the rules

of law in order to balance this preferred right with other important
yf

values.

In other words, one must look to the context.

[T]here are other purposes of government, such as order, the
training of the young, protection against external aggression.
Unlimited discussion sometimes interferes with these purposes,
which must then be balanced against freedom of speech, but
freedom of speech ought to weigh very heavily in the scale.

Along with Ernst Freund, Chafee felt that the limit of free speech was
at that ’’point where words will give rise to unlawful acts.”

Freund put it in 1904:

45

As

’’Freedom of speech finds, however, its limit

in incitement to crime and violence.”

45

This limitation is similar to
And

the governmental self-preservation condition proposed by Bagehot.

although the scholars have suggested some possible limitations on free-

dom of discussion, the troubling question of just how to accomplish this
process of balancing while preserving intellectual freedom remains.
The purposes of freedom of speech which have been surveyed up to
this point have been very largely instrumental in nature— the primary

purpose being to discover truth and to promote social progress.

There
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are, however, additional English and American
antecedents which show a

concern for intellectual freedom as an affirmation
of personal human
dignity.

In addition to his belief that "the greatest
liberty of

discussion" leads to social betterment, Robert Hall, an English
divine,

wrote in 1845:

Freedom of thought being intimately connected with the happiness and dignity of man in every stage of his being, is of so
much more importance than the preservation of any Constitution,
that to infringe the former under pretense of supporting the
latter, is to sacrifice the means to the end. 47

The American naturalist and writer, Henry David Thoreau, asks for freedom of thought and personal integrity above all else:

"Must the citizen

even for a moment, or in the least degree, resign his conscience to the

legislator?"

48

For Thoreau personhood precedes citizenship and a sense

of justice precedes respect for law.

Chafee, in addition to expressing

the social interest of free speech as the attainment of truth, also

realized that there was an important individual interest in "the need

of many men to express their opinions on matters vital to them if life
is to be worth living.

..." 49

More recently, the philosopher Sidney

Hook, in the context of asserting that some rights are more important

than others, says that the "right to pursue the truth has a prima facie

validity because of its inherent qualities of delight and dignity as
well as its beneficial consequences.

.

.

And Laurence Tribe, the

preeminent contemporary constitutional law scholar asks whether freedom
of speech is to be regarded as a means to an end only or also as an
"end in itself, an expression of the sort of society we wish to become
and the sort of persons we wish to be."^^
is
There is a growing realization and reaffirmation of an idea that
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not new but whose antecedents can be seen in the thinking of Socrates,
Milton, Mill, and beyond

— intellectual

freedom is valued both for its

political and social importance as well as for the role it plays in
individual development and delight.

It is valued as a means to the

discovery of truth and to effective self-government, and as an affirmation of the value of human dignity and personality

because

’’the

unexamined life is not worth living.”

— it

52

is valued

CHAPTER

II

FREEDOM OF SPEECH, AMERICAN EDUCATION, AND THE COURTS
It can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed
their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression
at the schoolhouse gate.

Justice Abe Fortas
Tinker v. Des Moines (1969)

Introduction

Since freedom of speech is regarded as significant both to the

development of intellectually and emotionally capable individuals and
to the development of a democratically constructed society, to say there
is an intimate connection between intellectual freedom and education may

easily be regarded as a truism.

Before looking at the specific imple-

mentation of the principle of free speech in the public school setting
as exemplified by the landmark decision in Tinker , the connection

between the principle of intellectual freedom on the one hand and education and schooling on the other will be briefly reviewed.
I

have chosen to draw liberally on the writings of John Dewey who,

apart from having had perhaps the greatest influence on educational

practice in this century, is widely considered to have been America's
foremost philosopher and educational theorist.

Dewey's writings for two reasons.

I

have chosen to use

Dewey believed in the fundamental

importance of intellectual freedom as a means and as an end; and he
the
believed fundamentally in the power of human intelligence to resolve

societies
complex personal and social problems that have beset modem

such as our own.

the
In fact Dewey considered individual liberty and
21

3

1
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use of intelligence to be the best elements of the
liberal tradition.
If we strip its creed from adventitious elements, there
are, however, enduring values for which earlier liberalism stood.
These
values are liberty; the development of the inherent capabilities
of individuals made possible through liberty, and the central
role of free intelligence in inquiry, discussion and
expression.

Dewey echoes what for many is the heart of the liberal tradition—
an: abiding respect for individual human dignity, what one

modem

legal

philosopher has called the individual's right to "equal concern and
respect,"

2

and a belief in the possibility of the full development of

individual capacities through intelligent and free inquiry.

The defini-

tion and elaboration of these values and their connection to education
will begin with a consideration of the nature of freedom in a general
sense.

The Relationship of Intellectual Freedom and Education

John Dewey has pointed out that true freedom consists in more than
the elimination of constraints

the old liberalism.

— it

is more than the negative freedom of

For Dewey the essential problem of freedom was to

relate individual choice to effective action.

He was not so naive as

to think that choice was meaningful without an ability to effect material change.

And choice could accomplish an increase in effective action

only to the extent that it was intelligent.
There is an intrinsic connection between choice as freedom
and power of action as freedom. A choice which intelligently
manifests individuality enlarges the range of action, and
this enlargement, in turn confers upon our desires peater
insight and foresight, and makes choice more intelligent.
There is a circle, but an enlarging circle, or, if you please
a widening spiral.

for
To the extent that choice is informed by intelligence, it makes

I

6

a
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"better choice" and "better doing" on successive occasions.
Dewey was very critical of both the orthodox theory of free will
and the classic theory of liberalism for conceiving of freedom as
some-

thing antecedently given.

For Dewey, freedom was a possibility—

potentiality to be realized through intelligent action.

As Dewey puts

it:

Our idea compels us.
.to seek for freedom in something
which comes to be, in a certain kind of growth; in consequence,
rather than in antecedents. We are free not because of what we
statistically are, but in as far as we are becoming different
from what we have been.^
.

The potentiality of freedom can be realized through the medium of
freedom of thought or intellectual freedom which, although not a sufficient condition, was for Dewey "the very heart of actual freedom."^

But

freedom of thought is not separable from freedom of speech and writing.

Nor is the idealistic notion that freedom of thought could exist, even
theoretically, without free speech a reasonable one.

Dewey explains the

connection between speech and thought and how thought develops through
interaction:
It has often been assumed that freedom of speech, oral and
written, is independent of freedom of thought, and that you
cannot take the latter away in any case, since it goes on
inside of minds where it cannot be got at. No idea could
Expression of ideas in communication is
be more mistaken.
one of the indispensable conditions of the awakening of
If ideas
thought not only in others, but in ourselves.
fade away
either
they
communicated
be
cannot
aroused
when
dispublic
of
air
open
The
morbid.
and
or become warped
of
condition
indispensable
an
cussion and communication is
into
growth
other
of
and
the birth of ideas and knowledge
health and vigor.

(sometimes
As the term "intellectual freedom" is used in this paper

interchanged with freedom of speech broadly considered)

,

it is meant to
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be understood as an active process which includes the ideas of
freedom

of discussion, writing, and thought.

It includes the possibility of

manifesting the results of these activities in intelligent choice,
observing the consequences, and choosing better the next time.

Intel-

lectual activity which is free does not simply emerge with the removal

of restraints.

It is an active accumulation of power to act in accord

with reasoned choice.

And it is facilitated by material conditions

which encourage this freedom.

John Dewey, among many others, was well aware of the importance of
social institutions in promoting or hindering the development of freedom, and felt that the most important problem of freedom was whether

social conditions effectively promoted the development of judgment and
insight.

As far as public schools were concerned, Dewey said that "even

our deliberative education, our schools, are conducted so as to indoc-

trinate certain beliefs rather than to promote habits of thought."^
Since for Dewey the possibility of freedom has to be actualized through

interaction with material conditions, he says that the "question of

political and economic freedom is not an addendum or afterthought" but

vitally necessary to personal freedom.

He felt that this was also the

case with other social conditions and institutions, especially educational ones.

A genuine energetic interest in the cause of human freedom
will manifest itself in a jealous and unremitting care for
the influence of social institutions upon the attitudes of
I
curiosity, inquiry, weighing and testing of evidence.
we
than
freedom
for
more
we
care
shall begin to believe that
to
order
in
others
upon
do for imposing our own beliefs
subject them to our will, when I see that the main purpose
powers
of our schools and other institutions is to develop
^
judgment.
and
of unremitting and discriminating observation
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It is important to note here that Dewey often draws
a distinction

between education and schooling that will be generally accepted throughout this paper.

Education is much broader than schooling, aiding the

process of cultural transmission and reconstruction in many informal
ways.

Formal education or schooling, on the other hand, is always a

purposive and hence moral undertaking.

Dewey considered schooling

necessary to aid cultural transmission and reconstruction in complex
societies, but felt that its power was relatively small when compared
to informal methods of education.

As far as intellectual freedom is

concerned, the position taken here is that it is equally necessary to

education considered in this informal sense as it is to the more formal

enterprise of schooling.

For most purposes, therefore, no distinction

will be made between schooling and education.

When it is made, the

reason will be clear from the context.
At this point it is appropriate to turn from the nature of freedom
in general and intellectual freedom in particular to the connections

that can be drawn between them and the avowed purposes of education,

both formal and informal, in the United States.

It will be assumed that

intellectual freedom, following Dewey's analysis, is understood as free-

dom of thought, speech, writing, and action that enables individual growth
and social evolution or betterment.

If the purposes of schooling are

consonant with this process, then at least one connection will have

been made.
schooling
It easily could be argued that a major goal of public

justification for
(whether accomplished or not), as well as the primary
students for
compulsory education in our society, is that it prepare
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intelligent participation in a democratic society.

This is reflected in

the language of leading Supreme Court cases where the purposes and

values of education are discussed.

In Brown v.

Board of Education

.

for example, the Court stresses the importance of education and gives
some ideas as to the avowed purpose and justification of education.

Today, education is perhaps the most important function of
state and local governments. Compulsory school attendance
laws and the great expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to
our democratic society.
It is required in the performance
of our most basic public responsibilities. ... It is the
very foundation of good citizenship. 11

Education is important to

oiir

society because to maintain freedom

and independence, it is thought that individuals need to be educated for

intelligent and independent participation in community life.

This idea

is elaborated in a relatively recent Supreme Court case, Wisconsin v.

Yoder

.

[A]s Thomas Jefferson pointed our early in our history,.
some degree of education is necessary to prepare citizens to
participate effectively and intelligently in our open political
system if we are to preserve freedom and independence. Further,
education prepares individuals to be self-reliant and selfsufficient participants in society. 12
.

.

And in order to accomplish this goal of open, active, intelligent citizen

participation in political and social life, constitutional freedoms for
the individual student and teacher must be protected.

Thus, education

for citizenship is accomplished, in part at least, through practice.
of
The Court in Board of Education v. Barnette discusses the importance

protecting student rights.
That they are educating the young for citizenship is reason
for
for scrupulous protection of constitutional freedoms
free mind at
the individual if we are not to strangle the
^

,
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its source and teach youth to discount important principles
of our government as mere platitudes.

Education for citizenship is stressed in these decisions primarily

because the state has the right to act for the general welfare and not

merely for the welfare of an individual.

But, although education for

social participation is emphasized, it is nevertheless implicit that

individual development is a necessary concommitant

.

The argument made

in this paper is that individual growth and social evolution are insep-

arable and proceed together.

As Dewey has said:

Social cannot be opposed in fact or in idea to individual
Society is individuals-in-their-relations. An individual
apart from social relations is a myth or a monstrosity.
If we deal with actual individuals, and not with a conceptual abstraction, our position can be also formulated
Education is the process of realization
in these terms:
of integrated individualities. For integration can occur
only in and through a medium of association.^^

.

—

It is at this point that Dewey's thinking is again relevant for the fur-

ther elaboration of the nature of education and for its connection to
intellectual freedom.

Dewey believed that education was a necessity of life.

It provi-

des for social and individual adaptation to the world as well as for

control and adaptation of the environment to meet human needs.
felt that education had no end beyond itself.

Dewey

"Since in reality there

growth, there is nothis nothing to which growth is relative save more

education."
ing to which education is subordinate save more

Dewey says

reorganizing, reconthat the "educational process is one of continual

struction, transfiguring."^*

His technical definition of education is

an elaboration of this theme.

"[Education] is that reconstruction or

meaning of experience.
reorganization of experience which adds to the

28

and which increases the ability to direct the course of
subsequent exper-

ience."

Although it may seem that Dewey conceives of education and

growth here in formal terms

,

their moral nature--the requirement of

betterment, progress, and ever-greater human meaning

entirety of Dewey's educational philosophy.^®

— can

be seen in the

Dewey makes clear that a

society which values betterment— change that will improve social and individual life— will have different purposes, materials, and methods of

education than a society which strives to maintain the status quo.
Deliberate, purposive education is especially necessary to democratic comumnities

,

according to Dewey, precisely because they are inter-

ested in intelligently directed growth.

Dewey said that "[i]f we are

willing to conceive education as the process of forming fundamental dispositions, intellectual and emotional, toward nature and fellowmen, philosophy may even be defined as the general theory of education."
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The

office of philosophy, of education, and of democracy as a way of life
is continual reconstruction and renewal.

Openness and intellectual exchange are necessary to renewal.

cording

Ac-

to Dewey, language and communication are particularly impor-

tant in this process because they effectuate a sense of community and
allow, in turn, for individual growth.

"To be a recipient of a com-

munication is to have an enlarged and changed experience.
the one who communicates left unaffected."

20

.

.

.

Nor is

This process of renewal is

both individual and social, and freedom of communication is an end and
a means in turn.

As Dewey says,

"A progressive society counts indiv-

of its own
idual variations as precious since it finds in them the means
growth.

ideal.
Hence a democratic society must, in consistency with its
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allow for intellectual freedom.

.

in a society professing demo-

.

cratic values, freedom of intelligence is not only a vital means
in the

project of deliberative education but an end in itself and a moral imperative,

As Dewey concludes:

’’The

only freedom that is of enduring

importance is freedom of intelligence.

..."

In the section which

follows the contemporary Supreme Court case which serves as the water-

shed for intellectual freedom in public schools will be considered.

The Case of Tinker v. Des Moines

It was not until 1969, in the case of Tinker v. Des Moines Indepen-

dent Community School District , that the Supreme Court of the United
States declared that students are persons and that both students and

teachers retain their constitutional rights while in school.
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It was

a few years earlier, in 1965, that John Tinker and several other students

were suspended for peacefully and symbolically protesting the war in

Vietnam by wearing black armbands to school.

Almost fifteen years

later, John Tinker recalled how he had felt about the issue of students'

constitutional rights in the mid-1960's.

"I didn't realize before we

wore the armbands that it wasn't established that we were citizens and

would have all the constitutional freedoms.

..."

The freedoms that

John Tinker had taken for granted certainly and most fundamentally included the full range of First Amendment rights to freedom of speech, writing, and association.

In fact, the Tinker case affirmed the right to

to free
engage in symbolic acts for communicative purposes— the right

protected form
symbolic speech, sometimes thought to have been a less

of speech than so-called pure speech.

And while the Tinker case did not
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develop in a vacuum, it was a particularly forceful assertion
of rights
that may indicate a new approach to thinking about the rights of
young

people in general and about the purposes and methods of pre-collegiate
education.

A bit of historical background will help to place the Tinker

case in perspective.
It was not uncommon in the early part of the century to think of

children as mere creatures of the state or as simple possessions of

their parents.

This was the result of a trend which began three centur-

ies earlier and which has had an influence that is still evident.

Al-

though today we live in a world where the notion of a long childhood is

commonly accepted, the concept of childhood probably did not come into

being for western societies until the seventeenth century.

Before that

time there was a short period of infancy after which the child entered

directly into the affairs of the adult world.

In the seventeenth cen-

tury, religious orders began to teach parents to care for and protect

their children.
the

The family took on a moral and spiritual function and

modem concept of schooling began

to develop.

As the historian

Philippe Aries says, ’’Henceforth it was recognized that the child was
not ready for life, and that he had to be subjected to special treatment,
a sort of quarantine, before he was allowed to join the adults."

25

In addition to whatever beneficial consequences the idea of child-

hood might have produced, it is perhaps this protective, paternalistic
dismiss
notion that has contributed to the tendency, until recently, to
rights under
the rights of the child completely or to subsume the child’s

those of the parent or the state.

Whether for humanitarian motives or

incapacity,
for socio-economic reasons, the notion of the child’s

J
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inadequacy, and dependency has been the rule rather
than the exception

throughout most of the twentieth century.

And in addition to dependency,

there is the additional notion that the child is duty-bound
to the
parent.

Blackstone wrote that ”[t]he duties of children to their parents

arise from a principle of natural justice and retribution.

For to those,

who gave us existence, we naturally owe subjection and obedience during
our minority, and honor and reverence ever after.

.

.

These twin notions of dependency and duty led to the development of
a legal philosophy which places great emphasis on parental and state

power vis-a-vis the child.

This power is reflected in a much quoted

nineteenth century Pennsylvania case:
not to liberty but to custody.

’’The

basic right of a juvenile is

He has the right to have someone take

care of him, and if his parents do not afford him this custodial privilege, the law must do so,”
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The idea that the state must step in if

the parents do not protect the child is an early American reiteration of

the idea of parens patriae , which developed in the English common law

and was applied to children in the case of Eyre v. Countess of Shafts -

bury

.

The case analogized the dependency of children to that of luna-

tics, saying that the king had a duty to protect both.

Although it is certainly true that children do need variable amounts
,

of care and guidance depending upon their level of development and maturity, until very recently it has been thought that the legal rights of

children have been severely limited or non-existent as a consequence.
Even in 1972, Justice Douglas had to disagree with a majority opinion of

the Supreme Court which held that the only interests at stake in a leadparents.
ing case concerning students were those of the state and the
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In considering whether the state could compel
the high school attendance

of Amish children against the wishes of their parents,
Douglas says:
"Where the child is mature enough to express potentially
conflicting
desires, it would be an invasion of the child's rights to permit
such
an imposition without canvassing his views.

That this expression of

entitlement for children was confined to a dissenting opinion is one

indication of why the earlier Tinker case can be considered a watershed
not only for pre-col legiate intellectual freedom, but for the rights of

children in general.
plete.

But even in Tinker the vindication was not com-

Justice Black, in a devestatingly sarcastic dissent, envisions

students all over the land exercising their newly won freedom by

"running loose, conducting break-ins, lie-ins, and smash-ins.
The original idea of schools, which I do not believe is yet
abandoned as worthless or out of date, was that children had
not yet reached the point of experience and wisdom which
enabled them to teach all of their elders.
It may be that
the Nation has outworn the old-fashioned slogan that "children
are to be seen not heard," but one may, I hope, be permitted
to harbor the thought that taxpayers send children to school
on the premise that at their age they need to learn, not
teach.

From this passage, it can be inferred that Justice Black's educational

philosophy is relatively traditional.

As the Tinker case is examined

in more detail it will become increasingly clear why Justice Black,

whose constitutional philosophy often had the effect of expanding the

protection of civil liberties, appears here in a dissenting role.
The actions of John Tinker, fifteen years old, his sister Mary Beth,
thirteen, Chris Eckhardt, sixteen, and other students took place against
for its
a background of war and in the middle of a decade that is noted

social turbulence.

President John Kennedy had been assassinated, the
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civil rights movement was well underway, and the nation was deeply in-

volved in the increasingly unpopular, many said immoral, war in Vietnam.

According to John Tinker, the idea of wearing armbands occurred to a
small group of people from the Des Moines area who were returning from
an antiwar rally in Washington in November of 1965.

On the way back on the bus there was a discussion of what
we could do to express our concern with the war in Vietnam. It
was agreed that we should write our senators and congressmen.
We also decided to hold meetings at churches, bring in informed
speakers, and provide literature so that people could find
information otherwise not easily available.
It was also
suggested that we could wear black armbands as a constant public
statement that we were against the killing in Vietnam. 32

When school principals in Des Moines heard about the intentions of
some students to wear armbands to school, they met and adopted a rule

against such actions.

According to John Tinker, it was his father, a

Methodist minister who worked for the American Friends Service Committee,
who felt that any move to defy the authority of school officials should
be a "most considered action.”
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Perhaps because of his father's in-

fluence John Tinker was not among the first group of students to be

suspended— he was waiting to discuss the new rule with school officials.
It was only when school authorities refused to talk with him about the

situation that John felt justified in wearing his armband in contravention of the rule.

He, too, was suspended.

Iowa Civil
It was not long after John Tinker’s suspension that the
suit
Liberties Union became interested in the issues involved and filed

been violated.
alleging that the students' right to freedom of speech had

echoing a philThe United States District Court upheld the suspensions,
that is protective
osophy of education and an attitude toward children
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and paternalistic.

It is also a philosophy that values order
above

the free speech rights of children.

School officials must be given a wide discretion and if,
under the circumstances, a disturbance in school discipline
is reasonably to be anticipated, actions which are reasonably
calculated to prevent such a disruption must be upheld by the
court. 34

Although the District Court recognized that the wearing of armbands for
expressive purposes is the type of symbolic act that is protected by
the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment, it expressly declined
to follow the reasoning of a case decided in the same year by the United

States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
V.

Byars

,

In that case, Burnside

high school students were permitted to wear "freedom buttons"

unless evidence showed that the action would "materially and substanti-

ally interfere with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the
operation of the school.

Following initial defeat, the Tinker case was appealed.

The lower

court decision was affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit.
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More than three years after the original student

suspensions, the United States Supreme Court reversed the decisions of
the district and appeals courts in the Tinker case.

chose to use the words of the Burnside case

in'

The Supreme Court

protecting student speech.

It held that imless evidence is presented that the speech would material-

ly and substantially interfere with ordinary school functions or with

the rights of others, it must be protected.

The mode of constitutional analysis that produced the Tinker decision is generally referred to as balancing.

It involves weighing or bal-

ancing the rights of the plaintiff in situations where various rights
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have come into conflict.

This mode of analysis varies greatly from a

very permissive, non-structured, ad hoc approach, where no
particular
rights or values are presumptively preferred, to balancing
within a

particular framework or with certain explicit guidelines.

It has been

said in many cases that freedom of speech occupies a preferred position

among other rights and values because of its importance for the contin-

uation of a democratic system.

But even though freedom of speech may

be preferred in a general sense, this does not mean that other important
rights and values, such as the right to privacy, for example, might not

override the right of a particular person to express his opinions in a
given situation or context.

Balancing the values of free speech with other important values can
also occur with the aid of tools which help to implement the values in a

more orderly fashion.

The tool which has had the longest history of

continuous use in resolving issues of freedom of speech, especially in

situations where public order or national security are threatened, is
the clear and present danger test, introduced in 1919 by Justice Oliver

Wendell Holmes.
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The understanding of what is necessary to prove a

clear and present danger sufficient to prohibit or prevent speech has

evolved over a period of fifty years to its present doctrinal synthesis.
In 1969, in the case of Brandenburg v. Ohio , the criminal conviction of
a Ku Klux Klan leader who had spoken at an organizers meeting was re-

versed.

The Court said:

[T]he constitutional guarantees of free ^eech and free press
do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use
of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is
likely to incite or produce such action.
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The opinion of the Supreme Court makes it clear
that one must look to
the words of advocacy to see if they are, in fact,
couseling lawless
action.

But, even if that be the case, a harmless inciter
cannot

properly be convicted under this test.

The contextual situation in

which the advocacy occurs must be examined to see if there is
evidence
that the unlawful action is imminent.
In 1969, the year of the

modem formulation of

the clear and pres-

ent danger test, an analog to that test appeared in the Tinker case.

As

the cases which have followed Tinker are examined, comparisons and con-

trasts will be made between the use of the clear and present danger test
and the material and substantial interference test.

Does the material

and substantial interference requirement of Tinker protect the harmless

inciter?

Will speech that does not threaten imminent and serious inter-

ference with school activities be protected?

And can speech be prevented

if it poses a material and substantial interference even though the

speaker is in no way attempting to incite disorder?

These questions and

others will be dealt with in the three chapters which follow, but before

leaving the Tinker decision, several important dicta which are necessary
to a more complete understanding of the case will be considered.

The first substantive point that the Supreme Court makes in the

Tinker case is that when the students wore black armbands in order to
publically express their views, they were engaging in the

’’type

of

symbolic act that is within the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.”'^®

This makes the point that actions which are intended to com-

municate ideas are, as the Court put it, ’’closely akin to 'pure
speech'.

They are therefore entitled to protection that, if not

37

exactly the same, is at least nearly as comprehensive as
the protection
afforded pure speech.
It has been very popular historically in free speech
cases to try

to make the difficult, or perhaps impossible, distinction
between speech

and action.

This grew out of the absolutist (and literalist) mode of

constitutional interpretation that is generally thought of as an alter-

native to the balancing approach.

Justice Black's name has been most

closely associated with this strict constructionist position that would
interpret the words and the meaning of the First Amendment literally.
Since the First Amendment says that "Congress shall make no law.

abridging the freedom of speech or of the press.

.

.

.

.

the words of the

amendment themselves account for Justice Black's famous assertion that
"no law means no law."
and not action.

He might have added that "speech means speech"

This position, if accepted, would not only abrogate

what are generally considered to be reasonable laws against defamation,
for example; but it would also prohibit the kind of expressive behavior

that occurred in the Tinker situation.

Neither wearing armbands nor

picketing would be protected by the First Amendment free speech provision, according to Justice Black.

"Marching back and forth, though ut-

ilized to communicate ideas, is not speech and therefore is not protected by the First Amendment."

It is ironic that one of the greatest de-

fenders of civil liberties has been so inflexible in the application of
his absolutist philosophy that it is made to seem unduly conservative

instead of the progressive, protective tool that he undoubtedly desired.
It can be argued, based on the previous discussion, that the major-

least two
ity opinion in the Tinker case is relatively progressive in at
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ways.

First, while recognizing that the rights of
many different people

were implicated in the particular situation, something
more than a permissive, ad hoc balancing was employed to resolve
the conflict of rights.

The material and substantial interference test was
developed as a tool,
and speech was held to be entitled to comprehensive
(one might even say

preferred) protection.

The burden was placed on school officials to de-

monstrate not a reasonable need but a compelling need to justify the

prohibition of speech.

Secondly, the absolute distinction between speech

and action was implicitly rejected.

The lines which separate pure speech,

symbolic speech, speech plus (speech plus action), and action are extra-

ordinarily difficult to draw and perhaps not as useful or speech-

protective as had been assumed.

The focus has now appropriately shifted

to the communicative impact of the speech and to the nature of the sur-

rounding circumstances.
In addition to the general type of constitutional analysis employed

in the Tinker case, several statements were made by the Court from which
a progressive general philosophy vis-4- vis education and constitutional

values can be inferred.

The dictum that students and teachers do not

"shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at
the schoolhouse gate" indicates a freedom-promoting educational philo-

sophy as well as reaffirming that all citizens, including students in
school, retain their constitutional rights despite the various roles they
A^

may assume.

And this is not merely stated, but stressed.

Neither an

"undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance" nor a "desire to
avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint" are sufficient to overcome the right to freedom of
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expression.
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The Court emphasized that students are "persons'* and that

they, too, possess "fundamental rights" which must be respected
by school

and state officials.
ents*’

They may not be regarded as "closed-circuit recipi-

of whatever the state decides to communicate but must be free to

®^r®ss their own opinions both inside and outside of the classroom.
Freedom of speech is an important right that must be cultivated and not

merely tolerated in principle.
On the other hand, the Court realized in its process of weighing
and balancing that students should not be allowed to exercise their

rights in a way that would substantially interfere either with the
rights of others or with normal school operations.

It could be argued

that the Court was interested in school order and proper decorum per se
and not in the fact that a material and substantial interference would

burden the rights of other students.

The entire focus of the opinion

seems to contradict this conclusion, however.

From the Court's emphasis

on the importance of free speech, one might infer that order is necessary
becaiise it facilitates the purposes of education, one of which is intel-

lectual freedom.

Tinker

,

Justice Fortas, who wrote the majority opinion in

uses a long quote from Justice Brennan’s opinion in Keyishian v

.

Board of Regents to demonstrate the importance of free speech and education to the discovery of truth and to the future of the nation.
"The vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is
nowhere more vital than in the community of American schools."
[citation omitted] The classroom is peculiarly the "marketplace of ideas." The Nation’s future depends upon leaders
trained through wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas
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Which discovers truth “out of a multitude of
tongues [rather! than
through any kind of authoritative selection. "^5
,

The Court stresses that the school is a ’’public
place"
open, non-authoritarian "marketplace of ideas."

a free,

But there is no sugges-

tion that the Court conceives of school as a place for
break-ins and
smash- ins, as Justice Black feared.

It is a place where state and school

officials have "comprehensive authority" to act within constitutional
limits, i.e., to act consistently with the fundamental constitutional

rights of students and teachers.

It is a place where freedom of speech

is comprehensively protected when applied with due consideration given

to the important purposes of education— one of which is the development

of intellectual freedom
tional setting.
gressive.

— and

to the unique characteristics of the educa-

The spirit of Tinker is not permissive, but it is pro-

It is not activist in the sense of greatly increasing the

evolutionary pace of constitutional analysis, but it is an important
reaffirmation of the basic commitment of our society to the dignity of
the individual and to the basic value of intellectual freedom.

It does

not represent an ad hoc, valueless approach to constitutional adjudi-

cation but a relatively careful weighing of competing claims in a context where important constitutional rights and educational purposes are
at stake.

Given the modesty of the opinion, it is to be expected that

the progressive aspects of the Tinker decision will be found to be

thriving in the Tinker progeny from 1969-1979.

The three chapters which

follow will examine cases which have arisen in this ten year period

which are directly relevant to the issue of intellectual freedom in
public schools.

—

CHAPTER

III

THE STUDENT’S RIGHT TO SPEAK AND TO KNOW

The First Amendment involves not only the right to speak and
publish, but also the right to hear, to learn, to know. And
this Court has recognized that this right to know is "nowhere
more vital" than in our schools and universities.
Justice William 0. Douglas, dissenting
from the denial of certiorari in
Presidents Council v. Connnunity
School Board (1972)

Introduction

The previous chapter was largely devoted to an explication of why
First Amendment rights are important in public schools.

Once educa-

tional institutions are recognized as a special marketplace of ideas, it

becomes necessary to take a closer look at how First Amendment rights are

"applied in light of the special characteristics of the school environment," as the Tinker case adminishes they must be.

These special characteristics can be reduced to two propositions
one looking toward the school as a learning environment and the other

toward the student.

The school has a unique purpose.

Unlike the home,

a public library, or a park, its purpose is neither recreation nor re-

laxation but rather teaching and learning.

The first proposition,

therefore, is that the school environment must be maintained so as to

promote teaching and learning.

The second proposition derives from the

fact that the school has a unique clientele

— students.

Students are

most surely citizens, but at the elementary and secondary level they are
a captive audience, compelled by law to attend school.
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Students are
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also less mature than most adults physically, emotionally,
and intellectually,

Thus, the second proposition is that the developmental

level of students must be considered in order to provide
optimal educa-

tional opportunities.

Because of the avowed educational purpose of public schools and

because of the captive, immature clientele, the state in the person of
local school officials owes a duty to these students which demands

special knowledge and extraordinary powers of judgment.

School offic-

ials must actively seek to promote a climate where freedom of expression,

learning, and growth can flourish; and yet they must discourage or pro-

hibit licentious speech and other behavior that interferes with the
educational purpose or with student constitutional rights.

School

officials can neither be overly permissive nor can they unduly censor
or impede.

Everyone who is active in public education, whether students,

teachers, school officials, or parents, must try to enhance the possibilities for student growth and development in keeping with the unique pur-

pose of schooling.

The state police power, which is used to provide for

the health, safety, and welfare of all people, can only be used legiti-

mately in the educational context to promote the emotional, social, and
intellectual growth of the students as individuals and as citizens.
This chapter is concerned with situations where students, and others
on their behalf, have asserted the right to speak and not to speak, to

know and not to know in the post- Tinker period.

Cases where speech is

not protected because it is intertwined with disruptive action will be

contrasted with cases where speech is protected.

The right to know will

and
be examined with regard to access to books, outside speakers,
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specialized courses.

The right not to speak will be illustrated pri-

marily by the flag salute cases.

And finally, the right not to know or

to privacy will be illustrated by cases which have sought to
protect

the emotional development of students.

The purpose will be to see if

these rights have been protected and how they are accommodated to other

rights and interests.

Student Speech:

Protected and Not Protected

The Supreme Court, in the Tinker case, affirmed that students retain their constitutional rights while in school, but it also held that
these rights cannot be absolute in school any more than they can be ab-

solute in the public forum and that expressive conduct will not be pro-

tected in school situations where because of time, place, or type of

behavior the conduct ’’materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others."^

Even conduct

which is clearly expressive but which is intertwined with materially
disruptive conduct will not be protected.

Thus where black berets were

"used by the plaintiffs as a symbol of their power to disrupt the conduct of the school,” and where the plaintiffs had walked in the school

halls shouting ’’Qiicano power” and had blocked hallways, the students

were held properly suspended for their disruptive conduct.

2

The Tinker

case was distinguished on the issue of material and substantial interference.

Another case where Tinker has been distinguished on this issue

involved a walkout where students left campus and attempted to persuade
resolved.
others to join them when a grievance had not been successfully

assemble at just
The court held that students did not have the right to

.
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any time and place.

Although shouting, blocking hallways, and walkouts will not
often
be protected in a place devoted to teaching and learning,
what is lacking in these cases and in some of the ones which follow is an
explicit

finding that this behavior has created a material interference.

The

issue of degree should always be considered--even in the most obvious
cases.

What is required by Tinker is a material interference, not just

any interference or disruption.

The definition of what constitutes a

material interference will be developed from a consideration of the
cases

At times, criminal penalties have been imposed on students who have

engaged in non-protected conduct in violation of legitimate, official
directives.

In one case where students refused either to go to class or

leave the school grounds after a three hour protest demonstration, the

students were held properly convicted of unlawful trespass.

4

This case

illustrates the type of conduct which, although intended to express the

message of student displeasure with eight previous student suspensions,
is not protected by the First Amendment.

The students cheered, shouted,

and sang; successfully urged others who were in classes to join them;
and raided the school cafeteria removing chairs and a desk to the pro-

test site.

As the demonstration got noisier it became difficult or im-

possible for teachers who were engaged in classes to be heard.

In this

case a finding was made that the protest demonstration was "unduly dis-

ruptive" of the educational process.
convicted
In another criminal case, five high school students were

organize a
of disorderly conduct for their actions in attempting to
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student walk-out.

Although here the conduct involved only five stu-

dents and in the prior case it involved twenty- five
to thirty, and the

only misconduct mentioned was singing and shouting on the
playing field

which caused some students to come to the windows, the court
held that
the Tinker case was not applicable because the issue was physical
dis-

order and not speech.

The court here seems confident that it can dis-

tinguish speech from action.

The more speech-protective approach would

be to first recognize that much action is intended and perceived as
expression, and then to determine whether or not it is protected speech

by applying the appropriate test.

It might be argued that this approach

is especially necessary when criminal penalties are likely to be imposed

rather than in-school remedies.

Other ways that speech which is arguably protectable is being dealt
with by the courts are illustrated by the following cases.

One Federal

District Court held that a school regulation requiring an automatic sus-

pension for engaging in boycotts, sit-ins, stand-ins, and walkouts was
overbroad because it was not limited to those activities which created
substantial interference rather than a mere distraction.

6

However, the

case was reversed on appeal, the implication being that all sit-ins,
etc., are per se not protected by the First Amendment.

7

This same re-

sult can be reached by applying school rules which prohibit "willful

disobedience," "intentional disruption," and "immoral or vicious practices," to uphold punishment of students for walkouts and boycotts.

g

The court can merely apply a gloss that such rules are intended to
regulate behavior which is not expressive and therefore avoid addressas to
ing the issue of whether or not such regulations are so vague

a
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Protected First Amendment sneech activities.
By presenting the above illustrations,

I

do not mean to suggest

that such expressive behavior in public schools should
necessarily go

unregulated.

What

I

do believe, however, is that when such cases are

critically examined it can be seen that illusory speech/action distinctions are being maintained in derrogation of possibly protected First

Amendment speech activity and that the degree of disruption necessary
to lawfully prohibit expressive conduct in schools is often assumed

rather than specifically found as judicial fact.

The cases which

follow, in contrast to the previous ones, are more speech-protective.

They concern student speech which has been protected by the courts and
some of the methods that have been employed to effectuate that protection.
It is interesting to note that the Fifth Circuit, which includes

Texas and most of the southern states, has, at times, been a leader in

protecting the free speech rights of students in public schools.
Burnside v. Byars

,

from which the material and substantial interference

test of Tinker was taken, is a Fifth Circuit case;

which follow originated in Texas.

9

and the two cases

Butts v. Dallas Independent School

District arises out of incidents surrounding the Vietnam moratorium of

October 15, 1969, which the court said "may end up as a footnote to

history but.

.

.

was tremendous in anticipation."^^

Shortly after

students in the Dallas district decided to wear black armbands to protest the war. Dr. Estes, the district Superintendent of Schools, de-

cided that such action would be disiuptive.

Pursuant to a policy, im-

provised for the occasion, students were prohibited from wearing armbands in school on the appointed day as well as thereafter.

Relying
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heavily on Tinker, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals granted an injtmction in favor of the students.
school environment.

.

.

The court said that ’’even in the

something more is required to establish

[a]

disruption than the ex cathedra pronouncement of the superintendent.
.

.

.

[T]here must be some inquiry, and establishment of substantial

fact, to buttress the determination.'*^^

Even though the school offic-

ials rightly concluded that there would be disruption on October 15th,

according to the court they needed to show evidence that the black
armbands would be the cause and that to prohibit them would eliminate

or meliorate the disruption.

The court added that even when school

officials are confronted with the possibility of disruptive activity,
"the Supreme Court has declared a constitutional right which school

authorities must nurture and protect, not extinguish, unless they find
the circumstances allow them no practical alternative."

12

This case represents anything but the old deferential approach to

decisions made by school administrators.

It is more consonant with the

recognition that students have important constitutional rights which,
perhaps because they are a captive audience, school officials have a
special duty to ’’nurture and protect."

Speech can be suppressed,

according to this case, only when there is a reasonable apprehension

of a material disruption based on fact, and there is no practical alternative to the suppression.
who
The other Texas case concerns five Mexican- American students
"apparel decorsought an injunction against a school rule prohibiting

which was promation that is disruptive, distracting, or provocative"
brown armbands to
ulgated one day after the plaintiffs first wore
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school.

The students intended to express their support for the criti-

cisms of certain educational policies and practices that had been put
forth by a community group called ’’Concerned Mexican American Parents.”

Citing the Tinker case as controlling, the court issued an injunction
saying:

’’There has been no showing that the wearing of the armbands.

.

.

would materially and substantially interfere with the requirements of

appropriate discipline or be disruptive of normal educcational functions.”

14

And this result was reached despite the fact that there had

been isolated incidents of unrest and apprehension, including one instance of several girls trying to force another girl to wear an armband
and one instance where a father kept his children out of school because

he was afraid there might be trouble.

The court also rejected the opin-

ion of school officials that wearing armbands in violation of school

policy was a disruption per se.
A case which illustrates another way that courts have protected student expression involves students who were suspended for picketing and

using loudspeakers outside school.

There was a school rule which pro-

hibited participation in pickets on school grounds ”if they affect the
institutional order,” and using loud speakers outside school ”if the
institutional order is affected.”

Although these particular students

might have been properly punished if the rule were constitutionally
of others,
drawn, in order to prevent a chilling effect on the speech
and overbreadth.
the court held the rule void on its face for vagueness

institutional order”
The rule is vague because the meaning of ’’affect the
is unclear.

meaning.

guess at its
People of ordinary intelligence would have to

manner of pickets
And it is overbroad because time, place, and
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and loudspeakers can only be regulated according to the special
needs of
an educational institution.

A total ban would overreach constitutional

limitations by taking in protected speech, i.e., speech which did not

create a material and substantial interference with school discipline.

The overbreadth issue in this case was decided by reference to the
standards announced in Tinker

.

The Tinker case has also been used as precedent on both sides of
the issue in cases which arise when a racial majority asserts its

right to freedom of expression in a way that is personally offensive to
a minority group.

In cases of this type freedom of speech of the major-

ity has been protected unless it violates the Tinker disruption limita-

tion or unless it is exercised by a state authority in such a way as to

violate the rights of others to equal protection of the laws.

In an in-

tegrated Florida school where eight per cent of the students were black,
a Federal Dsstrict Court enjoined both the officially sanctioned and the

private use of symbols of the Confederacy.^^

The court found that these

symbols, which included the Confederate Flag for example, were a "signi-

ficant contributing cause" of violence, disruption, and continued racial

tension which impeded the development of a unitary system.

Since the

school officials were under a desegregation order they could be enjoined

from using these symbols in order to foster a unitary system.

White

students who asserted their personal First Amendment right to continue
material
to use the symbols were enjoined based on the Tinker test of a
and substantial interference with school discipline.

Some students had

interused the symbols provocatively and there had been four massive

racial confrontations at the school.

I
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Two years later when school officials and some
white students used the
liiiker case as precedent to appeal for relief from the
permanent injunc-

tion, the Court of Appeals remanded the case to see
if the injunction was

still necessary in view of the free speech rights of the
majority of

students.

While the Tinker test had been used to support prohibition

prohibition of speech in the past, based on a material interference; it
was now being used to support the majority's claim to freedom of expres-

sion-even if that expression was distasteful to others.
involved in these cases are especially difficult.
mental importance come into potential conflict

— the

The issues

Two rights of funda-

majority's right to

freedom of speech and the minority's right to equal protection of the
laws or perhaps to the right not to hear.
In Banks v. Muncie Community Schools

,

a Federal Circuit Court of

Appeals took a relatively wooden approach to this problem.

Although

the lower court had recommended the elimination of symbols which were

personally offensive to a significant number of students, the appeals
court held that the use of the term "Rebels" for a school name, Southern Aires" for the glee club, and "Southern Belle" for the homecoming

queen were protected by the First Amendment.

adopted by student vote several years earlier.

These symbols had been
While it is probably

true that the black students' right of free speech was not violated, as
the court held; it is at least arguable that their right to equal pro-

tection was being violated even though there was no affirmative, official, physical blocking of access to school facilities and programs.

The result in the Banks case might be explained by the fact that it
arose in an Indiana school system where there had been no court finding

SI

of a denial of equal protection.
pared.

In Smith v.

minority students

,

A Louisiana case can be profitably com-

St. Tammany Parish School Board

,

plaintiffs, who were

moved for a modification of a desegregation order to

enjoin the use of the Confederate Flag and other indicia of
racism.

The

suit was motivated, in part, by the fact that the principal of
Covington

High School displayed the battle flag in his office next to the American
flag and the flag of Louisiana.

The court barred symbols of racism from

official use by the school board and its employees.

Since these symbols

signified resistance to integration, their official use could be banned
in order to foster a unitary school system by ending official discrimina-

tion.

At the same time, the court held that individual students could

use these symbols, presumably based on their right to freedom of expression.

The most troubling issue of relevance to free speech arises in the
first two of these school symbol cases, particularly in the Florica case
on appeal.
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It would be hard to argue that individual students should

be denied the right to speak freely, even if offensively, absent a material and substantial interference that could not be controlled in some

other way.

But the suggestion by the Court of Appeals in the Florida

case that the students should be allowed to exercise their right to

freedom of expression by choosing racially inflammatory school symbols
for at least semi-official school use is difficult to understand.

In

that case there had definitely been a material interference with school

discipline in the past— four massive interracial confrontations.

But

even assuming that the threat of material physical disruption was no

longer an issue, it could be argued that these officially sanctioned
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symbols interfered with the rights of other students to equal educational opportunity in a material and substantial way.

It is at least argua-

ble that judicial decisionmaking need not be so wooden that interference

with the social and emotional development of minority students who are
forced by law to attend school cannot be prohibited.

The notion of a

material and substantial interference need only be expanded to include
more than mere physical violence, as has been done in several cases to
be considered later.

The Tinker test would allow consideration of the

emotional and social needs of the students as well as their
tual and physical needs.

intellec-

These minority students may even have a First

Amendment speech right not to hear, an issue to be considered later.
The right to freedom of speech should not be lightly overcome.
Even the American Nazi Party and the Ku Klux Klan retain their right
to a type of speech which is extraordinarily offensive to many people.

The Tinker test provides a way to balance these competing rights, along

with the interest in a quality education, in a school setting where relatively less mature individuals are required to attend for educational
purposes.

In some of these school symbol cases the affirmative right to

speak may have to yield.

The following group of cases is representative of situations where
student free speech rights were not protected by the courts but where

they arguably should have been.

In the first case the court simply

failed to see any First Amendment issue.

In the next three cases the

is inreasonable forecast of a material and substantial interference

places, from the fact
ferred from a generalized tense situation in other
student body consisted
of integration itself, or from the fact that the
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of students from military and non-military
families.

In the last three

eases the evidentiary facts as they are presented
in the opinion appear

to be less than sufficient to support a conclusion
of material and sub-

stantial interference as required by Tinker , and the
necessary degree

of disorder is generally not considered.
In a Pennsylvania case, a group of high school students
wore arm-

bands to graduation reading "Humanize Education.

Subsequent to

graduation school officials decided that letters would be written informing the colleges to which plaintiffs had applied for admission that

they had worn armbands to commencement "even though they had been re-

quested not to wear any insignia which deviated from the formal graduation attire."
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The students sought an injunction against this action.

Although the court recognized that wearing armbands to express opinions
was protected by Tinker , it held that here there was no question of

official interference with freedom of speech because school officials

were merely conveying factual information to the colleges.

Of course

college admission officials might recognize that the students had en-

gaged in expressive activity protected by the First Amendment, but these
students should not have been forced to wager their future education
that the uncooperative implication of the letter would be rejected.

An

additional and perhaps more disconcerting effect of such a non-protective attitude is the chilling effect on the future speech of younger stu-

dents.

The following case, in contrast to this one, shows school

officials making at least a good faith effort to protect the students’
right to freedom of expression.
In 1970, during a time when there had been strong public reaction

,

54

to the involvement of troops in Cambodia
and just after four Kent

State University students had been killed,
the principal of a Pennsyl-

vania high school disallowed the wearing of
armbands with "strike,"
rally." or "stop the killing" on them.^^

In an attempt to abide by

the Tinjcer decision, the principal did allow colored
armbands to be
worn.

Other armbands which "could have caused disruption of the
edu-

cational processes in the senior high school" were prohibited
because

of the tense and uneasy situation, and students who wore them were
suspended.
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The degree of feared disruption was never mentioned by the

court, and no evidence was reported of disruption in the particular

school or in nearby schools.

The court concluded, citing the Tinker

case:

The restriction was related to the potentially disruptive
situation at the school at the time. ... We feel that
the limited restrictions imposed upon the students were
reasonable and necessary. The refusal of a student to
obey the reasonable requests in this case was insubordinate
and unprotected activity. 25
This case is a good illustration of an unusually deferential attitude toward the judgments of school administrators combined with a too

ready acceptance of what is arguably undifferentiated fear.

The citation

of the Tinker case in support of the judge’s conclusion is enigmatic.
This action is precisely the type of "xmdifferentiated fear of apprehension of disturbance" which the Tinker court said was insufficient "to

overcome the right to freedom of expression."
Court decision of Terminiello v. Chicago
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Citing the Supreme

the Tinker court says that we

must take the risk of trouble, fear argument, and disturbance in order
to protect freedom of expression.
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In a similar case a student was denied permission to
distribute

literature and suspended for wearing a button reading "April

5

Chicago;

Gl-Civilian Anti-War Demonstration; Student Mobilization Committee.
The recently integrated school’s no-button rule was upheld in a patern-

alistic and protective opinion where the majority reads Tinker as implying that when a no-button rule is consistently enforced and where there

may be "potential racial collision," there is no need to justify continuation of the rule based on a material and substantial interference.

There may, indeed, have been sufficiently good factual support for up-

holding the relatively repressive and absolute no-button rule in a case
where the school had recently become integrated.

The problem is that

the court does not critically examine the evidence.

The case has been

criticized by commentators for its uncritical assumption that the fact
of integration per se can be used to support a reasonable forecast of
substantial interference.
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Much can be learned about the process of judicial decisionmaking
and about underlying judicial motivations and philosophies in this case

by noting how students' rights are sardonically mocked:
We will not attempt extensive review of the many great
decisions which have forbidden abridgment of free speech.
We have been thrilled by their beautiful and impassioned
language. They are part of our American heritage. None
of these masterpieces, however, were composed or uttered to
support the wearing of buttons in high school classrooms.

of proThe opinion continues by expressing doubt as to the propriety
Douglas spoke
tecting the "colorful use of free speech" of which Justice
in Terminiello v. Chicago in school situations.

Douglas had written

unrest, to create
that one function of free speech was to induce
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dissatisfaction with the status quo, and to stir
people to anger.
Again, this was precisely the case upon which the
Tinker court relied
in demanding more than an undifferentiated fear
to bar student speech.
It is worth remembering that here a student
merely wore a button

announcing a demonstration, which prompted a few students to
ask what
the button said.

The case seems to illustrate the triumph of a rela-

tively authoritarian and repressive philosophy out of keeping with the
more progressive approach taken by the Supreme Court in the earlier

Tinker case.
In Hill V.

Lewis

,

where a "tense” situation had developed, school

administrators ordered that all students with armbands be removed from
classes.
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This action was precipitated by the fear of further polar-

ization of opinion in a school where 40% of the students were from mili-

tary families.

The only disturbance reported in the opinion was the

disruption of one class which occurred, ironically, on the day that
school authorities summarily ordered all students with armbands barred

from classes.

There had been no prior announcement of this decision and

there was no prior rule against the wearing of armbands.

The court

upheld the action because the no-armband order extended to all armbands
and symbols equally and because the demographic situation allowed school

officials to base their action on something more than undifferentiated
fear of disturbance.

This case again illustrates the erroneous assump-

tion that Tinker held total bans justifiable per se, and it also fails
to provide evidence that would show satisfaction of the Tinker disrup-

tion limitation.
It seems reasonable to conclude that something more than

.
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or apprehension of disturbance was meant to
require

more than a conclusory opinion based on a generally tense
situation, or
on the possibility of factional discord inferred from racial
integration

or differing political views.

If the fear was, in fact, legitimately

differentiated, these opinions do not provide the kind of information
that would be useful in allowing for such differentiation in the future.

The last three cases where student speech was not protected involve
somewhat different issues.

In one case an eighth grade student was sus-

pended for the remainder of the term for wearing a pantsuit in violation
of the rule that girls could not wear "any type of trouser garment" and
for demonstrating against the dress code in violation of the policy

against disruption.

34

The court held that even if wearing a pantsiiit

was intended as communication it was not protected because it violated a

school rule.

The court here seems to miss the point that if wearing

pantsuits is communication (as in this particular instance of passive

demonstration against the dress code it seems especially calculated to
be)

,

then the mere assertion that it violates a school rule is insuffi-

cient to say that it is not protected.

Courts have generally ruled that

not just any rule that interferes with free speech directly or indirectly
is permissible.

If it interferes directly it must be justified by some

compelling state interest; if indirectly, by some reasonable state
interest

An alternative explanation for the result in the pantsuit case
might be that the plaintiff's participation in a walkout demonstration
was sufficient in and of itself to legitimate the punishment.

Although

with
there is some indication that the walkout did minimally interfere
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the classwork of the participants, the court
did not find a material
and substantial interference.

It used the Tinker precedent only to the

effect that acts which interrupt the "pedagogical
regime" or are "dis-

ruptive of the educational process" or are "calculated to
undermine the
social routine" are not protected.

Although it is very likely that

most such walkout demonstrations would indeed amount to a material
and
substantial interference; it seems that perhaps here, for example, where
there was a limited and generally non-disruptive demonstration, the
spirit of Tinker would call for affirmative efforts to accommodate the
students' attempt to convey a message.

The same might be said of the next case where a high school student

who had distributed and carried signs was suspended when he refused to
give up a sign protesting the non-renewal of a teacher's contract.

The student asserted his free speech right to have the sign.
ion indicates that there had been some physical disruption

pushing, and shoving.

The opin-

— chanting,

But this activity occurred only after Steven

Karp, the leader of the demonstration, had been suspended.

Here there seems to have been no effort to accommodate the student's desire to indicate his displeasure with having lost a favorite
instructor.

But while justificatory facts do not appear in the opinion,

the coiiTt at least makes a good faith effort to consider the principles

derived from the Tinker case.

After noting the difficulty in applying

Tinker, the court says that there is no need to wait until actual dis-

ruption occurs.

What is needed according to the court are "facts which

might reasonably lead school officials to forecast substantial disruption."^^

The court realizes that the degree of disruption is relevant.
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but indicates that the level of disturbance required
is lower in a
school situation than it might be in a public park, for
example.

That

seems to be a correct interpretation of the Tinker principle
that

speech must be accommodated to the "special characteristics of the
school environment."

The only thing missing in this opinion is a de-

tailed examination of the evidence upon which the forecast of a substantial disruption was made.

Barring that, the reader cannot know if

such evidence was available or if the court simply accepted the judgment

of school administrators.

The last case in this group concerns a school rule that rallies not
be permitted in the central quad. 38

The rule was based upon the fact

that there had been four rallies in the last three years resulting in

"disgraceful episodes" which caused disruption and one recent rally

which had caused "disorder."

It is not clear from the opinion how many

rallies there had been all together in the last three years.

The court

held that where other "official" facilities for speaking were provided
and where previous unauthorized rallies had resulted in disorder, the

students need not be permitted to hold rallies in the central quad.

There are two possible problems with the court’s opinion, the first

being the familiar complaint that there was no finding of a reasonable
forecast of a material interference with appropriate discipline.
court seems to conclude that mere disorder is sufficient.

The

The second

problem is that if this is considered an indirect restraint on speech,
even neutral time, place, and manner restrictions must be reasonable.
was limited
It is at least arguable in this case that where discussion
time, the
to "official" school clubs which met at a predetermined
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limitation was not reasonable.
As a footnote to these student speech cases

,

a few cases regarding

student freedom of association might be considered to illustrate how
this implied First Amendment freedom interacts with and supports the

right to freedom of expression.

In two of these cases the court held

school regulations unconstitutional because they did not limit their

regulation of associational activities to those activities that were

materially and substantially disruptive.

The rules in these cases

prohibited recruiting members for political and religious groups and
a prohibition of the formation of controversial groups.
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Associational

activities of students cannot be limited to coincide with the social or

political tastes of school officials, and controversial speech is no
less protected than other speech.
In another case illustrating these principles, the court held that

the denial of recognition to a club, with the consequent loss of benefits including the right to distribute literature and to hang posters,

presented a constitutional issue as substantial as that presented in the

Tinker case.^® The denial was based upon the prohibition of groups which
"Redford
express a partisan point of view— the group was to be called the

Student Mobilization Committee."

Although this case illustrates the

organizations
proposition that school officials cannot prefer student
that the propowhich express favored views, the following case shows

where the First
sition is more difficult to implement in situations
conflict.
Amendment values of speech and religion come into

student Bible study club which
In a California case, a voluntary

prohibited from meeting on
wanted to "prayerfully" study the Bible was

1

1
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school groxmds during the school day in order to protect school
officals

from the charge of an unconstitutional establishment of religion/^
the dissent points out, citing Tinker

,

As

there may bery well be no state

action involving establishment of religion when religious expression is

simply treated like other expression.

The major problem might be the

possibility of unconstitutional state entanglement with religious activities.

The ease with which the result was reached in this case can

perhaps be explained because of the undervaluing by the court of the
plaintiffs' right to freedom of expression and association and the fear
that merely allowing a student club to function would lead to the charge

of religious establishment.

The issues are not easy to reconcile

— all

First Amendment rights, whether concerning religion or speech, have been

held to be fundamental
ustrates

— but

it is at least arguable that this case ill-

the judicial predilection to undervalue the importance of ex-

pressional rights when there is even a possibility that they might conflict with religious rights.

By doing this, the court misses the oppor-

tunity to discuss the special importance of religious speech, and why it

might be necessary to assure absolute separation in order to prevent
state entanglement with religion.

In the section which follows, the

student's right to know will be introduced through cases dealing with
access to library books.

.
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The Library as a Marketplace of Ideas:

The Student's Right to Know

When school board members remove books from public school libraries

because they disagree with the social or political views expressed therein, the question arises as to whether any constitutional right is in-

fringed.

The cases considering this issue, which have arisen between

1972 and 1979, can be looked at in terms of whether they offer more or

less protection to speech.

The leading case for the less protective

line of decisions is from the Federal Court of Appeals for the Second

Circuit

,

Presidents Council Community School District

School Board , decided in 1972.
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y^.

Community

This court holds that by removing

books from a high school library the "intrusion of the Board.

.

.

upon

any first amendment constitutional right of any category of plaintiffs
is not only not 'sharp* or 'direct,'

it is miniscule."
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The case was

used as precedent and its reasoning closely followed by two cases from
Federal District Courts in the Second Circuit which are now on appeal.

These cases will also be considered.

The more speech protective branch of the library cases is typified
by the leading case of Minarcini v. Strongsville City School District

decided in 1976, by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals."*^

,

This was the

first case to declare that students have a First Amendment right to know,
and to view the library as instrumental in this endeavor.
a mighty resource in the free marketplace of ideas.

dedicated to broad dissemination of ideas.
speech.

"A library is

It is specially

It is a forum for silent

from
The case has been followed by two influential cases

Federal District Courts in the First Circuit.
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The Supreme Court has not yet ruled on the precise issues that
have
arisen in this line of cases, but if the Second Circuit continues to

view these cases as lacking an appreciable constitutional issue, the

problem might be considered by the Supreme Court.

IVhen

various circuits

are split on an issue of some importance, the Court will often agree to

resolve the conflict.

A closer look at these cases will begin to show

their importance for intellectual freedom in the public schools.
The earliest case is Presidents Council

,

where the school board in

Queens, New York, acting on a parent complaint, removed Down These Mean

Streets from all junior high school libraries.

47

The book is a highly

acclaimed autobiography of a Puerto Rican youth growing up in East Harlem, which contains sexually explicit passages that were offensive to

some board members.

When a conflict arose, the court held that because

the book could be loaned to parents and because discussion of the book
was not precluded, ’’there is.

.

.no problem of freedom

expression of opinions on the part of parents
librarians

.

,

teachers

of speech or the
,

students or

Books do not acquire tenure on the shelf, and the shel-

ving and unshelving of books, according to the court, does not present a
constitutional issue.
The administration of any library, whether it be a university or particularly a public junior high school, involves
a constant process of selection and winnowing based not only
on educational needs but financial and architectural realities.
To suggest that the shelving or unshelving of books presents
showing
a constitutional issue, particularly where there is no
propoa
is
thought,
or
of a curtailment of freedom of speech
sition we cannot accept.

The next Second Circuit case was Pico
also originated in New York.^°

v_.

Board of Education, which

In that case nine books were removed
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from junior and senior high school libraries because they were
irrelevant, immoral, vulgar and in bad taste, according to the school board.

Concluding that it is the duty of the board to transmit primarily those
values which are consistent with the basic values of the local community

— the

indoctrination or transmission theory of education

— the

court

held that no First Amendment issue was involved.

A little later in the same year, 1979, the case of Bicknell

v.

Vergennes Union High School Board of Directors was decided in Vermont.
In this case the book The Wanderers

,

by Richard Price, was removed from

the high school library because it was considered "obscene and vulgar."

Dog Day Afternoon
shelf.

,

by Patrick Mann, was removed to a special restricted

Although the court said that a "library is a vital institution

in the continuing American struggle to create a society rich in freedom

and variety of thought,"
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it dismissed the complaint as presenting only

an "intramural strife" where basic constitutional rights had not been

directly or sharply infringed.
Presidents Council and its progeny is in direct conflict with a
second group of school library cases and arguably with an important line
of First Amendment precedent left largely unconsidered by those cases.
In the Minarcini case, an Ohio school board ordered Cat s Cradle by Kurt
*

Vonnegut, Jr. and Catch 22 by Joseph Heller removed from a high school
library.

Council

,

In this case, which was decided four years after Presidents

the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that students have a

and ideas,
First Amendment right to know— a right to receive information

have the power
Once having created a library, the school board does not
and political tastes of
to censor its contents based only on the social
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its members.

The right to know imposes constitutional constraints on

the board’s discretion with regard to censorship.

Removal of books

should be limited, according to the court, by fiscal restraints and

proper educational considerations, e.g., providing a balanced presentation.

This case was followed by a District Court judge in Massachusetts
in what is perhaps the strongest expression of constitutional protection

against censorship in public school libraries.

Committee v. School Committee

,

In Right to Read Defense

a book of poems by yoiong people called

Male and Female Under 18 was removed from a high school library because

board members felt that a poem it contained, "The City to a Young Girl,"
was "filthy" and "offensive."
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The poem was written by a fifteen year

old Brooklyn girl, expressing her feelings about being subjected to the
lustful behavior of men while walking on New York City streets.

The

first few lines will illustrate why the poem might have been contro-

versial.

The city is
One million homey lip -smacking men
Screaming for my body. 55
The court in this case did not read Presidents Council as requiring
from school
that school boards have complete discretion in removing books

libraries.

While Judge Tauro agreed that not every removal has consti-

of those who
tutional implications, he suggested that if the motivation

political tastes,
remove is to censor because of their own social and
the action implicates First Amendment values.

The court did not find

obsolete, irrelevant, obthat the book Male and Female Under 18 was
scene, or improperly selected in any way.

There was also no limitation
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of financial resources.

Citing the Tinker case, the court said that to

justify removal of a book, there must be some "substantial
and legiti-

mate government interest.

Although the interest need not concern

school discipline, some important and comparable interest must be at
stake.

Since there was no evidence that the book would have a harmful

effect on students, and no other reason was given for legitimate removal;
the court held that the censorship in this case violated the First

Amendment right of students and teachers to read and to "be exposed to
controversial thoughts and language.

Just as Right to Read Defense Committee relied heavily on the
leading Minarcini case, another case from the First Circuit relied on

both Minarcini and Right to Read
voted to remove

.

Where a New Hampshire school board

magazine from the school library because of ads for

contraceptives and materials dealing with lesbianism and gay rights, the
court held that First Amendment values were implicated, thus requiring
a substantial and legitimate governmental interest for removal.
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It is

interesting to note that the board later voted to return two issues of
the magazine with the advertisements excised.

In this case, Salvail v.

Nashua Board of Education , the court noted that objective criteria such
as obsolescence, architectural necessity, and legitimate educational

considerations were not the motivating factors in removal.

Since the

political tastes of the board could not be constitutionally controlling,
the court ordered the board to resubscribe to the magazine and to

restore the back issues to the library shelf.
positions than
It is -hard to imagine two more diametrically opposed
Minarcini
those followed by the Presidents Council line of cases and the
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line of cases.

Part of the divergence may be accoxinted for by
the fact

that Minarcini and the cases which follow it pay particular
attention to

important lines of First Amendment precedent that have developed
outside
the school situation.

Although it is certainly true, as Charles Alan

Wright has persuasively argued, that free speech precedent from other
areas of life cannot be transferred indiscriminately to educational

settings; it is also true that they cannot be ignored.

There is a

whole line of cases beginning in 1943 that protects the right to distribute and receive handbills in door-to-door solicitation, the right
not to have prisoner mail censored because of the two-way nature of the

communication, the right of radio listeners to have access to the social,
political, and aesthetic ideas of others, and the right to receive infor-

mation and ideas in one's own home.^^
The first case to create a right to know on behalf of recipient

plaintiffs was decided by the Supreme Court in 1965
Presidents Council case.

— well

before the

The Court held that it was an unconstitutional

infringement on the First Amendment rights of addressees to have the

"affirmative obligation" to request the receipt of foreign political
mail that had been addressed to them.^^

Since it is clear that those

who sent the mail (foreign nationals living abroad) had no independent

constitutional right to speak, the case protects recipients--those wishing to receive information.

As Justice Brennan explains, in a con-

curring opinion:
It is true that the First Amendment contains no specific

guarantee of access to publications. However, the protection
of the Bill of Rights goes beyond the specific guarantees to
those equally fundamental personal rights necprotect.
essary to make the express guarantees fully meaningful.
.

.
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(citations omitted)

think the right to receive publication
... It would be a barren marketplace of ideas that had only sellers and no buyers. 62
I

IS such a fundamental right.

The reasoning of the above line of cases was
summarized by the

Supreme Court in an important case decided in 1976— just
after PresiCouncil

Council

,

right.

.

In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy

Virginia Citizens

the Court again held that the right to know was a protected
In holding that consumers had a right to receive information

through pharmaceutical advertisements, the fact that communication
involves reciprocal rights was emphasized.
.

”[W]here a speaker exists.

.

the protection afforded is to the communication, to its source and to

its recipients both.'’^^

The Presidents Council court may perhaps be forgiven for ignoring
this line of precedent since the Virginia State Board of Pharmacy case

had not yet been decided.

But when the District Court in Bicknell

(decided after the Virginia case) argued that students have no right to

receive information because there is no speaker
to speak

— it

had clearly gone too far.
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— authors

have no right

The emphasis in Virginia State

Board of Pharmacy was clearly on the right of the consumers of prescrip-

tion drugs to receive information.

Lawrence Tribe in his seminal work

on constitutional law says that the right to know is a more generalized

right than the right to speak, but that it is not necessary that a cor-

relative right exist in any particular source to communicate.
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That

the court in Bicknell could have misinterpreted the Virginia case so

badly can only be explained by its lack of attention to a whole line of
precedent beginning more than thirty- five years earlier.
It

may be possible for the Second Circuit Court of Appeals to

1
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reconcile these two divergent lines of cases when
it reviews Pico and
Bicknell.

Deselection, it is true, does not always present a
constitu-

tional issue— sometimes science books become obsolete,
for example.

And

it is certainly correct, as the court in the Pico case
concluded, that

the selection/deselection process cannot be content blind.

The Minarcini

line of cases, however, would not require content blindness.

It would

require only neutrality in the sense that decisionmaking based on content be made with regard to legitimate educational interests and not

become a process devoted to sanitization of the library to suit the
social and political tastes of successive school boards.
It is probably only a matter of time until Justice Douglas, who

dissented in the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari in the Presidents
Council case, is vindicated.

There surely is a right to hear, to learn,

and to know, which cannot be defeated in the school library.

The First Amendment is a preferred right and is of great
importance in the schools.
Are we sending children to
school to be educated by the norms of the School Board or are
we educating our youth to shed the prejudices of the past, to
explore all forms of thought, and to find solutions to our
world's problems ?66
.

.

.

Although the rights of teacher/ librarians are to be considered in

Chapter V, it can at least be suggested at this point that, from an educational point of view, these professionals have an important part to

play in the selection/deselection process.

Selection and deselection

must differ to the extent that less is known about books before they

have found their way to the school library shelves; but however the process is accomplished, it must be done in a way that preserves the impor-

tant and fundamental right of the students to know.
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Non-School Speakers and the Student's Right to Know
This group of cases concerns a wide variety of speakers who in
one

way or another either seek to speak on or near the school campus
or
are sought out by students and teachers to present their views as part

of the regular school program.

The leading case dealing with expressive

activity occurring off the school campus is the Supreme Court case of

Grayned v. Rockford

.

In that case students, former students, parents

of students and concerned citizens were convicted of violating an anti-

noise ordinance which prohibited the willful making of noise adjacent
to school buildings during the school day.

Picketing by the defendants,

which lasted for about half an hour, was on behalf of more involvement
of balcks in school affairs.

The Supreme Court held that the ordinance

was neither impermissibly vague nor overbroad but that it was a reason-

able "time, place, and manner" regulation that was necessary to further
a significant governmental interest.

The court relied on the Tinker

case in allowing that public sidewalks could not be declared off limits

entirely for the purpose of expressive activity.

But activity which

materially disrupts classwork or invades the rights of others can be prohibited adjacent to schools as well as on school grounds.
An application of the Grayned case can be illustrated by an Arizona
case where members of a religious group attempted to broadcast their mes-

...

sage by loudspeaker on the sidewalk across from the school at mid-day.
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They were arrested and held guilty of willful disturbance of a public
school.

The Tinker case was cited for the proposition that expressive

substanactivity may be prohibited if it "materially interferes with or

activities, or
tially disrupts, the normal operation of schools, school

A
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the rights of other persons.

Although there are extreme cases which hold that a
total exclusion
of those outside speakers wishing to speak on
school grounds by distri-

buting literature, talking to passersby, etc., is a proper
exercise of
the state police power, ^ many cases allow such activity
within limits.

The limits can be illustrated by the following cases.
^Vhere citizens sought to erect a "tent- like structure" on
a uni-

versity library lawn to protest the plight of the Farm Workers, the
court held that such activity was not the type of symbolic speech contem-

plated by the Tinker case and was therefore not entitled to First Amendment protection.

Supreme Court case was quoted by the court to the

effect that the right to expressive social protest does not extend to
•

.

.

Street meetings in Times Square or to red light violations.
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The court

did allow leaf letting and talking to passersby, however, saying that such

activity was protected by First Amendment speech provisions.

A similar

case affirmed defendants' trespass convictions for the activity of set-

ting up a card table on school property in order to distribute leaflets,
books, and buttons to promote an antiwar demonstration.
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The First

Amendment claim of the defendants was summarily dismissed and the Tinker
case was held not applicable to the factual situation.
It appears that here again facile distinctions between speech and

action are being made in situations where the "action" is inextricably

intertwined with the peaceful, non-disruptive expressive activities of
citizens.

Perhaps it is possible to speak and to leaflet without tents

and tables; but if these activities are first recognized as having speech

implications of importance to speakers and hearers as well, then courts

I
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will have to look for a material and substantial
interference rather
than summarily dismissing the First Amendment claims.

A more speech-protective approach was taken by a California court

which overturned criminal vagrancy convictions against adults who peacefully distributed leaflets criticizing the Selective Service System,

racism in America, and the Vietnam War on high school camnuses.^^

Tinker case was relied on extensively by the court.

It

The

recognized that

constitutional rights were generally available in schools and that channels of communication should be kept open in a place which, although de-

dicated to a special purpose, was a public place.

The court was parti-

cularly attentive to the rights of students, noting that the right to
communicate included the right to hear and to receive information
ideas.

and

It is interesting to note that this case, although perhaps dis-

tinguishable from those above as involving pure speech that was not even

arguably disruptive, was decided in 1969

— well

before the others.

It is

also the only case which makes use of the Tinker dictum that school is
a "public place" where people entitled to be there may exercise consti-

tutional rights in a way that would not be permissible on purely private
property.

In Tinker the Supreme Court was probably referring to students

and teachers as those entitled to be there.

If the court here is sug-

gesting that adult citizens may have a limited right to be on school
grounds, it would seem consistent with the reciprocity necessary to pro-

mote the students' right to be informed, to hear, and to know.

Intellec-

of
tual freedom is promoted when students are exposed to a wide variety

views

— when

they are protected as hearers as well as speakers even

though they are at school.

There is no reason consistent with the
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Tinker case for an absolute ban on citizen speech
on school grounds.
In fact quite the contrary, for the Tinker
court said that schools

should not be considered "enclaves of totalitarianism"
with students
the "closed-circuit recipients" of official state dogma.

The next three cases from Federal District Courts in
Nebraska,

New Hampshire, and Oregon concern school regulations which are
not concerned with the time, place, or manner of speech, but which attempt to

regulate the type of expression that can be promoted on school grounds
or in classrooms.

In the first case the Gazette Publishing Cooperative

sought the right to enter on school grounds and distribute copies of

their publication, the Lincoln Gazette

,

on a "free-or-donation" basis.

A school rule against commercialism and solicitation was invoked to bar
agents of the publishers from distribution at school.

The court held

that the ban was an invalid prior restraint in violation of the First

Amendment in the absence of any indication of a material and substantial
interference with school work or discipline.

Apart from the fact that

the court found that commercialism and solicitation in the Gazette sit-

uation were incidental, it believed that in order for a ban to be con-

stitutionally applied on that basis it would have to meet the Tinker
test of posing a material and substantial interference.

The court was

of the opinion that reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions

were permissible, but a total ban without a compelling reason was not.
In another publications case, students challenged a school board

regulation prohibiting distribution of all non-school sponsored written
materials in school and for two hundred feet from the school grounds.
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The court held that a blanket prohibition of all non-school sponsored

€

74

publications was overbroad because it included materials
which would not
pose a substantial interference with school activities.
The last case involved a blanket prohibition on another
type of

speech--political speech.

Here, students and a teacher sought relief

from a school board order banning all political speakers from
high
school.

The ban arose when the political science teacher tried to in-

vite a Communist speaker to class after having received official
approval for speakers representing the Democratic Party, the Republican
Party, and the John Birch Society.

The court held that the speaker

ban unconstitutionally infringed on the students' right to hear and on
the teacher's freedom of expression by interfering with the choice of

teaching method.

The court also suggested that outside speakers might

have a constitutional right not to be denied equal protection with regard to speaking in school and that the teacher could raise the right of

these third parties.

So that while they might or might not have an

independent speech right to address student audiences, outside speakers
at least have the right not to be unfairly discriminated against.

This

would seem to be consistent with the reciprocal interest of facilitating
student learning, hearing, and knowing by providing presentations de-

signed to be balanced in terms of differing points of view.Because the Supreme Court has ruled with regard to the limits

which are appropriately applied to speech off school grounds, those
issues seem relatively well resolved.

With regard to speech on campus,

however, two divergent positions seem to be presented.

The first would

allow total bans on outside speakers, based on the conclusion that no

constitutional issues are involved in such a decision.

It represents
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an approach that is unduly protective and
paternalistic, and is arguably
an unconstitutional infringement on the type of
intellectual freedom

that is necessary in the school environment as well.

If the students

truly have a right to know, as the second line of cases would
suggest,
then to deny them that right would require that the speech be of
the
type that is not constitutionally protected— obscenity

,

defamation, or

fighting words— or that the prohibition comport with the Tinker limitations.

As the judge who protected political speakers in the last case

wrote:
I am firmly convinced that a course designed to teach students
that a free and democratic society is superior to those in
which freedoms are sharply curtailed will fail entirely if it
fails to teach one important lesson:
that the power of the
state is never so great that it can silence a man or woman
simply because there are those who disagree.

Curricular Challenges and the Student's Right to Know

In addition to challenges to library materials, to particular text-

books, and to other specific curricular materials, there is a growing

group of cases where parents, for the most part, have mounted more general challenges to the curriculum based upon their objections to the

values they feel are being transmitted to their children.

It seems that

these conflicts are more likely to arise to the extent that schools see

themselves in the business of transmission or indoctrination of a par-

ticular set of values rather than as promoters of a tradition of intellectual freedom.

It is unfortunate that the transmission theory as a

primary justification of education has been promoted in the legal literature, especially, out of proportion to its appropriate place in the
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educational theory of a democratic society.

Where intellectual free-

dom is emphasized, a spectrum of values representative
of the diversity
of our culture can be considered along with the transmission
of basic
values to which we are committed as a nation.

There is less reason to

want to indoctrinate students with a particular point of view if
one

truly believes that no one else is trying to do the same.

While it is

rare that the courts in the cases which follow actually consider the

student's right to know and to receive information and ideas in any
explicit way, the cases nevertheless have implications for the developing right of students in a captive audience to be exposed to a wide

spectrum of facts, ideas, and beliefs.

There have been several recent challenges by parents to the
attempted implementation by state or local school boards of curricular

programs in family life and sex education.
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These challenges generally

take the approach that the teaching of matters related to human sexual-

ity in public schools violates the parents' and/or the students' right
to free exercise of religion and their right to privacy.

The results

have not been uniform, some cases reasoning that the parents have no

exclusive constitutional right to teach their children about sexual
matters, and others implying that there might be such a right by ex-

plicit court approval of excusal systems.

There is support, however,

for the proposition that if courses are taught within constitutional

limits and deemed necessary by state or local boards of education, their

controversial nature should not be sufficient grounds for excusal.
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that
At the present time, the fact that the student may have rights
a minority
are different from those of the parent is recognized in only
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of cases.

The students' right to know should arguably be considered

along with the parents' right to free exercise and to privacy
in the

upbringing of their children.

Education is not a purely private con-

The fact that state law makes education compulsory is testimony

cern.

to the importance that the entire community places on education.

It is

for this reason that the rights and interests of all must be considered.

One case which recognizes that children have a right to receive an

education and that this right may conflict with the rights and interests
of the children's parents is Davis v. Page

,

a 1974 case.

The father

of two children brought an action against the school system to require
that his children be excused from all audio-visual programs, from a

health course, and from music classes.

The requested excusal was based

on values and beliefs derived from the family's Apostolic Lutheran
faith.

While the case poses somewhat of an extreme example, it is

nevertheless a good one to illustrate the types of objections that are
posed by parents to various curricular materials and methods.
Plaintiffs have introduced evidence that the dogma of their
faith makes it sinful for them to: watch movies, watch
television, view audio-visual projections, listen to the
radio, engage in play acting, sing or dance to worldly music,
study evolution, study "humanist" philosophy, partake in
sexually oriented teaching programs, openly discuss personal
and family matters, and receive the advice of secular guidance
counselors.
to
In holding for the children, the court balanced the father's right

free exercise of his religious beliefs with the state's interest in

providing an education and the children's right to receive that education.

The court, citing the Tinker case, recognized that children

into conflict with
have constitutionally protected rights that may come

I
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those of their parents.

Though the rights of parents to control
the

upbringing of their children must be considered,
the court was of the
opinion that parents do not have the right to make
martyrs of their
children in the name of religion or privacy.
This case is exceptional
result.

,

more for its reasoning than for its

While there are other cases which reach similar conclusions
on

similar factual situations
rights that children possess.

they have not stressed the independent
This is the fact that gives the Davis

case special relevance for the issue of intellectual freedom in public

schools, especially for the right of the student to know--to receive an

education.

In recognizing students' rights, it shows itself to be, in

spirit, the true progeny of Tinker

.

The following sections concern the

right not to speak and the right to privacy

— the

right not to know.

The Student's Right Not to Speak

The student's right not to speak was declared as long ago as 1943
in the leading case of West Virginia State Board of Education v.

nette
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.

Bar-

In an eloquent opinion by Justice Jackson that has stood as a

monument to student rights in general for more than forty years, the
freedom to express intellectual and spiritual individualism by declining
to engage in the compulsory flag salute was protected by the Supreme

Court.
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation,
it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall
be orthodox in politics, nationalism or other matters of opinion
or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.
In subsequent cases students have refused to stand for the pledge
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or have declined to leave the classroom when the pledge has
been said.
Some students have political motives— they believe that there is
no

liberty and justice for all, or they prefer to sit quietly as a protest
against black repression.

Some have religious motives.

And for some

their only motivation is to avoid punishment for their preference not to
participate.

The rights of these students have been consistently upheld.

One

court rejected the notion that sitting down was itself a material and

substantial interference or invasion of the rights of others.

It said

"[A] silent, non-disruptive expression of belief by sitting down" is

protected by the First Amendment.
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Another court held that standing

was an "integral portion of [the] pledge ceremony" and could not be

compelled consistent with the First Amendment.
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Citing Tinker , another

case held that a student is free to choose his own form of expression as
long as there is no material infringement of the rights of others.
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It

is clear that this right not to speak, which is a corollary of the right

to speak, will protect students from compulsory affirmations of belief

and will allow for a certain amount of intellectual non-conformity.

Whether or not these flag salute cases will be invoked to support other
instances of the student's right not to speak remains to be seen; but
the right not to speak, like the right to speak, is limited by the

Tinker disruption standard.

Indeed, Justice Jackson presaged that

notion himself in the Barnette case when he observed that remaining
and
passive during the pledge was not alleged to have created a clear

present danger that would permit the limitation of expression.

)
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The Student's Right to Privacy

Apart from the protections of mind and personhood
derived from
the flag salute cases, the right to privacy as it
has manifested itself
to date in the school situation protects the inwardlooking dimensions

of privacy— the student's right to be let alone.
two distinct ways.

It has done this in

First, it protects the student from being forced to

give information that is unduly personal --it gives sanctuary by
protecting the right not to speak.

Secondly, it protects the student from

being forced as a member of a captive audience to hear and be confronted with information that might be injurious

tecting the right not to know.

— it

gives repose by pro-

Although this area of case law is

still developing, two cases from the federal courts can be given to show

the types of interests that are involved and the ways that courts have

begun to resolve them in the public school setting.
In Merriken v. Cressman

,

a Federal District Court barred the use of

an unduly extensive questionnaire designed to identify potential drug

users.
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The questionnaire was administered by school officials and

participation in the survey was not voluntary.

It sought information

about the student questioned and about others of his acquaintance.

The

court held that students retain their constitutional rights while in
school and that one of these rights is the right to privacy implicit in
the penumbras of the Bill of Rights.

It showed sensitivity to the re-

lationship between the students' captivity and the preservation of pri-

vacy in holding that the questionnaire violated the students' right to

privacy and interfered with the parents' privileges with regard to
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upbringing

and discipline.

In protecting the student from being forced to reveal information,

the student's right to privacy is being balanced against the generalized

police power of the state.
be fundamental,

Since the right to privacy had been held to

it is likely that where doubt exists the right of the

student will be upheld.

The opposite aspect of the student's right to privacy--the right
not to know, has somewhat more troubling implications.

Most obviously,

this right is in direct conflict with the very same student's right to

receive information and ideas.

It is here that the rights of intell-

ectual freedom, broadly considered, and the privacy and personhood

rights must be very carefully considered.

It is because of the rela-

tive immaturity of students and because of their captivity that their

right to be left alone must be protected by school officials.

But it

is because of this same immaturity and captivity that the student's

right to intellectual freedom and to the development of mind must be

encouraged by a free flow of information and ideas.

A case from the university setting may help to dramatize why it
may be necessary to protect public school students from speech, expression, or ideas that, while not physically injurious, would nevertheless seriously interfere with social or emotional growth.
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The

case concerns the display by an art is of several paintings emphasizing

genitalia in a public corridor of the university.

The court upheld the

was scheduled
university's action in removing the exhibit well before it

for dismantling.

The court reasoned that in this case the right to

to greater
privacy of a captive university audience was entitled
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protection than the lesser constitutional interest of the artist
in
connminicating his message.

Charles Alan Wright and Thomas Emerson have argued that expression
of the sort sought to be conveyed by the artist in the above case will
not necessarily be constitutionally protected even though it falls
short of meeting constitutional standards of obscenity in a given context.
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The thrust of their argument appears to be that the shock

effect created by speech that dramatically exceeds the norms of public

acceptability is tantamount to an assault on hearers or viewers.

Wright

and Emerson would argue that this assault carries the force of action,
i.e., is not primarily expressive, and therefore not protected.

Of

course, it is no answer to Wright and Emerson that the purpose of art

that is explicitly sexual is precisely to convey a message that may be

shocking.

Justice Harlan, speaking for the Supreme Court, has more

recently said that the Constitution protects the "emotive function" of
communication as much as it protects is "cognitive content."
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But even allowing that the case of the artist might have been

wrongly decided when considered in the university setting, it is by
no means so clear that it would have been wrongly decided had the same
factual situation arisen in a public high school.

The problem is that

same
the assault reasoning employed by Emerson and Wright relies on the

distinction between speech and action that has historically been so
difficult to make.

If we want schools to be successful in promoting

and vulnerable
an optimal education for students who are still maleable

be discovered
intellectually and socially, better reasoning will have to
to support the
upon which to base the protective measures needed
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student's right to repose and to privacy while
at the same time protecting other valuable rights.

A suggestion for accomplishing this purpose

will be made after a case where these issues have
arisen in lower edu-

cation is presented.
In Tractman

Anker high school students were denied the right to

conduct a voluntary, anonymous survey of student attitudes about
human
sexuality, contraception, and abortion for tabulation and publication
in
the student newspaper.

Although the evidence presented at trial by

experts on both sides of the issue was conflicting, the court held that
"the record established a substantial basis for defendants' belief that

distribution of the questionnaire would result in significant emotional

harm to a number of students.

..."

The majority opinion relies on

the Tinker case, extending its rationale to cover situations where the

potential disruption is psychological in nature rather than physical.
But the court waffles in the standard that it applies to the case, at

times putting the burden of proof on school officials to demonstrate
that there was "reasonable cause to believe the distribution of the

questionnaire would have caused significant psychological harm to some
.

.

.

students;"

and at times requiring only that school authorities

"have reason to believe that harmful consequences might result to

students."
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One concurring opinion concludes that "a blow to the psyche may
do more permanent damage than a blow to the chin" and that invasion of

the rights of others is not protected by the Tinker case.^^^

This judge

also believes that the act of solicitation of opinion is somewhat more

intrusive than simple dissemination of opinion might be.

But while

84

these considerations are relevant and important ones,
it is not difficult to sympathize with the long dissent of Judge Mansfield,
who ex-

pressed the fear that if the limitation on invasion of the rights
of
others were extended to prevent ’’psychological harm,” it would pose a

dangerous potential for unjustifiable restriction of constitutional
rights based on a standard that is inordinately ’’vague” and ’’nebulous.”

It is arguable that this case presents just such an example

of unwarranted and paternalistic intrusion on the constitutional rights
of students.

Judge Mansfield felt that the record lacked a ’’substantial

basis” in evidentiary fact to prove that ’’significant psychological

harm" would result to an ’’appreciable number of students.”

He also felt

that the defendants’ understanding of high school students living in a

media-oriented, urban environment was so ’’unreal and out of touch with

contemporary facts of life as to lead one to wonder whether there has
been a communications breakdown between them and the next generation.”
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But while the danger of abuse must be fully appreciated, standards

do need to be developed by which to balance rights in extraordinary
cases.

What needs to be remembered in such cases is that standards and

tests are merely tools which must always be applied with due considera-

tion given to both constitutional principle and contextual circumstances.
What could be more vague than the test of material and substantial inter-

ference considered out of context?

But given the fact that schools must

not only provide an environment suitably free from physical disturbance

but that the developmental level of the students themselves must also
and subbe considered, there may be no better standard than a material

social.
stantial interference test extended to protect the emotional,

D
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and intellectual growth of the students.

The problem with the majority

opinion in the Tractman case is that the judge is
not quite sure whether
interests of sufficient import are involved to warrant
close scrutiny of

official action.

The interests involved on both sides of the case in Tractman
appear
to be fundamental ones

— the

right of students to gather and to print in-

formation and the right of other students either to receive the question-

naire or to be let alone.

With fundamental rights so heavily implicated,

minimal scrutiny of administrator judgment and action simply will not do.

Conclusion

The right of the student to speak and to receive information and
ideas while in school is a fundamental right deserving of encouragement
and protection.

While speech-protective student rights cases like the

Tinker case have brought a generally heightened awareness of these
rights, occasionally brilliantly defended by a lower court judge, there
is still an all too evident tendency to overcontrol the school environ-

ment and to overprotect the individual student.

In general, adminis-

trative judgments based on the unique characteristics of the school sit-

uation are given far too much deference by courts eager to avoid in-

volvement in school concerns.
Student rights while in school are often denigrated by a distinction

between speech and action which denies the existence of First Amendment
issues.

When the speech issue is recognized and considered by the court,

the factual situation should be publically explicated in the opinion so

that all will know that decisions have been based on specific facts
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rather than on generalized inference.

Where the prohibition of speech

is based upon the Tinker disruption limitation, an
explicit finding of a

material and substantial interference should be made by the
court.

The

use of the Tinker test as applied in various factual contexts
should be

made a part of the written opinion both for justificatory reasons and as
an aid to future action and decision-making.

Of the many unresolved problems and issues that arise in the present
chapter, a few are particularly important:

whether total bans on speech

are per se legitimate in the school context; whether constitutional

rights of students are implicated when school officials select and eliminate materials from the school library; and how the student rights to
equal protection and to privacy are to be balanced with the fundamental

right to speak and to know.
Some of these issues will reappear in the next chapter, which deals

with the student's right to compose and distribute literature, leaflets,
newspapers, and other written materials in public schools.

The legal

and educational issues surrounding prior restraint will assume special

importance, but the general issue of how best to promote and protect

intellectual freedom in schools will continue to be emphasized.

CHAPTER

IV

THE REGULATION OF WRITTEN MATERIALS:
THE STUDENT PRESS, LEAFLETS, AND PETITIONS

The ’’Awakening” contains, absolutely no material that could
remotely be considered libelous, obscene, or inflammatory.
As so-called ’’underground” newspapers go, this is
probably one of the most vanilla- flavored ever to reach a
federal court.
.

.

.

Circuit Judge Goldberg
Shan ley v Northeast Independent
S^chool District (Fifth Circuit, 1972)
.

Introduction

The First Amendment right to freedom of speech and press includes
the right to produce and to distribute a wide variety of written materials.

It is axiomatic that if students retain their constitutional

rights while in school, they also retain their right to engage in the

production and distribution of newspapers, literary magazines, flyers,
petitions, and leaflets.

The extent to which this right may be regu-

lated or limited to conform to the special requirements of a learning

environment devoted to elementary and secondary education is the subject of this chapter.

It begins with a general review of the historical

ban on prior restraint of The press, relates that issue to the student
press, and then continues with a development of the scope and limita-

tions on the distribution of a number of other written materials in

public schools.

Prior Restraint of the Student Press

The issue of prior restraint is one of the most complex and
87
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ambiguous areas of First Amendment law.

Thomas

I.

Constitutional law scholar,

Emerson, called the concept ’’curiously confused
and unformed,"

despite an "ancient and celebrated history."^

Because of the existen-

tial nature of ideas when reduced to written form as
opposed to the

nonmateriality of thoughts, the possibility of censorship or of review
by others prior to any general dissemination of ideas arises.

The

classic prohibition against prior restraint is understood as an absolute

bar to the general regulation or review prior to dissemination of written materials, films, etc., even though they may contain speech, such
as obscene speech, which is currently not protected.

The term prior

restraint is also used by courts to refer to blanket prohibitions, such
as those banning the distribution of all political materials in school,

for example.

In this chapter, the term prior review will often be used

to refer to general systems of prior restraint.

The prior restraint

terminology will be used for blanket prohibitions and as a general term
covering both prior review and blanket prohibitions.

The issues involved in prior restraint were first considered by
the Supreme Court in the leading case of Near v. Minnesota
1931.

,

decided in

The Minnesota legislature had provided for the issuance of per-

manent injunctions against the publication of written materials that

were "malicious, scandalous and defamatory."

In declaring the statute to

be an infringement of the liberty of the press, the Court discussed the

history of the First Amendment guarantee.

It concluded that the major

purpose of the constitutional free press provision had been to promote
freedom by prohibiting any prior censorship such as that which had been
allowed by the English systems of licensing.

The appropriate remedy for

^
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the abuse of this freedom to publish, according to
the Court, was sub-

sequent punishment.

At the same time, however, the Court in Near de-

parted somewhat from this historical view.

While the decision did not

expressly allow for general systems of prior review, it did conclude
that government could prohibit speech in exceptional cases.

These cases

would arise, according to the Court, where the recruiting service was
actually obstructed, where speech was obscene, where it would have the
effect of force, or where it was an incitement to violence.^

The 1961 Supreme Court case of Times Film Corporation

v.

City of

Chicago represents another assault on the historical ban against prior
restraint.^

In this case a Chicago ordinance requiring the prior review

of films was challenged.

In a five to four opinion recognizing Chica-

go’s ’’duty to protect its people” from obscenity, the majority rejected

the claim of absolute privilege against prior review that had been

asserted by the Times Film Corporation.

The dissenting opinion of four

justices, written by Chief Justice Earl Warren, lamented the rejection

of what it called ”an inherent

aind

basic principle of freedom of speech

and the press.

Now the Court strays from that principle; it strikes down that
tenet without requiring any demonstration that this is an
’’exceptional case,” whatever that might be, and without any
indication that Chicago has sustained the ’’heavy burden”
which was supposed to have been placed upon it. Clearly, this
is neither an exceptional case nor has Chicago sustained any
burden
.

Thomas

I.

Emerson, in his book T]^ System of Freedom of Expression

explicated
says that although the dissenters in the Times case finally
it was too
the importance of the traditional ban on prior restraint,

late.

the doctrine
”At least as far as movie censorship was concerned,

,
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in Its original form was abandoned.’*

Emerson’s general review of prior

restraint cases arising in various social contexts leads him to conclude
that much of the protective force of the original notion of prior re-

straint has been dissipated and now ’’merely signifies a type of restriction that the courts will scrutinize with special care.”^

From a general overview of the cases which have arisen in school
contexts, it appears that here also the doctrine which historically pro-

hibited systems of prior review has been almost completely abandoned.
While it is not so difficult, by comparison with many of the speech cases

presented in the previous chapter, to accept the notion that some speech
is unprotected and thus can be stopped in a particular instance, it is

not so easy to accept the idea that all written materials can be properly subjected to systematic review before dissemination.

The question

becomes, isn't this precisely the type of prior restraint that the
framers of the First Amendment intended to prohibit?

We might well ask,

along with Chief Justice Warren, what makes prior review in the school
press cases exceptionally necessary.

Not surprisingly, these complex

issues and questions have led to some difference of opinion by courts

which have considered the issue of prior restraint with regard to the
student press.
Before beginning a general review of the cases dealing with prior
if
restraint in the school, it might be advisable to emphasize that even

dissemination
schools do not have a general system of prior review, the

of certain speech can be prevented.

This would include obscenity, de-

a material and subfamation, fighting words and speech which would case

stantial interference with school discipline.^®

It should be kept in

—
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mind, however, that the advocacy of illegal or uncooperative
action in
inaterials will not, without more, be held substantially disrup-

tive and therefore subject to prohibition.^^

But whatever the nuances

that separate protected from nonprotected speech, it is sufficient to

note here that administrators are not legally prevented from stopping
the dissemination of prohibitable speech, once it is discovered, or from

punishing the disseminators pursuant to a valid school rule,^^ simply
because they have not established a general system of prior review.
Although it has often been repeated that any system of prior restraint bears

heavy presumption against its constitutional validity,"

’’a

13

there is only one important case which abides by the classic prohibition
against prior restraint with regard to the student press
Board of Education
a minority view.

14
.

Fujishima v

.

The view presented by this case is definitely

Although it has never been directly overruled, there

is evidence that the reasonging and philosophy of the case have been

substantially rejected even in cases arising in the same jurisdiction.^^
In Fujishima , three male high school students were suspended for

the in-school distribution of an underground newspaper. The Cosmic Frog

,

a petition, and leaflets about the war in Vietnam, because they did not

first secure the approval of the superintendent as was required by a

Chicago rule.

Citing the Stpreme Court decisions in Near and Tinker

,

the

Seventh Circuit held that the rule was unconstitutional on its face as
to
imposing a prior restraint on the First Amendment rights of students

freedom of the press.

Although the court said it would allow appropri-

speech to prevent,
ate rules regulating the time, place, and manner of

allow a
for example, distribution during a fire drill; it would not
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general system of prior review.

The court felt that those cases from

other circuits which had interpreted the Tinker
case as allowing for systems of advance review were plainly.. wrong.
in no way suggests that students may be required to
announce their intentions of engaging in certain conduct before
hand so school authorities may decide whether to prohibit the
conduct.
Such a concept of prior restraint is even more offensive when applied to the long-protected area of publication. 16

The court expressed its belief that the appropriate way to interprete
the Tinker forecast rule was as

*’a

formula for determining when the re-

quirements of school discipline justify punishment.

.

.

That is,

if a reasonable forecast of prohibited behavior amounting to a substan-

tial disruption could have been made, then the students are properly

held responsible.

18

Although there is very little support in the case law for the exceptionally speech-protective approach taken by the court in Fuj ishima

,

Leon Letwin has persuasively argued against the double standard which

exists with regard to the student press and the press of general cir-

culation.^^

After examining several cases from the Fourth Circuit,

where prior review is permitted, he argues that even if prior review
were necessary it would not be feasible to provide constitutionally valid

substantive standards and procedures.

Substantive standards must be

defined narrowly and with exacting precision, and the notion of a prompt
procedural review process inherently conflicts with the student's due
process right to have time to defend a prohibited dissemination.

Taken

together, the criteria and procedures lead to undue self -censorship,

well-meaning

btit

impermissible censorship by school officials, self-

interested censorship of criticism by school authorities, and to the
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type of delay that is tantamount to a denial of speech.

Letwin conclud-

es that "the prudent course is to reject ex parte restraints by school

authorities and to reject the "double standard in respect to the press
rights of students" as not feasible and unnecessary in the school context.

The appropriate accommodation of first amendment rights and
school disciplinary needs is to reject that constitutionally
abhorrent form of governmental power, affirm the vitality of
the first amendment in the educational system, and rely on
traditionally favored remedies to deal with any serious abuses
that may arise. 22

The minority view, presented by the Fujishima case and by Letwin,
can easily be contrasted with the majority view, which would not deny,
at least in theory,

that a valid system of prior review can be develop-

ed and implemented in cases involving the distribution of written mat-

erials in school.

Although courts seldom attempt to justify general

systems of review as necessitated by exceptional circiimstances as Near

had required, a few cases may be pointed to from which such a justification could conceivably be created.

One Federal District Court case, Frasca v. Andrews

,

can be used to

to illustrate why general systems of prior review might arguably be con-

sidered necessary and justified as exceptional cases in the context of

public schools.

Here, the former Ebitor-in-Chief and the present

Assistant Editor of an official high school newspaper sought an injuncschool
tion against the principal's seizure of the final issue of the

paper.

to
The principal seized the paper, in part, because of a letter

student.
the editor which criticized the conduct of a particular

In

in his duties
addition to accusing him of having been a "total failure"
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as Vice President of the student government

ly protected)

,

(an opinion which is arguab-

it said that he had used a computer to falsify his report

card grades, and that he did not maintain a high academic average.

The

court held that because the principal’s investigation showed that the

letter was "substantially false," he had a "rational and substantial basis" for preventing its publication based on the fact that libel is not

protected speech.

Even if the libeled student could collect money dam-

ages from the person who spoke falsely, it might be asked if that remedy

would be sufficient from an educational point of view where emotionally
less mature and captive students are involved.
In the same case, the court held that another letter to the editor

and a response to it were unprotected because there was reason to believe that its publication "would create a substantial risk of disruption.
.

."24

.

whether or not the degree of dis-

The court does not consider

The letters, which admittedly

ruption would have been substantial.
contain offensive langauge, follow:
Sports editor.

would like to know why you
the Chieftain. We would
in
articles
do not have any sports
else we will kick your
or
public
like a formal apology in
greasy ass.
We, the Lacrosse players.

.

.

/signed/

|igs|d e|f„sse
Team

We would like to reply by saying that the articles were
egotisWe would also like to say that you hotheaded,
stolen.
for
apology
an
deserve
not
do
tical, "pissed Off" jocks.
anything. ...
/signed/ The Editors
.

.

,.25

I

9S

The evidence showed "concern" over the "possibility"
of disruption and
"inharmonious" relationships; and while there well might have
been evidence that the letters would have created a material interference
with
school work or discipline, it does not appear in the written opinion.

The point here, however, is primarily to illustrate the types of written materials, which when considered in context, might be used in an

attempt to justify prior restraint in public schools as an exceptional
case.

A Federal District Court in Texas made an attempt to justify the
implementation of a general system of prior review in the school context

based upon the fact that students are a captive

and relatively immature

audience, and upon the fact that the educational process required that a

certain kind of environmental situation be maintained.

26

It is certainly

arguable that school authorities have the right and the duty to protect
students from material and substantial disruptions as well as from the
harms that might flow from allowing the free distribution of unprotected
forms of speech.

But even when courts do not attempt this sort of ex-

plicit justification, they almost universally allow for the possibility of
the constitutional implementation of general systems of prior review of

written materials in schools.

A major limitation, however, is that the

distribution must be a substantial one.

28

The criteria and procedures

that have been developed for prior review in schools will be considered
in the cases which follow.
In the leading case of Eisner v. Stamford Board of Education , the

that
Court of Appeals explicitly rejected the lower court's conclusion

prior review would be unconstitutional in all circumstances.

29
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A public school is undoubtedly a ’’marketplace of ideas.”
Early involvement in social comment and debate is a good
method for future generations of adults to learn intelligent
involvement.
But we cannot deny that Connecticut has authority to minimize or eliminate influences that would dilute or
disrupt the effectiveness of the educational process as the
state conceives it. 30

The Eisner

court, unlike the court in the Fuj ishima case, interprets

Tinker as allowing for considerable administrator discretion to both
control the educational process and to ’’restrain the distribution of dis-

ruptive matter.
op

The court in Eisner looked at several cases to devel-

a relatively comprehensive list of the substantive criteria by which

school officials could legitimately bar literature from the school.
•

.

.

scenity, libel, and insulting or fighting words are not protected.

Ob-

32

Words which have the effect of force, in addition to fighting words, are

not protected.

33

And words which would create a material and substantial

interfersnce with school activities would not be protected.

34

But while

school officials may censor the content of written materials, another

court gives this warning:

”[T]he school board's burden of demonstrating

reasonableness becomes geometrically heavier as its decision begins to
focus upon the content of materials that are not obscene, libelous, or

inflammatory.”

35

While the Eisner case shows that it is theoretically possible to

establish criteria for prior review that will withstand constitutional
challenges of vagueness or overbreadth, in practice this has been very

difficult for schools to accomplish.

In one case where a prior submis-

the
sion rule prohibited materials that were ’’libelous" and "obscene,”

rule was held invalid because it was vague.

"intolerable" in a prior restraint context.

Vagueness was said to be
The regulation needed.
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according to the court, "narrow, objective, and reasonable standards
by

which the material will be judged.

Another case held that a rule was

vague which provided that student publications must meet the "journalistic standards of accuracy, taste, and decency" of newspapers in the gen-

eral community and not be obscene, libelous, or

•to

incite to crime.

In

another case a regulation prohibiting material that would incite disruption was held to be both overbroad and vague.

It was overbroad be-

cause it did not limit itself to proscribing what would incite a "material disruption, and it was vague because disruption was not precisely

defined.

Another policy was held overbroad for including protected com-

mercial speech within its prohibition.

40

And in a final case, the prior

submission rule was invalidated because it did not detail the criteria
"by which an administrator might reasonably predict" the occurrence of a

substantial disruption or a material interference with school activities.

41

The court in this case held that the discretion which could pro-

perly be exercised by school officials was limited by the First Amendment rights of the students.

Many more examples of vagueness and over-

breadth could be given, but these few will serve to illustrate both how
the courts have protected student press activities and the difficulty of

narrowly defining general terms and terms with precise legal significance.
In addition to defining suppressable materials with particularity,

courts which permit prior review have demanded that various procedural

prior
safeguards be instituted in order to limit the adverse effects of
restraint.

The idea of procedural limitations on the power of censorial

review was developed in the Supreme Court case of Freedm an
A

which concerned a film censorship system.

^

v.

Marylanci

The court required that the
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burden be placed on the censor, that a judicial
determination be had

before final restraint, and that the period of time for
review be
brief.

The importance of judicial review of relevant facts where
free

speech issues are involved was emphasired by the Court.

Freedman v

Maryland was followed to a great extent by the court in Eisner

,

.

the first

case to discuss the necessary procedures for prior submission by students of written materials in schools.

Although the Eisner court did not

require school authorities to seek judicial review, it did reaffirm that
the burden was on school officials to justify censorship and that the

procedure should specify ”to whom and how material may be submitted for
clearance" and should contain a "definite brief period within which re-

view of submitted material will be completed.
Later cases from the same circuit which decided the Eisner case ex-

panded the necessary procedural requirements, adding that the procedures
must specify the effect of failure to give prompt review;

quate and prompt appeal procedure must be provided;

45

must be guaranteed the right to defend their position.

44

that an ade-

and that students
46

have confirmed that contingency plans may be necessary;

47

Other cases
and that an

appeal procedure should be provided.

The most colorful speech-protective language to be found in the
student press cases comes from the Fifth Circuit case of Shanley v.

Northeast Independent School District

.

In upholding the right of five

seniors to print and distribute an underground newspaper adjacent to the

high school, the court referred to the case as a "judicial believe-it-or
existence
not" where the school board "failed to recognize even the bare

production
of the First Amendment" when it drafted a policy regarding the
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and distribution of printed materials.^®

The two controversial subjects

contained in the suppressed underground newspaper, The
Awakening

,

advo-

cated a review of the marijuana laws, and told where
information about

birth control could be obtained.

The court characterized the content of

the paper as so benign that ”it could easily surface, flowerlike, from
its 'underground’ abode."

In addition to being declared vague and

overbroad, the prior review policy in Shan ley was held constitutionally

deficient because of its inddequate review procedures.

In addition to

the initial review, the court required that the policy state "a reason-

able appellate mechanism and its methodology" and give "a brief and

reasonable time during which the appeal must be decided."

The educa-

tional purpose underlying strict procedural protections for First Amend-

ment speech activity was eloquently stated by the court.
[T]he purpose of education is to spread, not to stifle, ideas
and views.
Ideas in their pure and pristine form, touching
only the minds and hearts of school children, must be freed
from despotic dispensation. ... It is most important that
our young become convinced that our Constitution is a living
reality, not parchment preserved under glass. 53

There are obvious reasons why almost all systems of prior review
that have been considered by the courts have been held to be constitu-

titionally vague, overbroad, or lacking in appropriate procedures that
will minimize the adverse effects of prior restraint.

At the present

time, however, schools wishing to establish systems of prior review of

student press activities, must

make a good faith effort to precisely

define the criteria to be applied and to institute procedures for re-

view and for appeal.

The exception to the general rule would be for
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schools in the states comprising the Seventh Circuit—
Wisconsin,
Illinois, and Indiana--where prior review has not been
permitted.

If

school officials should decide that the legal requirements are
too

onerous or that a general policy of prior review of written materials
is not necessary, they might begin to consider what alternative means

could serve the legitimate goals of review without providing the oppor-

tunity for illegal censorship of opinion.

The Seventh Circuit stands

alone in recommending subsequent punishment as a viable alternative to

prior review.

Letwin suggests, in addition to the punishment of stu-

dents engaged in proscribed and licentious speech activities, that the
school call upon its police powers to silence those creating any dis-

ruption or disturbance, or that it seek an injunction to prevent illegal
speech in an exceptional case.

55

In addition, educational alternatives

providing for a voluntary or mandatory advisory system might obviate the
necessity for any of these more extreme procedures.
The general history of First Amendment law teaches that prior restraint should not be taken lightly.

Whether the review of the student

press can be justified as a general policy or whether it represents an

unconstitutional and paternalistic double standard is yet to be com-

pletely resolved by authoritative court decision.

And despite the im-

portant educational interests at stake, or possibly because of these
interests, the restrictions allowed by the explicit or implicit approval

of prior restraint may yet be eliminated by constitutional design or by
default.
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Written Speech:

Protected and Not Protected

A problem tangentially related to student freedom to
distribute

written materials in and near school involves situations where,
in
addition to potentially protected speech activities, the students engage in a "pattern of open and flagrant defiance of school discip-

line,"^^ or are accused of "gross disobedience."^^

The three cases

that will be used to illustrate this problem involve three underground

newspapers

,

Watermelon

.

The High School Free Press

,

Space City

,

and

Plain Brown

58

In all three of the above cases the students who sought to distrib-

ute the newspapers in school were told not to do so, either because the

prior review policy had been ignored;

59

or, in one case, because the

previous issue had "four letter words, filthy references, abusive and

disgusting language, and nihilistic propaganda.

Taken together, the

cases contain examples of the following behavior that was held to be

defiance of school

independently unprotected in the school context;

prior submission policies, refusal to surrender newspapers upon request,
trying to get others to refuse to surrender papers, using profanity
in confrontations with school officials, and defying suspension policies.

Even though the speech-related activities of these students probably

would have been otherwise protected, the cases uniformly held that the
students involved could be reprimanded or disciplined for gross dis-

obedience, or for a pattern of defiant behavior.
legally enacted
Students should not be permitted to ignore.
regulations of the school board. Even if such regulations imrights
pinge in the most flagrant manner upon the constitutional
of a student, his remedy is to challenge the rules through
.

.
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lawful means.

Furthermore, since the students were being disciplined for
their behavior and not for their speech activities, there was no need to
find that

there had been a material and substantial interference with school
dis-

cipline as would otherwise be required by Tinker.
The overwhelming message in these cases is that even though student

constitutional rights are being infringed by unconstitutional prior re-

view policies or by unconstitutional ad hoc suppression, the students
have very little choice but to respectfully seek to challenge the actions
or procedures through established educational or legal channels.

The

legal system requires all who seek their aid to come into court with

"clean hands.

The one exception to the clean hands policy would be if students
sought to challenge a prior review policy as unconstitutional on its
face and were successful.

Even though the behavior of the particular

students could have been punished under a properly drawn policy, the
courts will enjoin their punishment because of the law’s potentially

unconstitutional application to others.

64

.

....

This type of adjudication in

the First Amendment free speech area is an exception to the rule that

plaintiffs cannot ordinarily litigate the rights of third parties.^^
It is

necessary because regulations which are vague and overbroad, and

therefore invalid on their face, will often serve to chill speech through
self-censorship.

As a practical matter, therefore, those who have vio-

lated the policy are often in the best position to challenge it.

The following group of cases represents ways in which courts have
written
protected speech where school officials have sought to regulate
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materials by blanket suppression, by interference even
though there was
no material and substantial disruption, by regulation of the
content

of protected speech, or by reaching beyond the authority of their
police

powers into the community.

The instance of blanket suppression is illustrated by a regulation

which prohibited "circulating propaganda" which is "alien to school purposes," including all political, religious, or commercial literature;
and the recruiting of members for political and religious groups.

Not

surprisingly, the court held the attempted regulation both vague and
overbroad.

The court did not allow the attempted prohibition of dis-

tributional and recruiting activities because they were not limited to
those activities that would materially disrupt school discipline or

that would interfere with the rights of others.

In a similar case, the

court held the rule against the distribution of all non-school sponsored

written materials in school and for two hundred feet beyond school property to be overbroad because it was not limited to that type of distri-

bution that would pose a material and substantial interference.^^

Another case which illustrates that courts do not look favorably on the
blanket suppression of non-school related ideas appearing in written
materials concerns students who wished to publish an advertisement

opposing the war in Vietnam in the school paper.

Relying on the

rationale of the Tinker case, the court held that students could not be
limited to expressing only "matters pertaining to the high school and
its activities" in the school paper.

The court was of the opinion

premised on
that the First Amendment gave a right of access to students
of diverse
the fact that the paper was a "forum" for the expression
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Student opinion.
Even where there is no attempt at blanket suppression,
courts have

sometimes looked carefully in making their independent determination
to
see if there was a reasonable forecast of a material and substantial
.

In one case two student editors were suspended from

school and removed from extra-curricular activities for their part in

the production of a literary

journal that was critical of school

policies and school authorities.^^

The punishment was accomplished

pursuant to a state statute which proscribed "gross disobedience or

misconduct."

The misconduct consisted of the distribution of written

materials containing the opinion that the dean had a "sick mind," as
well as the statement that "oral sex may prevent tooth decay."

The

journal further urged students and faculty to refuse to accept or to

destroy "propaganda" given them by school officials.
Reversing a former opinion on rehearing, the Court of Appeals
invalidated the student suspensions because the criticism was not a
material and substantial interference per se and there had been no

evidentiary hearing on the issue of a reasonable forecast of a material
and substantial interference.

There had been a storm of protest in

legal circles over the original opinion, which had ruled for the school

board even though no evidence was taken on whether the Tinker forecast
rule had been reasonably applied by school officials.

The decision

contains no evidence that the student punishment was based on anything
but the objectionable content.
who wished to
In a similar case, one student editor and one student

which
receive a banned copy of the Farmingdale High School newspaper,

A
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included a sex information supplement, brought their
challenge to federal court.

72

The court held that the confiscation by the principal was

not reasonably necessary to avoid a material and substantial
interference with school work and discipline and therefore violated the
First
and Fourteenth Amendment rights of the students.

More generally, this

case illustrates the proposition that school officials cannot ban the

distribution of literature because of a desire to suppress the content.

Another case which dealt with birth control information concerned
an article, "Sexually Active Students Fail to Use Contraception," which

appeared in a student paper called The Farm News

.

Although the school

board argued that the paper was created as part of the curriculum and
that students were a captive audience that needed protection, the court

rejected these arguments.

In the opinion of the court, the paper had

been established as a "public forum" and not as an "official publication" that was a part of the curriculum.

74

For this reason the general

power of the board to regulate the curriculum would not apply to allow
them to ban the portions of the school paper which were found objectionable.

The lower court had observed that in this case the students

were actually less captive than they had been in Tinker

,

because to

receive the communication required the affirmative act of reading the
newspaper.

75

The banning of purportedly obscene materials is another area of
frequent litigation.

In one case a student literary magazine, Streams

of Consciousness, was impounded by the principal because it contained
"fell
four-letter words, a description of a movie scene where the couple

into bed," and was generally "obscene.

Federal District Court

106

directed the return of the magazine noting that it was
not obscene based
on the standard which is applicable to minors.

There was "no extended

narrative tending to incite sexual desires or appealing to
the "prurient
interest" of minors.

Based on the obscenity standard in Miller v.

(with the addition of the variable obscenity idea from

Ginsberg

>/.

New York which defines obscenity relative to age) a work

would be obscene for minors if, taken as a whole, it "appeals to the
prurient interest" of minors, describes sexual conduct in a "patently
offensive way," and "lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value,"
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Another area in which problems often arise, as was pointed out in
the previous chapter, involves cases where the First Amendment protec-

tions for speech and religion might conceivably come into conflict.

In

a case where parents challenged the school's guidelines for the distri-

bution of religious literature, arguing that to allow distribution would
create an establishment of religion, the court held in a nine to five

opinion that the distribution of religious literature should be treated
like the distribution of other literature and not banned based upon con-

siderations of content.

A judge whose opinion was eventually adopted

by the majority argued that to disallow religious literature in school

would be a "wooden, nonconstitutional formulation of a wall of separaIt would be to "single out religion for especial and hostile

tion.

treatment and to stand the First Amendment on its head."

"[L]et all

be heard, the Jew, the Catholic, the Protestant, the Buddhist, the

Atheist--all who care enough to come forward to advance or defend their
views.

82
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The general lesson of this latter group of cases
is that the courts
will look for narrow and specific policies that impose
any type of prior

restraint and for actual evidence of a material and substantial
interference before accepting administrator action in derrogation
of the free

speech rights of students.

They will also look to see if the content of

written materials is being impermissibly scrutinized.

Apart from con-

tent which is obscene, libelous, inflammatory, or which in some other way

creates a material and substantial interference or interferes with the
rights of others, it is probable that no other prohibitions can be con-

stitutionally imposed.

83

The next two cases to be considered in this section show that
courts will generally allow schools to regulate the distribution of

written materials, within limits, even though that distribution takes

place off the school campus.

84

It stands to reason that to provide

talismanic immunity to distribution beyond the geographical boundary
of school property would not serve to aid the implementation of several
important educational policies.

What is relevant is whether the mater-

ials distributed will affect the school, not where they are distributed.

Two Federal Courts of Appeals cases have set limits on the school's

authority with regard to the distribution of written materials off
school grounds.

The earlier case upheld the right of five seniors to

print and distribute an underground newspaper on property adjacent to
the high school.®^

In reaching its decision, consideration was given

to the fact that there had been no material and substantial disruption

either actual or foreseeable.

Recognizing that the justification for

regulation pertains to the effect on schooling itself, the court gave
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the opinion that the authority to punish off-campus
activity could not

exceed the authority to punish on-campus behavior.

The later case con-

cerned the five day suspension of a high school student who
distributed
an allegedly obscene magazine off school grounds.®^

the publication, Hard Times

,

The court felt that

was "aptly described by the banner across

its cover as 'uncensored, vulgar, immoral.

Noting that there was

no evidence of any activity or any effect within the school, the court
held that "the First Amendment forbids public school administrators
and teachers from regulating the material to which a child is exposed

after he leaves school each afternoon."

Absent an in-school effect,

the students have the First Amendment right to produce and distribute

the magazine off school grounds, subject to the right of parental discipline.

Of course, school boundaries are not irrelevant.

The closer the

distribution is to the school grounds the more likely its effect will be
felt in the school building itself.

But the authority to regulate out-

of-school activities will have to be found in the general police power
of state officials and exercised in a manner that will allow the broadest protection of intellectual freedom.

The last group of cases in this section involves situations where
the written speech activities of students have not been protected.

The

inquiry focuses on the propriety of the various rationales for the

suppression of intellectual freedom in cases where the type of speech

objected to has been either religious speech or speech which was considered to be either indecent or vulgar.

Unlike the Fifth Circuit case considered earlier where the
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distribution of religious literature in schools was
treated like the
distribution of all other literature, a Federal District
Court in Neb-

raska held that the distribution of religious literature
in school was
not religiously neutral and therefore violated the First
Amendment pro-

hibition against religious establishment.^^

The court felt that to per-

mit the distribution of religious literature in school would be
more

than an accommodation of religion.

It would be interpreted by students

and parents alike as having been approved by the board of education.
IVhile there

may very well be good reasons for disallowing the distribu-

tion of religious literature in school, the court does not fully develop
them.

It does not consider the existence of a possibly conflicting First

Amendment speech issue, and it does not adequately distinguish religious
from political literature.
In a New York case where students at a public college attacked re-

ligion in a student publication, the court held that such activity was a

violation of the government neutrality toward religion required by the
First and Fourteenth Amendments.
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"The students.

.

.

are perfectly free

to hold views against religions, to voice these views and to publish

them.

They may not, however, utilize public facilities to do so."
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The Tinker case was cited for the proposition that speech may be regulated when there is a constitutionally valid reason to do so and when there
is an interference with the rights of others.

not really clear.
from other speech?

Again, the rationale is

Why is it that religious speech is distinguishable
What is the specific constitutional rationale for

such separation?

The general issue presented by these cases seems to be whether
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state school officials promote or establish religion by simply
allowing
or granting the privilege to distribute, discuss, or publish religious

views?

Is financial aid,

either direct or indirect, which is given on a

content neutral basis, sufficient to implicate the state in the views

espoused?

Is a complete separation between school activities and the

activities of religious groups necessary to prevent an entanglement between church and state?

At least with regard to student newspapers,

there is growing support for the idea that they are not to be viewed as

agencies of the state, but as semi-public forums where students have con-

siderable freedom in presenting their views on a wide variety of topics,

perhaps including religious ones.
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It is at least arguable that the

two cases which did not allow the distribution and publication of religious materials illustrate the proposition that when freedom of speech

potentially conflicts with freedom of religion, the free speech proviIf this is not the case,

sion of the First Amendment is undervalued.

fuller explication should be given in written court opinions so that the

public may see how these important values, both of which are encompassed

by the notion of intellectual freedom

have been reconciled.

With regard to the issue of whether or not school officials may con-

stitutionally prohibit speech which is indecent and vulgar, though not
obscene, there is one case which holds that "First Amendment rights to
free speech do not require suspension of decency in the expression of
.

views and ideas.

.

The court found Tinker irrelevant because in that

case vulgarity had not been involved.

The case concerned the suspension

student body, for
of the senior class president and the president of the

distributing an underground newspaper. Oink

,

which contained four- letter

.
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words, a drawing of then- President Nixon making an obscene
gesture, two

drawings of nude women, and two erotic poems.

In concluding that there

was no need to show disruption (obscenity was not mentioned)

,

the court

showed considerable solicitude for what it considered to be the proper
moral standards for a learning environment.

A concurring opinion in a

recent case supports the conclusion that school authorities can properly

regulate indecent language and that such regulation does not necessitate
a finding of disruption or obscenity.
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School authorities can regulate indecent language because
its circulation on school grounds undermines their responsibility
to try to promote standards of decency and civility among school
children.
With its captive audience of children, many of
whom, along with their parents, legitimately expect reasonable
regulation, a school need not capitulate to a student's preference
for vulgar expression. 9S
.

.

.

While it may be true that indecent speech which is not obscene will
not be constitutionally protected in the public school environment, there
has not been an authoritative opinion in the school law area which either

defines indecent speech or gives a supporting rationale for its suppression based on anything more than vague notions of decency, civility, and

morality.

To assume that FCC v. Pacifica Foundation

,

which involved the

banning of indecent speech from prime time radio programs, is directly
applicable is to forget that broadcasting has always received the most
limitfed First Amendment protection.

The Supreme Court, in a divided

opinion, considered that words referring to excretory or sexual activities or organs from comedian George Carlin's satiric monologue "Filthy
a
Words," when broadcast in the afternoon, were a nuisance, not unlike

pig in a parlous.

Justice Brennan, in dissent, says that the Court

result is "patently wrong," "dangerous," and "lamentalbe."

He also

s
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finds it disturbing that some members of the Supreme Court have
a depressing inability to appreciate that in our land of
cultural pluralism, there are many who think, act, and talk
differently from the Members of this Court, and who do not
share their fragile sensibilities.
It is only an acute
ethnocentric myopia that enables the Court to approve the
censorship of communications solely because of the words
they contain. 97
It is apparent that if objectionable speech which is not legally obscene

for minors is to be held unprotected, a good constitutional rationale

needs to be developed.

Until then, it can be argued that such speech

should be protected in order to avoid an undue chilling effect on free-

dom of communication.

Despite the obscenity rules developed by the Supreme Court in

Miller v. California

,

which makes a finding of obscenity somewhat eas-

ier to achieve than it had been previously,
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it is probably true that

the so-called variable obscenity standard still retains considerable
vitality.

This standard, which was first enunciated by the Supreme

Court in Ginsberg v. New York

,

would allow the determination of obscen-

ity to be made relative to the age and level of maturity of the audience.

That is, what is obscene for minors would be decided by con-

sidering the average minor, not the average adult.

The purpose of this

to
variable standard is to support the rights of the parent with regard

child-rearing and to protect the state's interest in child welfare.

But

standard is
to admit the continued vitality of the variable obscenity

would prohibit
not to permit the implementation of policies which

offensive materials that meet some lesser standard.

There is consider-

constitutionally valid
able support for the proposition that the only
traditional ones suggested
reasons for limiting student speech are the
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by the Supreme Court cases of Tinker and Chaplinsky

.

Speech that is

obscene, libelous, or consists of fighting words, or which would create
a material and substantial interference would be prohibitable.

An

explicit finding of obscenity is just as necessary in school situations
as It IS in the public forum.

Of course this does not mean that

speech which offends but which is not constitutionally obscene might
not be prohibitable on some other grounds.

The issue of the student's

right not to know and not to hear, made especially important because the

student is part of a captive audience, also needs to be considered.

But

whatever the reason for repressing or censoring speech, the major point
remains that it must be one that meets constitutional standards so that

intellectual freedom in schools can be protected and promoted consistent

with other rights.

Commercialism and Solicitation

Attempts by schools to ban commercial and promotional activities
are generally motivated by a desire to maintain the kind of school en-

vironment which is conducive to educational endeavors and to protect
students, who are less mature and captive, from being subjected to the
The

pressures which would inevitably accompany monetary solicitations.

madesire has not been to interfere with the distribution of written

protect imterials per se, but to preserve institutional order and to

mature and naive students from undue pressure.

Because these rules do

at the non-communinot aim at suppression of the content of speech but

or not the regucative impact of speech, the question becomes whether
activity.
lation unduly constricts the flow of communicative

m
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order to answer this question in cases which arise in public
schools,
it is necessary to briefly review an important concept that
has devel-

oped in First Amendment adjudication over the last forty years or so
the concept of the public forum.

The idea behind the concept of a public forum is that there are
certain places, such as streets and parks, which have historically been

used by people wishing to communicate.

This use has been so continuous

and pervasive that these places have taken on a special meaning and a

special status, and speech-related activities in such places cannot be

regulated unless such regulation is necessary to serve a "significant
governmental interest.

The type of restrictions which are generally

considered appropriate are limited to those controlling the time, place,
and manner of speech.

Several commentators have suggested that schools,

which have a special interest in promoting intellectual freedom, are
public or semi-public forums, where speech-related activities can be

regulated only to the extent necessary to maintain the activities associated with their central purpose.

The first two cases to be considered in this section represent the

minority and less speech-protective view regarding commercialism and
solicitation in public schools.

The first case presents a challenge to

a forty-seven year old school rule against "soliciting funds."

108

The

four plaintiffs in the case had distributed a leaflet called "Join the

Conspiracy" in an attempt to solicit defense money for eight Illinois
defendants.

Apparently asking merely whether the rule against solici-

"sufficiently high
tation was rational, the court held that there was a
the ban.
probability of harm" from multiple solicitations to uphold
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The rule, according to the court, was ’’reasonable and proper” and
had
a ’’rational relation to the orderly operation of the school system.

The court did not ask whether such a comprehensive ban had an unduly

restrictive effect on speech or whether it was necessary to maintain
the central educational purpose of the school; and the degree and type

of harm was not made explicit.

Even though the rule might be considered

reasonable, the fact that it had been in effect for forty-seven years
does not alone prove its necessity.
In another case upholding a rule against selling or soliciting in

school, an eleven year old student was suspended for three days for

selling a newspaper, Protean/Radish .

Here, the court failed to note

that enforcement of the policy would limit the free exchange of ideas,
at least indirectly; and held that there was no First Amendment issue

involved.

It reasoned that since free distribution was not prohibited,

the case raised no constitutional issue.

Despite the conclusion reached

here and in the previous case, it is arguable that flat bans against
sale and solicitation do unduly restrict the flow of ideas in a public

forum dedicated to teaching and learning.

Such regulation, which goes

beyond the reasonable control of time, place, and manner, is probably

unnecessary as well as unconstitutional , in most cases.
Although the concept of school as a public forum has yet to be
invalidated
widely relied on explicitly, there are four cases which have
the collecschool rules against advertising and promotional activities,
in nature,
tion of funds, the distribution of materials ’’commercial

commercialism and solicitation respectively.

and

The first court used

cases, holding
reasoning similar to that found in the prior restraint
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that the rule was vague and overbroad and did "not reflect any effort
to minimize the adverse effect of prior restraint."

The second court

held that a blanket ban on the sale of papers was an unconstitutional
regulation of time, place, and manner which violated the First Amendment

per the Supreme Court decision in Tinker

.

In the last two cases, al-

though the defendants suggested that the bans were necessary to avoid a
substantial and material interference with the educational program, both
courts held that the outright prohibition of commercialism and solici-

tation was inconsistent with the First Amendment speech provision.

The

courts seemed to look beyond the allegations of interference made by the

defendants and found that the regulations were unduly restrictive and
not necessary.

Both courts said that such bans, to be constitutional,

would have to be justified by a reasonable forecast of a material and
substantial interference.

The above cases recognize, either implicitly or explicitly, that
there is something unique about a school.

^Vhile it

may not have the

venerable public forum history of a public street or a public park, it
to
is especially dedicated to promoting an exchange of ideas incident

the educational process-- something not true of streets and parks.

It

are a captive
is perhaps because the students in these public forums

state not
audience that it is especially important to insure that the

number of ideas.
make them the "closed-circuit recipients" of a limited
marketplace of
A public school is more than a marketplace, it is a

ideas— a public forum with

intella special interest in promoting the

ectual freedom of its citizens.

This idea is well expressed by the

cases.
District Court judge in one of the previous

3

U7
A public school is
ment in debate and
the development of
proper functioning

a market place of ideas and early involecomment and free exchange is essential to
the democratic spirit necessary to the

of our government

.

11

Although a school is only semi-public in the sense that it is dedicated
to a particular, specialized, and limited purpose, it is perhaps
because

of the importance of this purpose to the individual and to society that
it deserves at least as much reverence as we give to the great public

forums of the street and the park.

Conclusion

The device of prior review, which has unique application to written
materials and which has been applied with frequency to the student press,
is an extraordinary device.

favor in the legal tradition.

It has a long history of particular dis-

Because of the type of environment that

is conducive to the educational process and because of the relative

immaturity of the students involved, the argument that the student press
represents an exceptional case with regard to the issue of prior review
is understandable.

But this same justification, the promotion of learn-

ing among a captive and immature group of individuals

,

could also be

used to argue that prior review is inappropriately repressive.

Even if

prior review is determined to be desirable, it must be remembered that
most attempts to establish criteria and procedures able to pass consti-

tutional muster have failed.

A better educational alternative might

well be to institute review procedures that serve an advisory function

rather than a censorial function.

Traditional legal remedies along

and
with an advisory system may have a better chance of protecting
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promoting intellectual freedom, along with other important
values,
than the potentially more repressive systems of prior
review.
%

Just as the motivation for prior review of the student press
is
arguably excessively protective, the same argument could be made
against
blanket prohibitions and ad hoc attempts to regulate student morality
by controlling exposure to materials found offensive by school officials.
Blanket prohibitions on non-school literature, commercial literature,
and the sale of literature, even if well-motivated, represent a philo-

sophical approach to schooling which misunderstands the special public

forum function of education in our society.

The attempt to impose

rigid standards of propriety with regard to the type of speech which is
allowable in written materials is probably unnecessary, unwise, and
unconstitutional.

While obscenity is clearly not protected, the cases

show much confusion as to how the judgment of obscenity is to be made.
A description of a movie scene where a couple ’’fell into

bed*’

is clearly

not obscene; and while distasteful, neither is most profanity and vulgarity.

A review of the cases suggests that until a rationale can be de-

veloped by which indecent speech can be constitutionally prohibited,
expression will be subject to regulation for traditional reasons only.

Two other issues arising in this chapter concern attempts to reg-

ulate the distribution of written materials off-campus and attempts to
prohibit the distribution of religious literature in school.
issue is relatively well settled.

The first

While school officials have no great-

er authority beyond the school boundary, they can regulate those activities which have a substantially deleterious effect on the school's

learning environment.

The religious establishment issue remains as
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unsettled as it was in those similar cases presented in the previous
chapter.

While the one case which gave thorough consideration to both

the religion and speech issues held that religious literature should be

treated like all other literature, the cases which emphasized the freedom of religion issue ruled against freedom of speech having a religious content.

In a sense, intellectual freedom concerns both freedom

of belief as well as freedom of speech.

Additional authoritative

treatments of cases where these two fundamental values come into conflict may help to clarify their appropriate interaction and to develop
the basis for an appreciation of their importance in the promotion of

intellectual growth.

The next chapter will deal with intellectual freedom in the class-

room

— with

how teacher freedom or lack of freedom with regard to the

curriculum promotes or hinders the learning process.

In a sense the

focus will shift from the student to the teacher, but in another sense,

the focus remains on the student for it is he or she who is always the

principal subject of public education.

CHAPTER

V

ACADEMIC FREEDOM

Our nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic
freedom, which is of transcendant value to all of us.
That freedom is therefore a special concern of the First
Amendment, which does not tolerate laws that cast a pall
of orthodoxy over the classroom.
The classroom is
peculiarly the ’’marketplace of ideas.”
.

.

.

.

.

.

Justice William J. Brennan
Keyishian v. Board of Regents (1967)
Introduction

The subject of this chapter is freedom of speech for teachers.

Its

focus is limited to those speech activities taking place in the class-

room or in the school which directly relate to curricular and extra-

curricular activities in which students are involved.

Hence, it will

concern teacher freedom with regard to the selection of curricular materials, topics for discussion, and teaching methods; the limits to that
freedom; and due process protections for teacher speech.

Except in un-

usual cases it will not concern the teacher's speech or associational

activities outside of school even though they may relate to educational
issues.

In order to maintain the intellectual freedom focus, this chap-

ter will be limited to those speech and speech-related activities by
teachers which most directly affect their interactions with students in

educational settings.

The chapter is based on the assumption that teach-

of intellecers play a key role in developing and maintaining a climate
the quality of
tual freedom in schools, a climate that directly affects

student learning.
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The Limits of Teacher Freedom

A case which dramatically illustrates unduly permissive teacher behavior with regard to student speech over which they had control concerns the dismissal of two teachers for their part in permitting a ra-

cially inflammatory school program by the school's Black Student Alliance.^

It presents the issue of the extent to which teachers have an

obligation to control certain kinds of student speech.

One skit, "Okla-

homa Shootout," portrayed the mistreatment of blacks by whites and included the use of the terms "racist pig" and "mother fucker."

courtroom skit a white judge was referred to as a "racist pig."

Ih a

And in

a classroom skit, a white teacher was physically dragged from the room

after making derogatory remarks toward black students.

sulted in considerable disorder.

The program re-

There was a fire, property was damaged,

two lunchroom workers were injured, a teacher was hospitalized for smoke

inhalation, and the school was forced to close for ten days.

Although the court merely held that a review of the record showed
substantial evidence to sustain the dismissals, one concurring judge recognized that freedom of expression was an implicit issue in the case.
Where teachers are involved in approving speech which they should forsee
will create a material and substantial interference and where they could

have prevented such speech, teacher dismissals may be entirely warranted.
issue.
However, the court's reasoning should not ignore the free speech

nature of
The court should give explicit reasons for the non-protected
that context.
the speech and should examine the teacher's behavior in
are less valuable as
Conclusory opinions such as the one in this case
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precedent and will seem unjust in less extreme cases.

Although the

speech here was arguably licentious, for any number of reasons; those
reasons were not detailed.

If it is not shown that teachers are able to

predict a material and substantial interference, their dismissals will
seem unfair and will unduly chill freedom of expression.
In addition to inflammatory speech which either amounts to ’’fight-

ing words” or which would otherwise create a material and substantial

interference, teacher speech which urges non-cooperation with the dir-

ectives or wishes of school authorities is generally not protected.

This

proposition can be illustrated by a case where a teacher was not rehired
for directing a journalism class to cease publication of the school

paper, the B- Liner

,

rather than have it subjected to prior review.

2

The

principal had asked to see the paper prior to distribution because of a

rumor that it would be a "hot" issue containing an article about marijuana.

Noting that no constitutional issue was involved, the court affirm-

ed the school board's action.

The teacher's speech-related activities

were not protected because they were insubordinate.

In addition, they

allowed the court to avoid the constitutional issue of prior review.

Although teacher due process will be considered later, for the present
it is sufficient to note that a refusal to rehire can be based on almost

amy reason or no reason--unless the teacher's fundamental rights are

involved--because a teacher without a continuing contract has no consti-

tutionally guaranteed property right.
to four hunIn a similar case, a tenured teacher made statements

which implicitly
dred students who had gathered in the school gymnasium
superintendent that the
contradicted directives of the principal and the
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students return to classes.^

Citing Tinker

,

the court held that such

speech was not protected by the First Amendment because it interfered

with the regular operation of the schools.

Although the degree of

interference was not stressed, the teacher in this case was held properly dismissed for advocating a course of action opposed to that ad-

vocated by school officials.

And this was true despite the fact that

the student disquiet and disruption of normal school activities was

apparently induced by the summary dismissal of two popular student
teachers who had attended an anti-war rally at Kent State University.

The dismissals were based on the fact that they had failed to get
official permission to absent themselves from school although they had
the permission of their supervising teachers.
was apparently not easily reached.

this case.

The decision of the court

’’There are disquieting overtones to

The atmosphere of Southeast High School appears frightening-

ly oppressive and the board appears excessively authoritarian and vin-

dictive."^

But regardless of the extent of repression, the implication

of this case is that teachers must support the reasonable directives of
their superiors, at least in particularly tense situations.

The next case moves from advocacy of non-cooperation to advocacy
of violent action.

It involves a teacher, Beauregard Birdwell, who was

dismissed because of an anti-military class discussion conducted on a
day when military personnel were recruiting.

The teacher implicitly

physical force
and explicitly suggested to his students that they use
to induce the recruiters to leave campus.

According to the court, the

action" and not
comments were "infused with the spirit of violent

constitutionally protected.
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One important question suggested by the situation in the Birdwell
case is whether or not speech which is calculated to cause a material
and substantial interference with school activities is unprotected even

though it appears totally unlikely that such speech could have its intended effect.
Mr.

The court in this case clearly stated that it regarded

Birdwell 's speech in the class a disruption per se, apparently be-

cause the speech interfered with the prescribed course content.

Again

there is no explicit finding that the speech created a material and substantial interference as would be required by analogy to the Tinker case.
But by focusing on the fact that the extraneous discussion interfered

with the learning of algebra and by vague references to "potentially

disruptive conduct," the court misses the real point.

A teacher's ad-

vocacy of violence arguably need not create disruption or interference,
in any physical sense, to be constitutionally unprotected.

Although it

makes good sense to hold teacher advocacy of violence unprotected in

elementary and secondary schools, a better rationale will have to be
developed by the courts.
The advocacy of noncooperation and violence can be compared with
the advocacy of techniques of direct action such as boycotts and dem-

onstrations.

In a borderline case, a teacher was not rehired for ad-

vising students to demonstrate against a dress code by wearing slacks
or blue jeans. ^

The advocacy was held insubordinate and unprotected

because it advised disobedience.

The case is probably more analogous

to the cases where teachers have urged non-cooperation.

Another case

is more troubling.

coach of the
Where a teacher was removed from his position as

I
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swim team for growing a beard, another teacher. Miss Robbins, devoted
a total of fifty-five minutes on two days to a student- initiated dis-

cussion of the situation.^

Miss Robbins suggested that the students

could demonstrate their displeasure by engaging in a boycott of swimming events.

Although the teacher was apparently not rehired for

several different reasons, the court was of the opinion that the sug-

gestion of a student boycott of school events would be unprotected
speech.

The case is not like the earlier case where the teacher sug-

gested that four hundred students not return to the classes from which

they were absent without permission.

The difference is that here the

teacher merely suggested that students might engage in otherwise permissible and protected activity.

In other words, if the suggested

action is legal, violates no school rules, and does not interfere in
a material way with schoolwork, then the advocacy of such action should

be protected.

Teacher speech, like student speech, should be protected

unless it goes beyond the explicit or implicit limitations of Tinker

.

Human Sexuality and the Issue of Obscenity

While the subjects of human sexuality and obscenity are only tan-

gentially related from a legal point of view, they are similar to the
extent that both involve sex

—a

subject which is widely considered taboo

school
by adults concerned with the education of elementary and secondary

students.

the
The cases in which these issues arise illustrate some of

found in jumost remarkable repression of intellectual freedom to be

dicial documentation.

At times, school officials assume almost unlim-

discussion of sex-related
ited authority to ban the teaching and even

9
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issues, to fire homosexual teachers, and to dismiss those
teachers who

have used materials or engaged in class discussions where controversial
speech is involved.

While some courts have given due consideration to

freedom of speech, others are paternalistic, unduly deferential, and
even prudish.

Freedom of speech is very often less than enthusiastic-

ally protected where sex-related issues are concerned.

’’No

cases have

been cited, nor is this court prepared to say, that disapproval of a
teacher’s sexual references in a high school class,

.

.

.

,

is a vio-

lation of the right of free speech.”^
In a Florida case involving the mid-year dismissal of a teacher

for incompetency and immorality, the teacher had made remarks to a
group of "mixed boys and girls relating to sex and virginity and pre-

marital sex relations."

g

While it is conceivable that such comments

could be sufficiently immoral to justify mid-year dismissal, the opinion

of the court belies this conclusion.
[A]s to the immorality charge, there was evidence of unbecomin a class of mixed
ing and unnecessary risque remarks.
teenage boys and girls which we agree with the School Board
It may be that topless waitresses
were of an immoral nature.
vogue
in certain areas of our country
in
and entertainers are
and our federal courts may try to enjoin our state courts
from stopping the sale of lewd and obscene literature and the
showing of obscene films, but we are still of the opinion that
instructors in our schools should not be permitted to so
risquely discuss sex problems in our teenage mixed classes as
to cause embarrassment to the children or to invoke in them
other feelings not incident to the courses of study being
pursued.
.

.

it
The court in this case can hardly disguise its irritation with what

considers to be the undue permissiveness of the federal courts.

There

topless
was no indication that the teacher in this case discussed

waitresses or embarrassed any student.

The court’s solicitousness for

.
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the possible '’embarrassment'’ of the students as well as
its fear of the

possible invocation of ’’other feelings” suggest that the court's
major
concern was something other than protecting the constitutional
rights

of students and teachers.

The less obvious but more important result of

a case such as the present one is the extent to which the dismissal, if

not completely warranted, would tend to chill the speech of other

teachers
In another case a high school biology teacher was denied a contin-

uing contract for the discussion of ’’illegitimate" subjects.^®

Those

subjects included prostitution, masturbation, homosexuality, and gonorrhea.

But since the illegitimate topics also included criticism of

the School Board and the Superintendent, there is no way to tell whether
the issues related to human sexuality would have been considered suff-

icient standing alone.

The teacher was offered an annual contract for

the fourth year if he would agree to discuss nothing but biology on

school grounds.

Although it is generally held that state employment

cannot be conditioned upon giving up constitutional rights, the court

here held that there was no violation of the teacher's First Amendment
right to free speech.

While it is probable that the major concern in

this case was with biased criticism detracting from the teaching of

biology, it is certainly arguable that the limited discussion of sex-

related topics was not prima facie illegitimate in a high school biology
course.

A similar case occurred at the college level, where a teacher
"overemphasized sex" in a health survey course.

The court held that

content of a
there was no right to override superiors on the proper

128

college course.

After the general right of curricular control is con-

ceded, the question becomes how nnich emphasis is overemphasis and how

much speech is unduly chilled by post hoc determinations such as the
one made here.

A case raising several important issues involved the constitutionality of a state statute prohibiting giving instruction, advice, or information about birth control to students.
was completely barred.

12

Discussion of the topic

In addition to allowing for comprehensive school

board control of the curriculum, a topic to be pursued later, the court

held that the statute was not overly broad.

That is, the court appar-

ently felt that the topic of birth control could be completely banned
from discxission without violating the First Amendment.

No justifica-

tion was offered.

Another case concerned a teacher who was directed by the Superintendent not to conduct a debate on the subject of abortion.

13

The

court held that the teacher's union could not submit the dispute to

arbitration because to the extent that the contract made teachers responsible for the general course of study, the contract was illegal.
This type of reasoning, which equates general curricular control with

curricular decisionmaking power in specific situations, could be used
to silence speech on innumerable controversial topics.

It is not

necessarily inconsistent to say that while the school board retains
retain some
comprehensive control of the curriculum, the teachers also

right to academic freedom.

At this point, however, it is sufficient to

to silence controrecognize that this case illustrates yet another way

versial sex-related speech.

Arguably legitimate speech is suppressed
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by the mere assertion of generalized school board authority.

The im-

portance of intellectual freedom is not considered.
There are occasional cases which do recognize the right of public
employees to First Amendment freedom of speech where sex-related issues
are involved.

Two Federal Courts of Appeals have reversed teacher dis-

missals where one teacher gave a homework assignment to eleventh and

twelfth grade English students on the subject of teen-age attitudes
toward premarital sex,^^ and where the other discussed homosexuality

with boys in an eighth grade spelling and math class.

Perhaps the

discussion in the latter case was considered appropriate because the
class was not mixed.

was relevant.

Or perhaps the fact that the teacher was a woman

There is no question that there has been extensive har-

assment of teachers known to be homosexual, despite one leading case to
the contrary.

Views about homosexuality presented by homosexual teachers themselves are effectively precluded by school boards and courts adept at

justifying the transfer or dismissal of most known homosexuals.

In a

case where the male plaintiff had been a high school English teacher,

advisor to the school newspaper, and the play director, the school

board adopted a resolution requiring a psychological examination when
he became president of the New Jersey Gay Activist Alliance.

court emphasized that

’’the

reasons do

^

The

include a single instance of

classroom
any undue conduct or actions in the classroom or out of the

with respect to a particular student.

It nevertheless held that the

teacher's free
directive was fair and reasonable and did not violate the

speech rights.

the
The court cited Tinker for the proposition that
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First Amendment guarantees are dependent on the circumstances
of each

particular case.
The board does not question the right of the teacher to say
or to do any of the things which are mentioned ....
It
simply contentds that
.[the teacher's] actions display
evidence of deviation from normal mental health which may
affect his ability to teach, discipline and associate with
the students. 19
.

.

It appears that neither the school board nor the court looked at the

actual behavior of this teacher or at its effect on classroom activities
for evidence of mental illness.

The actions referred to are the assoc-

iational and speech activities themselves.
In another case, a homosexual teacher who had made several public

statements about homosexuality was transferred to a non-teaching position.

The teacher had appeared with his parents on a Public Broad-

casting System program designed to help homosexual children and their
parents cope with the special problems associated with homosexuality.

Although the court held, citing Tinker

,

that the teacher's speech was

protected because there was no substantial interference with teaching
or any reasonable forecast of such, it denied relief.

Because the

teacher had intentionally omitted his college membership in the
"Homophiles of Penn State" from the portion of the teaching application
asking for extracurricular activities
precluded.

,

his constitutional attack was

The court held to this position despite the fact that school

officials admitted that if the teacher had listed the membership, he

would not have been employed.
homosexual
One can only imagine the severity of the punishment if a

teacher attempted to speak of homosexuality in the classroom.

These
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CEses hEve deElt only wi'th situations where homosexual teachers have

merely been involved in associational and speech activities intended to
educate the general public.

And yet these teachers, if they allow their

homosexuality to be known, are almost universally denied the right to
practice their chosen profession.

If there are good reasons for barring

homosexual teachers from the classroom, they should be tested by constitutional standards and not evaded by disingenuous charges of intent to
deceive.

With very few exceptions, the present situation with regard to

homosexual teachers allows only two alternatives:

the permanent and

complete chilling of speech related to homosexuality by homosexual
teachers both inside and outside the classroom, and the abandonment of

teaching as a profession.
The next several cases are variations on a theme.
volve, in the words of one court,

'*a

They all in-

four letter word, beginning with

the letter "F,” being an extremely vulgar word meaning sexual intercourse.*’^^

These cases do not involve the teaching of subjects related

to human sexuality nor are they directly related to the legal issue of

obscenity.

They nevertheless are related to the earlier and later cases

in this section because they involve a sex-related word.
two
In the first case a teacher was fired in mid-year for requiring

punishment for
fifth graders to write a vulgar word a thousand times as

using it.^^

The court held that the situation presented ample evidence

freedom right to
of incompetency, and that the teacher had no academic
the use of vulgar words which had no purpose.

Even if the teacher's

of scrutiny can still be
poor judgment is conceded, the court's level
questioned.

action had a
The court held that the school board's
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rational basis that was supported by substantial evidence.

Where a

teacher's property and liberty rights and the right to academic freedom

may be involved, courts should arguably look for more than mere rationality.

A more sophisticated educational lesson was attempted by a fifth
grade teacher who, upon finding a note circulating among her students,

explained that the "vulgar colloquialisms" it contained were not nec-

essarily offensive in all circumstances.

The teacher was held prop-

erly demoted pursuant to a state statute which prohibited "neglect of
duty" and required that teachers maintain discipline and encourage
morality.

While the court did note that the application of the statute

would vary with the context, age, and maturity of the students, no consideration was given to the possible free speech issues involved and no
substantial degree of harm was required.

In the words of one concurring

judge, "our dockets cannot afford the time and effort to grind such
.

.

.

.

,,24

petty grist."

By way of contrast, the action of a teacher who explained the

meaning of "taboo" to his eleventh grade English class by writing the

word "fuck" on the board was protected.

In holding that the teacher

was not guilty of "conduct unbecoming a teacher," the court said that it
saw no alternative for "a case-by-case inquiry into whether the legiti-

mate interests of the authorities are demonstrably sufficient to circumscribe a teacher's speech.

In making this determination the court

and the
considered the relevance, purpose, and effect of the word’s use;
age, maturity, and sophistication of the students.

Although the court

license to say
recognized that "free speech does not grant teachers a

L
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or write in class whatever they may feel like,” it also said
that discharge of teachers could not be predicated on mere disapproval of
speech- related activities by school authorities.^^

Of course it is well-settled that the use of speech which is
legally obscene in the public school context would not be protected.^®

The Supreme Court has consistently held that obscenity is not protected
speech in any context.

29

The problem is how to define obscenity.

It

will not do to repeat the simple assertion of Justice Stewart—”! know
it when

I

see it.”^®

In the leading case of Keafe v. Geanakos

of Appeals found that the offensive word
uous son”

— was

— ”a

,

the First Circuit Court

vulgar term for an incest-

used in an article which was ”in no sense pornographic;”

that the word was "important to the development of the thesis;” and not

"unknown to many students in the last year of high school.

In

Parducci v. Rutland , the short story assigned by the teacher to her
class of high school juniors contained "several vulgar terras and a ref-

erence to an involuntary act of sexual intercourse.”

32

In holding that

the story was not obscene, the court said that ”[t]he slang words are

contained in two short rhymes which are less ribald than those found in

many of Shakespeare's plays.

The reference in the story to an act of

sexual intercourse is no more descriptive than the rape scene in Pope's
'Rape of the Lock."'^^

widely
Since the mere appearance in curricular materials of words
obscene,
considered to be vulgar will not make the materials legally

not resolved.
the question of what constitutes obscenity is still

Most

obscene has been held
of what has been considered by school boards as
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not to meet that legal definition.

In addition to the above cases,

example, MS magazine was held not obscene.

for

And federal court judges

are divided on the question, as can be illustrated by the case of BruTC

baker

Board of Education .
In this case three teachers were fired for distributing a ’’Wood-

stock” brochure to eighth grade students.

The mid-term discharge was

accomplished by a board who felt the brochure was ’’obscene and improper”
reading for eighth graders.

Some of the objectionable sections, taken

out of context, are as follows:

take acid.

A place to make love,

touching each other.

.

.

’’Woodstock felt like home.
.

.

.

A place to

Bodies naked into the water,

moving together we're a big fucking wave.

Old world crumbling, new world being bom.”^^

.

.

.

Although a determination

of obscenity must be made by considering the work as a whole, this was
apparently not the procedure followed here.

To the teachers' objection

that the board should have reached its conclusion of impropriety with
the benefit of expert opinion in the fields of literature, obscenity,
and drugs, the court responded;

"Experts should not be needed to sup-

port a conclusion that is obvious.”

37

At least one person who did not consider the conclusion obvious

was a dissenting judge.

He stated that the brochure was not obscene in

the legal sense.

The use of profanity does not transform the controversial into
Even assuming the continuing validity of
the obscene.
the variable obscenity doctrine, and making the widest allowances for the age of plaintiffs' students, neither the brochure as a whole nor the poem "Getting Together” begin to
satisfy the Miller criteria. 38
.

.

.

case, a California
In sharp contrast to the immediately preceding

13S

court protected a teacher from a mid-year dismissal for
her actions in

allowing a group of eighth graders "to write directly on a
ditto sheet"
that would later be duplicated for class discussion.

The students,

who were in a special class for poor readers, apparently took great
pleasure in writing stories containing references to male and female
sex organs and to the sex act.'^^

A dissenting judge felt that the

stories were legally obscene unless that word is "a semantic fiction,

wholly unrelated to any reality,.

.

The decision of the court can perhaps best be understood by con-

sidering the concurring opinion of one judge who considered the partic-

ular situation in great detail.

The students were poor readers, thirteen

to fourteen years old, largely from impoverished neighborhoods in a rel-

atively large city, and they used vulgarity in their everyday interactions .
We should also consider that in this world there are many
cultures and many concepts of what is acceptable sexual conduct, and of what sexual conduct may be the subject of free
and open discussion or publication in folklore or literature.
It may be impossible to impose one strict moral code on all
of society, and we may have to acquaint ourselves with, and
accept, without puritanical prudery, as natural to them, the
standars of others. ^2

Although the majority opinion made no explicit finding on the obscenity
issue (which was probably a close one)

,

it held that because there was

no disruption or impairment of discipline and no significant danger of

harm to the students, the teacher did not demonstrate "evident unfitness
for service."

This case represents an exceptionally protective approach to the

preservation of academic freedom.

It suggests, indirectly, that there
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is more to be considered than the offensiveness
of the language and that

what is obscene in one classroom may not be obscene in
another.

It per-

haps also suggests that even if the materials are obscene, they
represent, at most, one instance of poor judgment.

Imagine the dilemma faced

by this teacher, who had promised in advance to distribute student writing, only later discovering that it was offensive.

This is how the act-

ual teacher described the situation.
I could either say ’’This is vulgar language, it's dirty
writing, it's bad, you are bad, your writing is no good, I am
going to throw it out and I never want to see anything like
that again." I could say that and I think that would be the
ordinary teacher's response.
.
[B]ut I was in a class.
room day after day after day and fighting a fight that I was
losing and caring that I was losing it, and so I felt, "Well
I have to do something.
I have to somehow reach these kids.
..." And so I said, "I am willing to take a risk. I am
going to say to these kids "What you did is not evil. You
are not evil. The stuff you wrote is not evil, ..." I
felt for one day I had a classroom of kids that were reading
and writing as hard as they could and as fast as they
.^3
could. .
.

.

The California case considered above is exceptional because it considered the teacher's motivation.

In addition, it considered the ad-

verse effect on the students, the degree of such adversity, the extenuating or aggravating circumstances, the likelihood of a recurrence of
the questioned conduct, and the impact of the discipline on the consti-

tutional rights of the teacher involved and on other teachers.

44

These

are the kinds of considerations that are necessary if intellectual free-

dome is to be promoted in public schools.
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The Question of Academic Freedom

Academic freedom for elementary and secondary school teachers is
confined to the generalized free speech right to teach, to speak freely,
and to independently select at least some materials and methods for

classroom use.^^

The minority opinion appears to be that school boards

have complete authority to control not only the general content of every
course offered in school, but the selection of every piece of writing to
be read and every topic to be discussed.

Thus one court held that be-

cause the school board was responsible for courses of study, a teacher
could not conduct a debate on the subject of abortion.

46

In another

case, where a teacher challenged a state statute prohibiting instruction

or discussion of birth control, the court held that the teacher’s First

Amendment rights were not violated by the prohibition because the
teacher had no independent right to select subjects for instruction.

47

In addition, the teacher was prevented from raising the right of the

students to hear and to know by the judicial policy which denies standing to third party challengers.

Some important Supreme Court cases have

recently been decided on the question of standing, which would now allow
the
the argument to be made that teachers should be permitted to raise

constitutional rights of students.

Students will often lack the re-

sources and the motivation for a court challenge.

And by refusing to

for example,
discuss birth control in response to a student question,

student's right to know
the teacher is arguably being forced to deny the
as well as his or her own right to speak.

academic freedom rights
The almost absolute denial of independent
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to teachers has been followed in the less speech
protective line of

library cases as well.

Where librarians have joined students, parents,

and others to protest the removal of books from libraries

,

courts which

have considered the issue have generally held that librarians have no
independent First Amendment right to control the collection of the
library under the "rubric of academic freedom.

This dichotomous

approach, which grants authority to one group and denies authority to
another, can be sharply contrasted with a growing number of cases since
1969 which contributes to the developing consensus that teachers have

some measure of academic freedom.
In the earliest case Keefe v. Geanakos

,

the First Circuit held that

the conduct of the plaintiff teacher in assigning a controversial article from the

Atlantic Monthly to his senior English class was protected

as a matter of academic freedom.

"vulgar

terra for an

Although the article contained a

incestuous son," the court found it to be a "valu-

able discussion of dissent, protest, radicalism and revolt.

It was

not pornographic, obscene, or shocking, and the objectionable words were

not used gratuitously.

Although some parents may have been offended,

the court admonished the school board that the sensibilities of parents

were "not the full measure of what is proper education."

52

The next important federal court case to base its holding on the
academic freedom of a teacher was Parducci v. Rutland

.

The case sub-

stantively clarified the meaning of the term "academic freedom.
of the
’’Although academic freedom is not one of the enumerated rights
emphasized
First Amendment, the Supreme Court has on numerous occasions
study is
that the right to teach, to inquire, to evaluate and to

b
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fundamental to a democratic society.

The court continues by giving

the quote from Keyishian with which the chapter opened.

"Our nation is

deeply committed to safe-guarding academic freedom, which is of transcendant value to all of us and not merely to the teachers concerned.

That freedom is therefore a special concern of the First Amendment,

which does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the
classroom.

In affirming the right of a teacher who had assigned

Kurt Vonnegut's story, "Welcome to the Monkey House," to her eleventh

grade English classes, the court said that "the safeguards of the First

Amendment, will quickly be brought into play to protect the right of

academic freedom because any unwarranted invasion of this right will
tend to have a chilling effect on the exercise of the right by other
teachers.

The court used the material and substantial interference

test as a guideline in determining the extent of the teacher's right.
It found that there was no interference with the orderly atmosphere of

the school setting and no invasion of the rights of other students.

In

addition, the court determined that the story would not interfere with
the emotional development of the students because it was neither in-

appropriate nor obscene.

The story presented no social danger because

nothing illegal was advocated.

And there was no danger to intellectual

development because no attempt had been made to propagandize.

The dis-

missal was held to violate the First Amendment rights of the teacher.

Academic freedom has also been used by courts to protect a high
of a play
school drama coach from dismissal for allowing the production

with drinking scenes and vulgarity;

to protect a student teacher who

and approved
made "unorthodox" statements saying that he was agnostic

1
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the Darwinian theory; 58 to prohibit the dismissal of a Catholic
priest

who read an autobiographical story recounting the funeral of a student
who died of a heroin overdose and which contained a "slang expression
for an incestuous son;" 59 and prevented school officials from attempting
to restrict a teacher's use of Catcher in the Rye .^^

Some courts prefer the more traditional language of freedom of

speech or expression, but regardless of the language used, a teacher's
right to teach has often been protected.

Thus, a teacher was permitted

to invite additional speakers to a political science class to represent

diverse views.

And a high school civics instructor was protected

when, in response to student questions, he said that he did not oppose

interracial marriages.

62

This teacher believed that it was not possible

to teach seniors about current events without discussing controversial

issues such as repression of anti-war dissent in the armed forces

race relations.

,

and

The court balanced the rights of the teacher with

educational needs.

A teacher's methods are not without limits. Teachers
occupy a unique position of trust in our society, and they
must handle such trust and the instruction of young people
with great care. On the other hand, a teacher must not be
manacled with rigid regulations, which preclude full adaption of the course to the times in which we live.®^
But academic freedom, even where recognized, will not protect all

teacher speech in the classroom, as is illustrated by the following
two cases.
In the case of Carey v.

Board of Education , a United States Dis-

importance of academic
trict Court judge eloquently discussed the vital
freedom.*'^

L

teacher
After arguing for the relative importance of the

3^
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employee compared to employees in the private sector based
upon the nature of the product (e.g. automobiles versus well-educated
students),
the judge ignored the importance of the distinction.

Thus a teacher may bargain away the freedom to communicate in
her official role in the same manner as an editorial writer
who agrees to write the views of a publisher or an actor who
contracts to speak the author's script. One can for consideration, agree to teach according to direction.
,

Judge Marsh viewed the prohibited use of certain books for eleventh and
twelfth grade elective courses as a simple contracts case.

He held

that because of a collective bargaining agreement the teachers had bar-

gained away their right to participate in the selection of curricular
materials.
But for the bargained agreement, the plaintiffs would
prevail here. The selection of the subject books as material
for these elective courses in these grades is clearly within
the protected area recognized as academic freedom.
Because of the bargained agreement the plaintiffs' claim
must be denied. Whatever may be the scope of the protection
of the First and Fourteenth Amendments for a freedom to
communicate with students directly in classroom speech or
indirectly through reading assignments, such protection does
not present a legal impediment to the freedom to contract.
.

.

.

This is an astonishing conclusion after several pages replete with dicta
about academic freedom and the beneficial effects of protecting intell-

ectual freedom in the schools.

Even if freedom of communication is a

permissible subject for negotiation, the holding that it can be completely given up by either party is certainly subject to question.

The

problem with allowing teachers to bargain away this right is that it
also interferes with the right of the students to know.
free speech rights are of a reciprocal nature.

First Amendment

It is arguably against

public policy to permit the waiver of another's rights in the
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circiimstances of this case.
In the other case where teacher rights were not protected
although

academic freedom was recognized, a black high school teacher was dis-

missed after having taught for fifteen years.

His dismissal was

based on the following statements:
Integration in churches and classrooms came recently, but in
bed for a long time because if a white man wanted a little
loving he would go across the tracks.

The black man has had the idea that only white women could
love adequately because of picture shows. Until recently
there were no black women in movies.
Black girls have more illegitimate children because they
can't afford to have anything done as white girls do.

Obscenity and vulgarity are needed to motivate people.

68

One can readily admit that the teacher's right to academic freedom is
not absolute, and still question the summary dismissal of this teacher.
"We believe that the findings noted above are examples of acts which

need no regulation to define their indecorum."

69

The case suggests the

question of whether or not the right to academic freedom and freedom of

expression in the classroom can be overcome by the mere assertion that
speech was improper or indecorous.

If this case were typical, free

speech would not long remain in the preferred position it has generally

been given.
There are, of course, legitimate limitations to the teacher's free
dom of expression in the classroom.

"The teacher's liberty is not a

freedom,
license, either as formalized authority or as an undisciplined

required to achieve
and limitations on the manner of its exercise are
^
the purpose of academic freedom."

Teachers cannot falsely shout

143

£ire

in the classroon.

They cannot interfere in any other way with

the physical safety of the students --they cannot advocate violence, for
example.

And teachers also have the duty to promote the social and emo-

tional growth of the students

,

so that the advocacy of noncooperative

and illegal acts can generally be prohibited.

In addition, since the

teachers have the primary duty to protect the process of intellectual

exchange itself, they must not do anything that would deny the students
the fundamental opportunity for intellectual growth.

Some limitations

are necessary to achieve the primary purpose of academic freedom itself.

There are two major ways that the process of intellectual freedom
could be thwarted by the teacher.

It could be thwarted passively by

simply not teaching the prescribed course content, or actively by pros-

elytizing or indoctrinating.

Since propagandistic materials, if used

for indoctrination, would stifle free communication and be inimical to
the development of free intellect, they could properly be excluded.

A closely related concern is that teachers not use the classroom as a
And whatever the subject

springboard for their personal criticism.

matter involved, several cases suggest that the materials should be relevant to a legitimate educational objective and not inconsistent with
the general purpose of a course.

These cases represent a concern that

there not be a substantial interference with the intellectual development of the students.

As it was colorfully stated by one court, the

teacher is not ’’invested by the Constitution with
teach politics in a course in economics.

[a]

right.

.

.

'to

,,,74

discuss subThis does not mean, however, that a teacher can never

jects of general political or social concern.

Where teachers were

\

I

.
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prohibited from answering student questions regarding negotiations,
the court held that their First Amendment speech rights were being

violated absent a showing that a material and substantial interference would result.

75

Another court had a similar opinion.

[I]nvoluntary restrictions on the individual liberty of
teachers and students to communicate, directly or indirectly,
where such open expression is consistent with attained level
of educational development, are matters of constitutional
concern

Academic freedom, in the sense of the freedom to teach and to discuss a wide variety of issues with students, has been comprehensively

protected by many courts in

flhe

post- Tinker period.

When freedom of

communication is not protected by school officials or courts, it often
appears to be because the desire for order or absence of controversy
has been allowed to obscure its vital role in the process of intellectual development itself.

To legitimately prohibit or interrupt speech

in elementary or secondary schools, a showing of substantial inter-

ference with the legitimate objectives of education in a democratic

society should be required.

Due Process for Teachers

Although several important cases have established that teachers
who have property rights (contract or tenure) or liberty rights (good
name or reputation) are entitled to a hearing before dismissal,
is not the subject of this section.

this

The issue here is whether or not

or property if the
it is reasonable to deprive a teacher of liberty
he engaged in
teacher had no notice or reason to know that the activity

might legitimately be considered inappropriate.

Several cases from the
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early 1970 ’s evidence a concern that teacher speech be protected
in

borderline cases where there have been no standards for guidance and
where the speech is not patently unprotected.

Although the motivation

in these cases is partly to insure participation and accuracy in dis-

missal or demotion proceedings, the primary purpose of this due process

protection is to preserve the fundamental right of intellectual freedom.
This exclusively procedural protection is afforded to a
teacher not because he is a state employee, or because he is
a citizen, but because in his teaching capacity he is engaged in the exercise of what may plausibly be considered
’’vital First Amendment rights." [citations omitted] 78

The earliest case to deal extensively with this issue was Parducci
V.

Rutland

,

where the teacher's right to academic freedom was held to

justify her use of Kurt Vonnegut's "Welcome to the Monkey House," which
had been considered by the principal to be "literary garbage."

79

The

court was concerned about what it called a "total absence of standards"

by which a teacher could know what conduct was proscribed.
Our laws in this country have long recognized that no
person should be punished for conduct unless such conduct
has been proscribed in clear and precise terms. When the
conduct being punished involves First Amendment rights, as
is the case here, the standards for judging peraissible
vagueness will be even more strictly applied.
The court went on to observe that valid educational interests would not
be served by allowing school administrators "unfettered discretion to

decide how the First Amendment rights of teachers are to be exercised.
in the classIt emphasized the chilling effect on intellectual freedom

room that such unlimited discretion would have.
conduct is
When a teacher is forced to speculate as to what
to be
permissible and what conduct is proscribed, he is apt
Such a reoverly cautious and reserved in the classroom.
and exinvestigate
to
luctance on the part of the teacher

L

81
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periment with new and different ideas is anathema to the
entire concept of academic freedom. 82

The next important 'case on this issue, Mailloux v. Kiley

,

held that

because the teacher's conduct in explaining the concept of taboo by

writing a four- letter word on the board was ’’within standards responsibly, although not universally recognized, and.

.

.

he acted in good

faith and without notice,” his dismissal would be a violation of due

process.

83

The lesson of the Parducci and Mailloux cases has been

heeded by several other courts.

84

Because of the importance of academic

freedom to the process of education, where the teacher's speech activity

arguably falls within standards recognized as reasonable, it should be

protected unless there was notice to the contrary.
The above rule of law has two important corollaries.

First, it is

not necessary to have a rule in all cases in order to give notice of the

unprotected nature of teacher speech activity
Keefe v. Geanakos

,

.

As the court said in

"It does not follow that a teacher may not be on

notice of impropriety from the circumstances of a case without the necessity of a regulation.

Although this is undoubtedly true, the Keefe

case does not say which speech activity is so obviously inappropriate
that prior notice would not be needed.

It is probable that speech which

and speech which
has been traditionally unprotected, such as obscenity,

would not have to
would create a material and substantial interference

be proscribed by a specific rule.
any regulations
The second corollary to the above rule is that

unprotected teacher speech
which are promulgated to define protected and

must meet constitutional standards.

If this is true, one wonders, by
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analogy to the attempts to establish rules for prior review of the
student press, whether or not such regulation of teacher speech is

either possible or necessary.

The point is that it may not be con-

stitutionally or practically possible to proscribe teacher speech other
than that which is unprotected by Chap 1 insky and Tinker

.

And that

speech which is unprotected by Chap 1 insky and Tinker is very likely just
the sort of speech for which written prohibition is unnecessary.

The effect of the line of cases requiring that teachers be put on

notice in borderline cases as a matter of due process certainly has the
potential to protect academic freedom.

The problem, as always, is that

the use of precedent can be perverted.

A case which illustrates this

especially well is the recently discussed case where the black teacher

with fifteen years teaching experience was fired for statements he made
to his high school class about interracial sex, illegitimacy among poor

black girls, and the social need for profanity and vulgarity.

87

The

court cited the Keefe case for the proposition that "a classroom teacher,

merely by the nature of that position, should be aware of the impropriety of some practices.

It then asserted the impropriety without

analysis. "We believe that the findings noted above are examples of
acts which need no regulation to define their indecorum.

89

a regWhile it may very well be true that there was no need for

for a constiulation in the above case, there certainly was a need

tutional justification for dismissal.

In an apparent attempt to just-

First Amendment
ify the summary nature of the conclusion regarding

rights, the court cited the Tinker case.
schools are of great
While the First Amendment rights in the
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importance, [citation^ omitted] the right of free speech is
not absolute, but is limited by state re^latory control
that is not unreasonable or irrational ^0
.

But the Tinker case stands for the proposition that in order to reg-

ulate in the First Amendment area, where important intellectual freedom
rights are concerned, what is reasonable must meet a very high standard.

The due process cases considered in this section recognize the importance of these rights.

The Teacher's Freedom of Speech:

Protected and Not Protected

One of the most quoted passages of the Tinker decision is the asser-

tion that "[i]t can hardly be argued that either students or teachers
shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at

the schoolhouse gate."

91

But despite this dictum , a teacher was dis-

charged for his action in wearing a black armband to class to protest
the war in Vietnam.

The dismissal was justified by the belief that

the expression of political views was not appropriate in a public school.

Perhaps not surprisingly, a federal court of appeals held that the First

Amendment protected the teacher's action.

Any limitation on the exercise of constitutional rights can be
justified only by a conclusion, based upon reasonable inferences flowing from concrete facts and not abstractions, that
the interests of discipline or sound education are materially
and substantially jeopardized, whether the danger stems initially from the conduct of students or teachers.^
no
The court commented on the fact that there had been no proselytizing,

deliterious effect on teaching, and no disruption.

In addition, it

issues was
voiced the opinion that the discussion of controversial

necessary to the educational process.
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Along with students, and despite some additional considerations,
teachers are also protected in their right not to speak.
even though their actions may be controversial.

This is true

Where a teacher was

discharged because of a refusal to participate in the pledge, a court
ordered reinstatement.
.

.
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"[T]he right to remain silent in the face of

.

illegitimate demand for silence.

...” 95

Here again the court noted

that this was a passive action on the part of the teacher.

There was

no attempt to proselytize, and tenth grade students would not be un-

duly influenced by the action.

In addition, the court felt that con-

troversy was not to be dreaded in classroom situations.

By protecting

controversy, these courts, like the Supreme Court in Tinker, recognize
that our national strength derives from our "relatively permissive,

often disputatious, society.
In another case where controversy was central, school authorities

had created a forum for the speech of teachers and others on a wide va-

riety of issues.

Despite the invitation to open discussion, a teacher

was transferred for speaking on the dress and grooming code, the outside speaker policy, and the school paper.

The punishment was effected

for the creation of "disharmony and friction."

But this court, too,

and
protected controversial speech in the public school environment

nullified the transfer.
adminPriorities place constitutional rights above unlimited
Disharmony
istrative authority to act in their derrogation.
of a society
and friction are the healthy but natural results
subject and
which cherishes the right to speak freely on a
individual
prevent
these resultant by-products should never
penalized for such
from speaking or cause that individual to be
protections that
speech. Any attempt to do so abrogates the
the First Amendment affords to all.^^

^

.
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Teachers are protected not only from discharge, but from any other
significant punishment, when they are exercising their constitutional
rights.

And their constitutional rights do not end where controversy

begins

Where teachers themselves are not engaged in controversial speech
but are advising students engaged in press activities, for example,

they apparently get First Amendment protection derivatively.

Where a

teacher encouraged an honors English class to publish a paper outside
of school even though the principal was ’’quite opposed" to underground
papers because they tend to "deteriorate," the teacher's contract was
not renewed.
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The paper, called Catharsis

,

contained several short

articles on sexual equality, football, free press, and ecological

issues--hardly evidence of deterioration.

But whether or not the paper

would "tend to degenerate," since it was a legitimate and constitutionally protected activity, the teacher's acts of assistance and association were held permitted by the First Amendment.

The other side of this issue is that teachers can also be held

responsible for the press activities of students under their control.
Where a teacher was dismissed for allowing an article to appear which

criticized the disciplinary actions of certain teachers— the "Old.Meany
evidence
Master" article— the court held that the lack of censorship was

of incompetence.^®^

The court considered the Tinker case, deciding that

permitted because
personal attacks on members of the faculty were not
interference with discipline
they would create a material and substantial
and a collision with the rights of others.

Because the conclusion here

"undifferentiated fear," it
was arguably based on nothing more than

ISl

I

illustrates that the derivative First Amendment protection is beneficial

only to the extent that courts are willing to place intellectual freedom
in a preferred position.

The final case in this section, one of the few to arise in the elementary school context, illustrates the extreme repression of student
and teacher speech by some school administrators.

A second grade teach-

er with twenty- five years of experience was discharged for allowing a

student to write a letter to the school cafeteria requesting raw carrots;
for showing the principal student cartoons showing wilted flowers as a

protest against a broken water fountain; and for voicing concern about
an open incinerator in the middle of the playground.

A Federal Dis-

trict Court in Arkansas held that the teacher had a First Amendment

right to engage in all of these activities.

Conclusion

Teacher freedom of speech in the classroom and the corresponding
rights of students to know have been given increased protection by the

growing recognition of a generalized right to academic freedom.

Al-

though academic freedom for the teacher may not provide any additional
reciFirst Amendment rights, the new terminology has connotations of

encouragprocity and interaction which are especially appropriate for
ing intellectual freedom in an educational context.

be limited
Teacher freedom, of course, is not absolute and may

interference with the learnwhere it creates a material and substantial
ing environment.

Beyond this, it can be argued that an expanded

would help courts to balance
material and substantial interference test

(
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freedom of speech for teachers with the state's interest in promoting
the emotional, social and intellectual development of students.

For

example, non-disruptive teacher speech which advocates disobedience to

school rules or which involves indoctrination is ill-suited to prohib-

ition by the traditional Tinker disruption limitation.

An expanded

material and substantial interference test might be useful in situations
such as these which do not look toward the protection of the learning

environment so much as toward the promotion of student growth.
An expanded test could also be helpful when dealing with the sensitive issues of sex education, sex-related language, and sexual preferences of teachers.

The question would be whether the speech activity

would have a material and substantial negative effect on the emotional
or social development of students.
and clearly unprotected.

The issue of obscenity is separable

While what is obscene for minors is difficult

to define apart from a contextual situation, it appears from the cases

that teacher speech which is legally obscene is almost non-existent.

The role of the collective bargaining process in promoting in-

tellectual freedom is an emerging issue.

For the immediate future,

courts which interpret state legislation as granting complete curricissues
ular control to school boards can be expected to view curricular
as impermissible subjects of bargaining.

In states where these issues

limits which
are bargainable, courts will need to define constitutional
\^ill

assure the protection of the students' right to learn.
intellectual freeThe last major post- Tinker development to affect

especially speech-protective
dom in the classroom is the emergence of an

notion of due process for teachers.

It is applicable where teachers
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have engaged in speech-related activities that, while not clearly protected, are not amenable to easy analysis and disapproval under the

Giapl insky or Tinker doctrines.

In these cases, in order for teachers

to be punished for engaging in speech-related activities, they must

have clear notice that their behavior has been validly proscribed.

It

is the protection of academic freedom that has provided major impetus

for the judicially created notion of a special First Amendment due

process right.

In borderline cases, fairness to the individual arguably

requires such a result as a matter of principle, and the protection of

academic freedom requires such a result as a matter of public policy.

CHAPTER

VI

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

We are free only if we know, and so in proportion to our
knowledge. There is no freedom without choice, and there
is no choice without knowledge,— or none that is not illusory.
Implicit, therefore, in the very notion of liberty is the
liberty of the mind to absorb and to beget.

Judge Benjamin Cardozo
Paradoxes of Legal Science (1928)

The humanitarian instincts of the first half of the twentieth century led to much needed reform in the way our society dealt with children and other less competent or mature individuals.

While it is un-

doubtedly true that children are especially needful of protection, it is
also important to remember that children grow more and more competent as

they mature socially, emotionally, and intellectually.

The special

importance of Tinker v. Des Moines, more important than the holding or
the Tinker test, is that the majority recognized and reasserted a philo-

sophy toward children which respects their individuality and uniqueness
as people.^

Although a great many people throughout the first half of the century believed that children were properly subject to almost complete
control by their parents and the state, the Tinker court denied that

assumption by asserting the personhood of children.

’’Students in school

They are

as well as out of school are ’persons' under our Constitution.

possessed of fundamental rights which the State must respect.

,t2
.

.

.

the
The majority opinion of Tinker is a powerful reminder that neither

authority with
state nor the parents of a child can exercise unfettered
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regard to the children under their control.

Even though children are

less mature than most adults, they still deserve respect as human beings

and they still have fundamental constitutional rights.

The concurring opinion of Justice Stewart in the Tinker case represents

an alternative point of view.

It illustrates a major philo-

sophical difference of opinion between him and the Tinker majority with

regard to student rights.

Justice Stewart bemoans what he feels is the

"Court’s uncritical assumption that.

.

.

the First Amendment rights of

children are co-extensive with those of adults.''^

He believes that

because children are not "possessed of that full capacity for individual
Of course, from

choice" their rights must necessarily be more limited.
a practical point of view this is often true.

they can't marry at any age they choose.

Children can't vote and

But Justice Stewart would ap-

parently limit the rights of children in theory as well as in practice,
and this limitation would have profound consequences.

The Tinker majority began with the philosophical assumption that

children are persons who deserve the protection of fundamental constitutional rights.

This more libertarian philosophical assumption assures

that any limitation of the rights of children in particular situations

will require adequate justification.

"In the absence of a specific show-

speech, students
ing of constitutionally valid reasons to regulate their

are entitled to freedom of expression of their views."

Ginsberg v. New York

,

4

Even the case of

which influenced Justice Stewart, held only that

obscenity in context.
the state had the power to define prohibited

And

dissemination to minors, the
since the context in that case involved the
the particular situation.
determination of obscenity was adjusted to meet

1S6

The point is that the principles remain the same.

Even though the power

of the state to control the behavior of minors goes beyond
its power to
control adults, that proposition is not a statement of principle
and it
is not self -executing.

assumptions.

Judgments have to be made based upon principled

And the assiamption that is most congruent with our liberal,

democratic values as expressed in the Constitution is that children are

possessed of fundamental rights which must be respected.

As their right

to speak, for example, is adjusted to accord with the special character-

istics and needs of the school environment. Justice Stewart's simple

assertion that children don't have the same rights as adults do will

not be adequate justification.

Constitutionally sufficient reasons will

have to be given to validate the denial of a student's fundamental rights.

Contrary to implications that can be drawn from Justice Stewart's
opinion, the Tinker majority does not argue that students should be able
to exercise their speech rights in exactly the same way as adults gener-

ally may.

The majority recognizes that the special needs of the school's

learning environment and the fact that students constitute a captive

audience will require the making of unique adjustments.

But the basic

assiomption of the Tinker court is that all persons have fundamental

rights.

And it is this assiomption rather than the one often derived from

Justice Stewart's opinion that best accords with the liberal belief in
human dignity and equality.
In addition to asserting that students are persons and that they

have rights, the Tinker majority reasserted the rights of teachers as
human beings and as citizens.

Just as it had been assumed that students

that
had few if any rights while in school; it had long been assumed

1S7

teachers, by virtue of their occupational status, had
fewer rights as
well.

In a statement that has been repeated in scores of
teacher rights

cases the Court in Tinker declared:

"It can hardly be argued that ei-

ther students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to
freedom of
speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate."^
ers have the right to speak

out— to

Both students and teach-

give their opinion— on a wide varie-

ty of controversial social and political issues.

They may talk about

war, about abortion, and about evolution, as long as the expression does

not fall outside of the realm of protected speech and as long as there
is no substantial interference with the school's learning activities.

And this assertion of rights has been generalized to protect fundamental

teacher rights in addition to speech as well.
The students also have an emerging right to know, which supports and
enlarges the teacher's right to speak.

And they have a right to privacy

which imposes special obligations on teachers and other school officials
to carefully weigh the various interests involved before engaging in

speech activities.

This can be accomplished in the more typical situa-

tions by looking to speech which has been traditionally unprotected,
as defined by Chap 1 insky (obscenity, defamation, and fighting words), or

by asking whether the speech is likely to create a material and substantial interference with good order and discipline, as has been prohibited

by Tinker.^

But where speech which potentially threatens the emotional,

social, or intellectual development of students rather than the peace of

the learning environment is involved, it can be argued that the Tinker

competing
test will have to be extended to allow proper consideration of
rights.

make
Indeed, there is evidence that the courts are beginning to
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these more inclusive applications.

The types of situations where an extended application of the
Tinker
text would be most useful involve, for example, the distribution
of an

anonymous survey on student attitudes toward sex and the use of short
stories with ’’sophisticated" language or themes.

Although these sit-

uations will not threaten peace and good order, they may threaten or

appear to threaten the emotional development of students.
be easy to resolve these issues.

It will not

Non-material concerns are subject to

less exact measurement than material disruptions.

And there is less

agreement among educators and psychological experts as to what would
amount to a substantial interference with the emotional or social de-

velopment of students.

But the preservation of intellectual freedom

requires that flexible standards be developed and implemented.

Even if

the Tinker test was not initially created for application to situations

other than those which threaten physical disruption, the general import
of the decision would require that all restrictions be accompanied by

substantial justification, not a mere assertion of reasonableness.

And

because the protection of intellectual freedom in a public or semi-

public forum dedicated to teaching and learning is of special importance,
the general presumption must always favor freedom of expression and

intercommunication.

There is even more at stake in these cases than

important individual rights.

The interests protected by the First

Amendment speech provisions have both individual and social relevance.
We all benefit from an intellectually free and capable citizenry.

have
These dual interests for the protection of free communication
levels in
been recognized and given special support by courts at all

159

about half of the well over a hundred cases considered
in this paper.

This speech protectiveness does not appear to be the province of
any
one state, or of any one district or circuit.

It could plausibly be

suggested that the spirit of the Tinker case has permeated all sections

of the country, at least to the extent that half of the cases concerning
intellectual freedom in public schools seem to rely on its egalitarian
and speech-protective philosophical approach.

On the other hand, and by contrast to this relatively high level

of protectiveness, about a quarter of the cases considered show very
little inclination on the part of the courts to protect either speech

or individual rights.

They show too little appreciation of speech

values, and excessive deference to the overly paternalistic and pro-

tective judgment of school officials.

As has been noted previously

the facts of many cases suggest that school officials frequently over-

react in situations where controversial speech is concerned, evidencing
a desire to maintain perhaps unreasonably high levels of order and control.

In addition, the existence of blanket prohibitions and prior re-

view policies, for example, tend to suggest possible undue paternalism.
When courts decline to intervene in these situations, they frequently
cite the following language from the Supreme Court case of Epperson v.

Arkansas:

"Courts do not and cannot intervene in the resolution of con-

flicts which arise in daily operation of school systems and which do

not directly and sharply implicate basic constitutional values."

g

When

of
the courts show less judicial deference with regard to decisions
case:
public school officials, they cite this language from the same

school
Judicial interposition in the operation of the public

^
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system of the Nation raises problems requiring care and
restraint.
Our courts, however, have not failed to apply
^he First Amendment's mandate in our educational system
where essential to safeguard the fundamental values of
freedom of speech and inquiry and of belief.

A lack of appreciation for the function and importance of freedom
of communication in public education is shown by the courts in various
ways.

They often ignore or fail to appreciate that speech issues are

involved.

They claim that a regulation of speech is reasonable with no

regard for the high level of preference given to the fundamental right
of free communication.

Or they circumvent the spirit of the First Amend-

ment and the Tinker decision in other ways.

While the large number of

cases which are relatively speech-protective may be encouraging, it

could be argued that the cases where student or teacher speech has been

protected involve unusually blatant violations of constitutional rights,
thereby artificially inflating the percentage of speech-protective cases.
On the other hand, these cases might never have come to court in the pre-

Tinker period.

But while the effect of Tinker can be debated, the fact

that a quarter of the cases show almost total disregard for the funda-

mental rights of students and teachers indicates that there is a great
deal more to be done to encourage an optimal level of protection for

intercommunication in educational settings.
During the course of this investigation several issues have arisen

which seem worthy of extensive individual treatment in the future.

Some

of them would involve quasi -empirical or historical research and some

would involve the construction of theoretical, constitutional arguments.
and
The possibilities for further study, therefore, are both theoretical

some
applied; and while they all involve issues of law and education,
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are more educational in nature and some more legal.

A major issue which suggests itself for consideration is how to

balance the rights of students inter se.

This will involve deciding

which students are entitled to exercise their rights when they conflict
with the rights of other students; and it will involve determinations as
to whether or not a particular right will have to yield so that school

officials can promote either a conflicting right in the same individual
or the general welfare of another student or group of students.

Once

fundamental legal rights of students have been authoritatively established, the problem of judicial balancing in a particular case involves

educational and psychological issues in addition to primarily legal ones.

The case where students wanted to collect and publish information on
student views regarding human sexuality is a good example of the need
for this type of information in a situation where several rights were
in potential conflict.

The student researchers had a right to gather

and disseminate information, and other students had a right either to

receive information or to be left alone.

Since school officials have

a duty to promote the fundamental rights of students as well as to

promote their general welfare in other ways, it is they who must determine initially how to resolve these types of conflicts.

Even though

free
fundamental constitutional rights such as those protected by the

of school officspeech provisions are given preference, the decisions

reflect a consideration of
ials, and ultimately of courts, will have to

when these rights
various social issues in addition to legal principles
conflict.

threatening
Whether the questionnaire would provide a non-

concerns and to exchange
opportunity for students to think about sexual
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views, or whether it would provide the stimulus for
emotional injury

can only be decided by considering educational and psychological
evidence.

An important issue for educational and psychological research

is to determine how principles of learning theory and information
about

child development can be used to effectuate an appropriate balance in
these types of situations.

An important issue for legal consideration

is to determine the extent to which third parties, such as teachers

and administrators, will be given standing to assert the constitutional

rights of students.

A related problem involves the same educational and psychological
issues considered above.

Because children are persons, a reasonable

justification must be provided when their intellectual freedom is curtailed in a way that would be constitutionally impermissible for adults.
Legal issues are mixed with social issues.

Why is it, for example, that

we do not permit the legal dissemination of obscenity in our culture?
Is it possible or reasonable to define what is obscene for minors in the

context of the subculture of the minors themselves?

If so, can this

type of reasoning be used to build a constitutional justification for

limiting the exposure of children to indecent speech?
to be defined?

not for adults?

How is indecent

Should indecent speech be prohibited for children and
For children in school only?

What is the particular

justification?
substanIt has been suggested previously that if the material and

situations where
tial interference test of Tinker were extended to cover

appeared to be
the emotional, social or intellectual growth of students
guidance for
threatened, it might usefully provide the necessary
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assessing whether nonna.lly protected speech should be held unprotected
in the school situation.

In the public park, for example, citizens can

constitutionally be exposed to propagandistic and vulgar speech.

There

it is the duty of the citizens to absent themselves if they desire to

avoid indecent speech or speech which advocates violence.

It is because

students are not adult citizens and do not have the right to absent

themselves from public school that the educational situation is unique.
The major criticism that could be made of the proffered extension

of the Tinker test to cover these more difficult situations is that the
test is vague.

What types of materials would be likely to create a ma-

terial and substantial interference with student emotional

intellectual development?

,

social

,

or

But like all multi-purpose constitutional

tools, the vagueness is both necessary and purposeful.

Educational and

psychological theory, applied within a principled legal framework, will
still be needed to resolve problems that arise in particular school

situations.

Another relatively general problem to be investigated is the issue
of intellectual freedom vs. indoctrination or whether the marketplace of
ideas model is to be preferred in public education to the values inculca-

tion approach.

There is a strong strand in the legal literature that

transviews the function of schooling almost exclusively as that of

mission of knowledge.

In a Harvard Law Review article which is clearly

of education
pre-Tinker in tone, the assertion is made that one function
knowledge and values.
is indoctrinative— the transmission of

Because

conclusion is reached
children are not fully mature intellectually, the

relevance to speech in
that the free speech clause "is of questionable
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public elementary or secondary school classrooms.

The article has

exerted a great deal of influence and continues to be extensively cited
in the post- Tinker period.

Another commentator, for example, argues

that the marketplace of ideas model
the prescriptive model

— is

— or

the analytic model as opposed to

not constitutionally compelled and that the

"deliberate inculcation of the right societal values" is supported by
history.

While it is true that one purpose of education is to trans-

mit societal knowledge of facts and values ; in a liberal

,

democratic

society this transmission is not properly authoritarian, prescriptive,
or doctrinaire.

The transmission of values should arguably alternate

with an analytic approach if intellectual freedom is to be protected
and if the child’s capacity for independent, creative thinking is to

be fully developed.

The student's right to know will mean little if the underlying
educational theory accords inordinate weight to the prescriptive as

opposed to the analytic.

It will also mean less to the extent that

the school’s learning environment is not made full and rich by the

views of outside speakers j by views expressed on buttons, bumper stickinto
ers , and banners j and by views from the outside community brought

the school by petitions, books, and leaflets.

Educational and legal

the
arguments need to be elaborated which would deny school officials

circmstances
right to enact and enforce total bans except in unusual
and for limited periods.

It can be argued that a long-term ban on

respected status, should be
buttons, rather than achieving an especially

especially suspect.

unable
A captive audience, immature, to some extent

from an exchange of particular ideas
to defend itself, forever precluded
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or from making assertions by wearing ever-popular buttons, is a
con-

stitutional anomoly.

Similar educational and legal principles should arguably limit
state or local school board authority with regard to curricular development, the selection of textbooks, and the selection of library materials.

That is, because the First and Fourteenth Amendments limit

all state action with regard to intellectual freedom, it must be true

that there is an outer limit to the scope of state control over the

intellectual life of the student.

"In our system, students may not be

regarded as closed-circuit recipients of only that which the State
chooses to communicate."

12

Some cases suggesting that the state could exert complete control

over the curriculum have involved teacher attempts to secure a voice in

curriculum development (or school board attempts to limit that involvement) through provisions in collective bargaining agreements.

Whether

or not the limited, bilateral model of collective bargaining is an

appropriate forum for resolving educational policy issues of such im-

portance is open to question.

But even if academic freedom can be

promoted by the mutual agreement of school boards and teacher groups
without conflicting with state labor laws or with the U.

S.

Constitu-

tion, some additional mechanism may need to be developed to insure that
a variety of other groups are heard.

public
The problem of the limit to state authority with regard to

education is primarily legal.

The question will be whether or not per-

with which to
suasive constititutional arguments can be developed
not be a matter
counter the following type of assertion. "[I]t should
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Emendmen't concern if a school system were to determine that
it wanted to control, as far as possible, all inputs into a student's

learning process while he is in school.

.

.

While it is certainly

true that state officials have comprehensive authority with regard to
the education of children, that authority must nevertheless be exercised

with due regard for the constitutional rights of the students.

At a

minimum, the First Amendment prohibits the type of indoctrination in-

visioned here.

After fundamental constitutional rights have been guaranteed, the
limits of state action defined, and overbroad and standardless delegation

curtailed, the next task would be to develop the educational means for

broad-based participation in curricular development.

This should argu-

ably be an on-going process which would involve teachers, librarians,

other professional educators, school board members, parents, and students.

Because the personal interest of individual students and par-

ents, while important and necessary, is relatively transient, school

boards should arguably rely on professional educators to provide con-

tinuity and much of the long-term planning.

To deny a professionally

trained librarian, for example, the right to participate in the development of a school library is probably unconstitutional and surely

educationally unwise.
unique.

But each area of educational planning will be

Different groups will be involved to a greater or lesser ex-

is required
tent as the need for a broader, more general perspective

becomes necessary.
or as the need for greater professional expertise
and cooperation will
Good procedures for allowing optimal participation

derive from experimentation.

But the state cannot be the lone
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participant in the decisionmaking process.

Better decisions will likely

be made to the extent that reasonable methods are developed which op-

timize the participation of various constituencies.

Another area which deserves in-depth investigation and treatment
concerns the issue of prior review of the student press.

Where permit-

ted, model prior review policies need to be developed which would serve

the legitimate educational objectives of prior review while at the same

time preserving the free press rights of students.

Studies should be

undertaken to determine whether prior review policies are more effective
than advisory systems in achieving an appropriate level of control of
the student press.

At present there appears to be much confusion among

school officials, teachers, and students as to what is constitutionally

subject to suppression and what is protectable speech.

This confusion

results in overreaction and an undue chilling of intellectual freedom.

A related issue involves the question of whether or not it is

especially important to protect individuals from defamation in the
school environment— whether or not defamation in school could be said
to have the potential for irreparable injury.

If it is students who

perpetrate the defamation, they may not be financially able to pay
appropriate damages to the individuals defamed.

If it is captive and

vulnerable
immature students who are defamed, they may be particularly
to psychological injury.

Whether or not prior review policies are nec-

interests will only become
essary to protect this and other legitimate

clear after further experience and investigation.
suggested by this investiAnother line of research which has been
impact of the Tinker case on school
gation would involve studies of the
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administrators and school board members.

iVhether or not educators are

familiar with the decision and understand it, and whether or
not their

behavior conforms to the holding could be examined in practical settings.
It has also become apparent that the propositions of the
Tinker de-

cision itself have had a far-reaching effect on courts at all levels.

A

variety of children's rights cases from child abuse and child custody
cases to delinquency cases have cited the Tinker decision.

A detailed

examination of the impact of Tinker on children's rights in general
could also be undertaken.

And perhaps the most delicate problem for further investigation and

resolution concerns the appropriate balance when the First Amendment
rights of speech and religion conflict.

The values promoted by all as-

pects of the First Amendment must be carefully considered in each case
to provide the kinds of solutions that will foster true freedom of com-

munication and belief.
Freedom of intelligence is perhaps the only freedom of enduring
individual and social importance in our society.

To be intellectually

free is the means and the end of education in a democracy.

Because the

public school is dedicated to teaching and learning, it is even more
important to the development and preservation of intellectual freedom
than the great public forums of the street, the sidewalk, and the park.
It is this special purpose which makes the public school the most

sacrosanct public forum of all.

.
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